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Editorial
Globalization demands for setting up new cultural orientations.
Different traditions and forms of life struggle for recognition through-
out the world and have to meet the necessity of values and norms
with universal validity. Similarities and differences in understanding
the world have to be analyzed and recognized which requires a new
reflection on what it means to be a human being concerning its an-
thropological universality, but also its diverseness and changeability.
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new Humanism, which not only highlights humaneness in its cultu-
ral and historical varieties but also presents it as a transculturally va-
lid principle of human interaction in all cultural life-forms.
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It is an immense pleasure to see that the revised lectures delivered
at the international symposium Buddhism and Human Rights: The-
ory—Practice—Outlook that took place here in Hamburg in No-
vember 2008 have now been made accessible in printed form. The
Center for Buddhist Studies at Hamburg University is proud to
have been chosen to host the meeting and support the event in
various ways in cooperation with the project “Humanism in the
Era of Globalization — an Intercultural Dialogue on Culture,
Humanity and Values” at the Institute of Advanced Studies in the
Humanities (KWI) in Essen, Germany.
Promoting the kind of intellectual exchange that was facilitated
by this symposium by bringing together individuals from quite dif-
ferent fields and disciplines is desirable in many ways. Yet such
gatherings are far from common at academic institutions in Central
Europe. In the field of Buddhist Studies this observation rings par-
ticularly true, given that from its pioneering moments in the 19th
century until today the textual dimension of research on Buddhism
has dominated the field in Europe. Little attention has been paid to
Buddhism’s contemporary manifestations or its reactions to the
massive social and political challenges of the modern world across
Asia and the West. Consequently, one of the foremost aims of the
Center for Buddhist Studies at Hamburg is to address this trend
and function as a platform for cross-disciplinary dialogue involv-
ing all aspects of research on Buddhism. In this spirit, the title of
this volume, Buddhist Approaches to Human Rights, reflects a concern
with some the most urgent questions of our day: whether there is a
MICHAEL ZIMMERMANN
8
trans-cultural and universal entitlement to individual inviolability
and freedom; whether religious, doctrinal and ethical standards
promote such rights; and, whether this concept of individual enti-
tlement can and should be extended beyond human existence to
the realms of other living beings and even ecological systems such
as the earth itself. Certainly we cannot expect to find straightfor-
ward and ready-made answers to these challenging questions.
Buddhist traditions are manifold and their positions have devel-
oped and changed over the ages. Some of them have come under
the strong influence of Western ideas and practices, whereas others
have preserved the specific flavor of their origins.
Buddhism and Human Rights: Theory–Practice–Outlook was a first
attempt to become aware of this variety of positions and to reflect
on the role Buddhist ideas might or might not play in the political
landscape and the issue of human rights in modern Asia. Even if
one of the outcomes of this symposium was, in fact, the realization
that in many respects Buddhist thinkers over the centuries have not
been particularly interested in the political and social dimensions
of Buddhist teachings, it is nevertheless true that at the bottom of
the search for liberation  the central aim for all Buddhists  we
encounter the ideal of individual freedom from the bondage of
sa s ra. Many of the contributions included in this volume suggest
that this quest for liberation is not necessarily limited to an inner
psychological dimension but includes striving to be unimpeded by
outside factors as well. 
My thanks and deep appreciations go to the organizers of the sym-
posium, Carmen Meinert and Hans-Bernd Zöllner, both fellows at
the Center for Buddhist Studies at Hamburg University. It is due to
their commitment and tireless efforts that this symposium could
take shape and finally be realized. I am extremely grateful that the
fruits of their work is now available to the broader public.
MICHAEL ZIMMERMANN
Center for Buddhist Studies, Hamburg University 
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Introduction
CARMEN MEINERT AND HANS-BERND ZÖLLNER
In September 2007, not only human rights activists were shocked
when the protests of Buddhist monks in Myanmar against their
government — also composed of Buddhists — were brutally put
down. Some months later, Chinese soldiers forcibly suppressed
demonstrations by Tibetan monks. For the editors of this book,
both events provided the initial impulse to once more reflect upon
the relationship between Buddhism and human rights. How is it,
we asked, that there are obvious human rights violations in places
with such a long Buddhist tradition as Burma, China and Tibet?
A quick look into the literature on the theme showed that Bud-
dhism and human rights do not fit together as easily as conven-
tional wisdom might assume. Both realms have their own reason-
ing — a particular non–theistic religious reasoning, and a secular
reasoning, respectively. Whereas the former is based on 2500 years
of traditions that developed in various Buddhist schools and are
even within Asia embedded (or not embedded) in at least ten dif-
ferent legal systems, the latter is often referred to as a result of a cer-
tain breaking with traditional cultures and is thus described as a
phenomenon of modernities, most often developed in stable de-
mocracies.1 Although there appears to be quite a gap that needs to
be bridged in order to bring Buddhism and human rights together
at one table, a very prominent interest is already shared in both dis-
                                             
1 See the article of Alfred Hirsch in this volume, p. 33. 
CARMEN MEINERT AND HANS-BERND ZÖLLNER
10
courses, namely the wish to eliminate suffering. Whereas in the
former this very wish to remove suffering is contextualized within
an other–worldly soteriological aim, namely the very attainment of
Buddhahood, the latter is confined to the protection of the individ-
ual against any form of oppression in this world. What happens
when these two perspectives meet was a further question for us. 
From the Buddhist point of view of “ultimate truth” (Skr. pa-
ram rtha-satya, P. paramattha-sacca), the concern of human rights ac-
tivists to eliminate suffering appears rather limited, namely to the
freedom of a human being in a specific social setting in this world. It
neither takes into account all sentient beings, which is the scope of
the Buddhist concern, nor the ultimate elimination of suffering,
which entails cutting the ties to worldly existence (Skr. sa s ra) for
all sentient beings and the attainment of peace (Skr. nirv a, P. nib-
b na). In this regard, to secure human rights may be seen as an “ex-
pedient means” (Skr. up ya) to provide through legal codes a set-
ting that is conducive for the individual to develop “wisdom” (Skr.
prajñ , P. paññ ) which may lead to higher spiritual attainments.
Thus the Buddhist concerns by far exceed the jurisdiction of any le-
gal system.
However, on the level of “conventional truth” (Skr. sa v ti-
satya, P. sammutti-sacca), worldly reality proves that adherents of
both discourses, Buddhist and human rights, do meet or seem to
meet. In recent years not only Burmese and Tibetan, but also Thai
and Sri Lankan monastics started demonstrating against various
forms of human rights violations in the countries concerned. One
feature that unifies all of these groups is the experience of some
kind of injustice, so that their demand for protection of human
rights is an answer to this very experience. Admittedly, one cannot
be sure if the term “human rights” adequately represents what a
Buddhist monastic in Asia has in mind when he or she is protesting
against what he or she regards as unjust actions of the authorities.
Likewise, one may argue that within the global village there is no
other choice than to answer to experiences of injustice in a “mod-
ern” way — if only to be heard and understood by other people
around the world.
Anyway, the very fact that Buddhist monastics, the representa-
tives of the various Buddhist traditions, call for the observance of
human rights, also alludes to the insight that in modern societies it
is not sufficient any longer to demand justice solely on the basis of
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particularistic religious, in this case Buddhist, ethical norms. And,
perhaps more importantly in some respect, such norms prove to be
an insufficient means to establish equality within Buddhist tradi-
tions as well — for example, to provide equal rights for nuns when
monks in power often still act to preserve an unequal status quo in
their own interest. Therefore, human rights discourses among
Buddhist communities are discovered as an expedient means to
protect individuals against powerful institutions threatening or
suppressing from the outside and from within. Although in this
way, rights may create a conducive culture, through this process
there may also develop another non-conducive culture, for exam-
ple one that is overloaded with false claims of universality coded in
the form of legal rights. Thus the big task that still needs to be ac-
complished in a Buddhist approach to human rights is to find a
middle way between these two extremes. And this is, in fact, where
Buddhism might be able to offer a great deal and possibly could
make a major contribution to the discussion of, and demand for,
multiple foundations of human rights regulations.2
We, the two editors of the book, have over the years separately
observed developments in Buddhist communities and human
rights violations, particularly in Burma and Thailand (Hans–Bernd
Zöllner) and in China and Tibet (Carmen Meinert) before we,
through a series of unexpected events in the winter of 2007/08, at
the time of the protests in Burma and Tibet, were bound by com-
mon destiny to share room 129 of the Asia-Africa Institute at Ham-
burg University. As new officemates we decided to make a virtue
out of necessity and embarked on a joint project to raise concerns
about major human rights violations in Buddhist communities.
Our first step was the international symposium on Buddhism and
Human Rights held in November 2008, a few weeks before the sixti-
eth anniversary of the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, as a joint project of the Center for Buddhist Studies at
Hamburg University and the project “Humanism in the Era of
Globalization” at the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Hu-
manities (KWI) in Essen, Germany. The second step in our endeav-
ors is this volume, Buddhist Approaches to Human Rights, which
                                             
2 For a discussion on multiple foundations of human rights see Gut-
mann 2001: pp. xviiiff. 
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gathers some topics discussed during the symposium as well as
later contributions.
The story of the book’s genesis, the “room-129-story”, might be
taken as metaphor alluding to the contents of this book: namely a
selection of contingent case studies contributing to a necessary de-
bate within a general context. We see this publication as a continua-
tion of research in this important yet still neglected field, which was
first opened up by the publication Buddhism and Human Rights ed-
ited by Damien V. Keown, Charles S. Prebish and Wayne R.
Husted in 1998.
The contributors of the present volume are either rights theo-
rists, regional or political scientists, practicing Buddhists, or spe-
cialists who have studied Buddhism as a living tradition in Asia.
Thus the perspective is generally not only that of a theorist of Bud-
dhism. Rather, most of the authors look at these issues in living
contexts and try to analyze how Buddhists have actually reacted to
human rights problems.
In other words, this volume attempts to look at our topic of in-
terest in an interdisciplinary manner. Besides the variety of the au-
thors’ scholarly specialisation, this book brings together case stud-
ies from, and remarks on, the three major Buddhist traditions —
Therav da, Mah y na, and Vajray na — as they are practiced in
different parts of Asia, and thus provides some insight into the dif-
ferences and similarities between and within the Buddhist oikumene
that is as global and diverse nowadays as within the world’s Chris-
tian population.
This interdisciplinary and “ecumenical” aspect has its price.
This volume does not claim to be exhaustive neither in respect of
discussing the variety of Buddhist traditions, nor in regard to the
inclusion of all countries with large Buddhist communities that suf-
fer or deplore human rights violations. As such, this book does not
cover, for example, Sri Lanka, Burma, Nepal, Singapore, Japan or
Vietnam.
Even this small selection of articles, however, points to a central
problem inherent in the attempt of looking at the variety of Buddhist
approaches to human rights, namely the important question: Who is
authorized to put forward an “official” Buddhist position towards
human rights? In fact the problem of reaching consensus among a
group of sa gha elders was obvious at the First International Confer-
ence on Buddhist Womens’ Role in the Sa gha held in Hamburg in
INTRODUCTION
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2007. Here a large number of representatives of all Buddhist tradi-
tions worldwide gathered for discussions on how to legitimately or-
dain women. Yet a formal consensus remained elusive even when
there was broad agreement about what should be done. In a volume
like this we must not propose any type of “official” Buddhist an-
swers to human rights, as was offered in the above-mentioned vol-
ume Buddhism and Human Rights by means of a Buddhist Declaration
of Interdependence — no doubt a remarkable and thoughtful objec-
tive, graced with an ingenious title pointing to a core conviction of
Buddhism, namely, the interdependence of all sentient beings and
phenomena.3 However, we would like to invite the reader to look at
the following articles as eye-openers for new questions that could be
as valuable as the finding of (semi-)final answers in the promotion of
both worldly justice and peace of mind based on other-worldly,
transcendental insight. In this sense, each of the contributions as-
sembled here — both in itself and as part of a greater ensemble — is a
thrilling walk into still widely unexplored territory. 
The contributions to this book can be compared to a collection
of snapshots approaching the greater theme from a particular per-
spective and portraying an appealing subject in some detail. When
put together, these shots may reveal the outlines of a greater picture
of the conditio humana at the beginning of the 21st century. It will be
up to the reader to choose which portrait should be placed at the
center of the whole image. And in any case, she or he will necessar-
ily be obliged to add some of her or his own imagination to com-
plete the patchwork of insight assembled here.
If the reader chooses Alfred Hirsch’s article as his starting point,
she or he will be exposed to the great occidental discourses on how
to get along with the “other,“ the foreigner who despite their
strangeness is part of the worldwide network to which “I” belong,
and to various concepts of organizing human co-existence within
the global village. Alfred Hirsch illustrates his tour d’horizon through
the philosophical and historical-hermeneutical approaches of how
to reconcile relativism and universalism, forward-looking moderni-
zation and cultural heritage, focusing on the example of how the Is-
lamic world might have developed an allergic reaction against
Western hegemony. Here, Edward Said’s challenging and thought-
                                             
3 Keown et al. 1998, pp. 221f. 
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provoking thesis comes into view, and can be extended by the delib-
eration that Western orientalism brought forth occidentalism as its
twin. Enlightened by these deliberations, the reader is well-prepared
to discover later that a kind of “allergy” against Western crusades for
the implementation of human rights does exist in the Buddhists’
worlds as well. Nonetheless, it might be added that in comparison to
Alfred Hirsch’s chosen Islamic example, the Buddhist traditions
seem to be more pliable and more able to adjust their teachings to
different cultural and social realities, as may be seen in the other au-
thors’ contributions.
If Alfred Hirsch’s contribution can be compared to looking
upon the larger topic of human rights through a wide-angle lens,
Perry Schmidt-Leukel’s article narrows the perspective a little and
thus offers a smooth transition to the variety of case studies on
Buddhist approaches to human rights that form the main body of
this volume. Schmidt-Leukel stresses the critical function of human
rights, and thus establishes a sophisticated argument with regard
both to the “relativists” and the “universalists” in the human rights
debate. The “Golden Rule” put forward in different contexts, tran-
scending cultural and religious boundaries, may be regarded as a
common denominator for Buddhists of different denominations
and secular Western human rights activists. It is the Buddhist ver-
sion of responsibility as a moral obligation to respect and protect
the freedom of others that corresponds to the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, but this correspondence is not without tensions.
Buddhist thought contains a fundamental reservation towards the
principles of Western liberal rights based on the principle of no-self
(Skr. an tma, P. anatt ). This concept may lead to a collectivist the-
ory of society, illustrated by the idea of a benevolent “Dictatorial
Dhammic Socialism” as conceived by the eminent Thai monk
Bhikkhu Buddhad sa and, one may add, practiced in the “Burmese
Way to Socialism” with well-known disastrous effects. Such disso-
nances, Schmidt-Leukel argues, call for efforts for complementing
instead of confronting distinct concepts of human nature and their
consequences for society and environment. 
With Martin Seeger’s essay, the reader is invited to take the first
close-up view of how human rights are discussed in Buddhist Thai-
land both in practice and theory. Being a country in which Thera-
v da Buddhism, the “Teaching of the Elders”, forms one of the pil-
lars of the nation’s official identity, the controversies depicted and
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reflected upon are closely related to Thailand’s manifold troubled
internal politics. This holds true for the nun-ordination controversy
and the supposedly deviant teachings of two Buddhist sects. While
the latter cases touch on the issue of religious freedom, the former
concerns the more direct concern of activists advocating women’s 
rights. 
Besides portraying and analyzing the respective conflicts and
public controversies within the Thai intellectual community, the ar-
ticle provides a detailed portrait of one of the most prominent con-
temporary Buddhist learned monks, Phra Payutto. Like Bhikkhu
Buddhad sa, whose writings are discussed by Perry Schmidt-
Leukel, Phra Payutto is also regarded by Thais and sympathetic
foreigners alike as a “modernist”. The presentation given by See-
ger, based on an intimate knowledge of the scholar-monk’s writing
and public action, shows that such an appraisal is highly problem-
atic. It seems more appropriate to make use of the Buddhist concept
of the “Middle Path” to adequately assess Payutto’s stance.
Like Seeger, Kenneth Fleming lived in Thailand, where he
spent some time as a Buddhist monk. Fleming is, however, a theo-
logian and involved in the Buddho-Christian dialogue to which
Schmidt-Leukel has contributed as well. Fleming’s contribution
takes up the latter’s call for an ongoing process of interaction and
mutual learning. After discussing the consonances and disso-
nances of Buddhist approaches to human rights from a broader
Therav din perspective, his article concentrates on the challenges
that become visible when representatives of both sides meet.
For the human rights activist, purification of the mind may help
to deepen the understanding of their concern and to enlarge their
scope of action to the “root causes” of global suffering. On the other
hand, Therav din Buddhists might be asked to consider the chal-
lenge of liberating and purifying society as a whole and not just the
individual. It is interesting, one may add, that those countries in
which the “Teaching of the Elders” dominate — despite many
revolutions taking place — have not yet undergone a deep process
of “reformation” as it for example occurred in Europe some 500
years ago.
Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer, taking up the question of whether
Mah y na Buddhism can be called a “humanism”, takes us to
Thailand’s large neighbor China and the “Great Vehicle” of Bud-
dhism, which in China has a history of more than 1500 years. He
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highlights the different roles of laymen according to Mah y na
teachings and thus adds another outlook to Buddhist concepts vis à
vis the global world. Schmidt-Glintzer’s search for traces of hu-
manism in Mah y na Buddhism is based on a reconstruction of the
tradition rather than on an attempt to prove its harmony with hu-
man rights. He clearly shows that although the core ideal of Mah -
y na Buddhism — a bodhisattva who with his or her strong sense of
compassion tries to eliminate suffering — is resonant with the hu-
man rights approach, the foundations of both discourses are, none-
theless, dissonant; for example, Mah y na Buddhism does not
comply with Western theories of human rights based on a certain
concept of the individual. His argument that in China Mah y na
Buddhists also form a natural alliance with human rights as an ex-
pedient means — when it comes to the process of modernization
and concomitant suppression of Buddhist institutions — directly
leads us to the following contribution on Buddhism and state con-
trol in China by Shi Zhiru.
Shi Zhiru, a scholar-nun originally from Singapore, is well-
trained in both Mah y na Buddhist theory and practice. Through
her lucid essay, the reader may explore discussions of various
paradigms followed by Chinese Buddhist leaders during the Qing-
Republican transition in the first decades of the 20th century, as
measures to protect religious rights, and here in particular Bud-
dhist rights, and ensure the survival of Buddhism amid anti-
religious state policies. Zhiru finds an exemplary Buddhist re-
sponse to political oppression in the doctrinal and institutional re-
forms of the progressive Buddhist intellectual Taixu (1890–1947),
who literally embodied the ideal of a bodhisattva. Here the reader
might sense the potential of social engagement and reform that is
inherent in the spirit of Mah y na Buddhism, and by extension in
China itself. Taixu may even serve as a model example of a monk
ready to break with his traditional Chinese and Buddhist culture, in
a certain respect, in order to achieve higher goals for society and the
survival of Buddhism in China. He might be seen as a reform-
minded figure similar to the Thai monks Bhikkhu Buddhad sa and
Phra Payutto discussed by Schmidt-Leukel and Seeger above.
Taixu’s reputation as a “globe-trotting” monk, which he gained
due to his international travels at a later stage in his life, might even
make him a forerunner of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, the Tibetan
religious leader and head of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, who
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similarly travels around the globe for the cause of furthering hu-
man rights. Although China under communist rule has not yet al-
lowed Buddhism to recover to its full former extent, this contribu-
tion of a Chinese Buddhist nun-scholar about a progressive Bud-
dhist reformer in the early 20th century may offer a sign of hope for
forward-looking movements within Chinese Buddhism.
The three remaining contributions of this volume invite the
reader to explore different aspects of the relationship between Ti-
betan Buddhism and human rights. With the recent escalation of
violence in the Sino-Tibetan conflict in Tibetan areas of the People’s
Republic of China, the Tibetan Buddhist response to human rights
violations is formed under tremendous real-world pressures. Here
the contributions of Jan-Ulrich Sobisch and Trine Brox and of
Stephanie Römer discuss developments that stem from the Tibetan
exile communities, whereas Jampa Tsedroen’s focus is on women’s
rights in the Tibetan Vajray na tradition.
The joint contribution of Jan-Ulrich Sobisch and Trine Brox is
written from the Tibetologist’s perspective of a broad knowledge of
Tibetan Vajray na Buddhism and of the situation of the Tibetan ex-
ile communities in India. Jan-Ulrich Sobisch and Trine Brox criti-
cally ask whether traditional Buddhist societies have to bring
themselves into line with Western concepts at all. They approach
this issue by discussing problems arising in the process of cultural
translation of ideas and terms and indicate the difficulties entailed
in the assumption of universal ideals and cross-cultural standards.
The translation of secular terms proves particularly challenging in
the Tibetan context, where the Dalai Lama and many leading poli-
ticians still exercise both secular and religious functions. Sobisch
and Brox show that despite the public Western perception of the
Fourteenth Dalai Lama as a human rights activist, among Tibetans
the human rights concept is itself contested. It is the inherent pre-
dicament of an exile and the need to respond to various issues of
modernity that most likely forced the Tibetan exile leadership to
master the language of human rights in order to obtain recognition
in the international community. The cultural translation of human
rights terminology thus has clear political implications. The au-
thors demand time for an independent autochthonous develop-
ment of Tibetan (Buddhist) human rights concepts that might in
fact enlighten and expand Western concepts as well. Thus their
contribution may be seen as another call for multiple foundations
of human rights regulations. 
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Stephanie Römer provides the reader with another snapshot of
the intricately linked duo of Tibetan politics and human rights from
a political science point of view. Her article illustrates how the con-
cept of human rights is politicized in the Tibetan context. In a simi-
lar fashion to the modernists surrounding the Chinese scholar-
monk Taixu in the first half of the 20th century, discussed by Shi
Zhiru, Stephanie Römer outlines institutional reforms of the Ti-
betan Government-in-Exile which were implemented in order to
facilitate a human rights discourse on an international level as well
as a communal level. It is intriguing to read how the Central Ti-
betan Administration (CTA) actually managed to merge Buddhist
traditional values with Western political concepts based on democ-
racy. One important promoter of a human rights discourse is the
Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy, set up as an in-
dependent office, yet which closely cooperates with the Central Ti-
betan Administration. The so-called “universal rights strategy” of
the CTA advocates human, environmental and women’s rights as a
vehicle for the Tibetan struggle. Although this concept finds a lot of
support in the international community, the Fourteenth Dalai
Lama’s core motivation and continuous effort of nonviolence to set-
tle the Sino-Tibetan conflict has not shown tangible results — even
after fifty years. Is this then also a failure for the democratic voices
in the international communitiy.
With the final contribution of Bhik u Jampa Tsedroen (Carola
Roloff) the reader may gain insight into issues of gender inequity in
the Tibetan Buddhist Vajray na tradition from the first-hand ex-
perience of a German scholar-nun in this tradition. Although the
Tibetan Government-in-Exile introduced women’s rights in their
political agenda, as discussed in the contribution of Stephanie
Römer, they are not (yet) rigorously implemented in a religious
context. For instance, in Tibetan Buddhist institutions all leading
positions are held by men — even in some nunneries. Whereas in
secular contexts Tibetans are largely, maybe only out of necessity,
embarking on the course of modernization of a traditional society,
similar aspirations in a religious context still meet a lot of resistance.
In fact, Jampa Tsedroen is a vocal advocate of “equal opportuni-
ties” (Tib. go skabs gcig pa or go skabs ’dra mnyam) for both women
and men. Because of the worldwide Tibetan diaspora it is Tibetan
Buddhism that is among all Buddhist traditions most widely ex-
posed to Western modernity in all its facets, including feminism. It
is from her position between two cultures that Jampa Tsedroen
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challenges “the rigidities of established traditions” and asks for a
reinterpretation of old texts in accordance with contemporary
needs. We are very happy to conclude this volume with the view of
an engaged German female “modernist” within an ancient wisdom
tradition — in some respects, another voice of hope and an indica-
tion of a progressing “individualization” of the great Buddhist tra-
dition. 
This process, as with most other societal and academic trends,
proceeds with ambivalence. Only if the phenomenon is accounted
for can the fruits of an interdisciplinary adventure like this be
reaped as the following examples may demonstrate.
The editors of this volume, to start with, gained a lot of enlight-
enment through the exposure to the intellectual experience and in-
sight of the contributors and hope that the reader might similarly
profit as well. On the other hand, a glance at the index at the end of
the book demonstrates that a high amount of possibly confusing
complexity is necessarily created when one tries to transgress the
usual boundaries of academic disciplines and at the same time stick
to German scholarly efficiency.
The meeting of Buddhism and human rights results, among
other things, in manifold discourses within Buddhist communities
challenged to come to terms with tradition in the face of new practi-
cal and theoretical challenges which in most cases are intertwined,
as the case studies of this volume show. But these discourses do not
necessarily point towards the same direction or, even more disap-
pointingly, produce convergence and dissonance at the same time.
Imagine how the Dalai Lama, as a virtual political leader of an
imagined independent Tibet, would comment on Buddhad sa’s
concept of “Dictatorial Dhammic Socialism” at a conference of the
International Network of Engaged Buddhists that was chaired by
both as patrons prior to the passing of the Thai monk.
Finally, the contributions of this book, besides pointing towards
the spiritual needs of human rights activists, are useful for assess-
ing the societal and political situation in many Asian countries. But
such wisdom might widen the gap between the “enlightened few”
and the political authorities both in East and West.
The consequence of such deliberations cannot be to stop at-
tempts to transgress boundaries. On the contrary, such attempts
and reflection on their possible results have to be increased. To this
end, we would like to express our gratitude to all institutions that
supported the publishing of this book and the conference preceding
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it. We would like to thank the Foundation for Buddhist Studies
(Hamburg), the Gustav Prietsch Stiftung (Hamburg), the Hermann
und Marianne Straniak Stiftung (Salzburg), the Mikado AG (Berlin),
the Stiftung Mercator (Essen), and the KWI (Essen), who facilitated
the symposium, and for financial support of the Andrea von Braun
Stiftung (Munich), the Stiftung Mercator and the KWI for covering
costs for editing and printing of this volume. 
Our special thanks go to Claus Leggewie, director of the KWI,
and Jörn Rüsen, head of the project “Humanism in the Era of Global-
ization” at the KWI for their interest in and support of our project.
Here, we are particularly grateful to Jörn Rüsen who kindly offered
to include Buddhist Approaches to Human Rights in the new printed se-
ries of the humanism project. Our special thanks also go to Michael
Zimmermann, director of the Center for Buddhist Studies at Ham-
burg University, Barbara Schuler, managing director at the Center
for Buddhist Studies, and their staff who invited, encouraged and
supported the symposium and the publication at each stage by any
means possible. To publish this volume within a year after the sym-
posium was only possible with the help of Martin Hanke who pre-
pared the typeset manuscript, Sebastian Lorenz diligently organiz-
ing the index, and of course thanks to a wonderful group of con-
tributors who facilitated a smooth editing process in the first place.
May the texts printed in this book and the meaning behind these
texts leave some humanistic footprints on this earth, may the aware-
ness of suffering stimulate compassion in the world of academic dis-
course and beyond and may the faults and shortcomings of the col-
lection presented here be graciously tolerated and taken as motiva-
tion for trying harder.
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Different Cultures and the Universality  
of Human Rights 
ALFRED HIRSCH
The Measurement of  Rights  
Structures, processes and semantic categories permeate the option of
the “one” narrative of the occidental nomos. Without doubt, at first
sight there seems to be a powerful discourse within the narratives of
European language and legal culture that evokes “one” rationality
and “one” repeatable understanding. However, there is also the
anti-discourse, those constant and consistently emerging refusals
within the narrative tradition of occidental thinking to blend into the
homogeneity and isolation of a single rationality. The numerous
narratives of such a refusal paint a far more complex, multi-layered
and more intensive picture of those constitutive processes which
generate human rights anew.1 They abandon the narrative produc-
tion of catchy archetypes that allow for simple identification. They
                                             
1 These process-like, discontinuous movements become descriptive in 
what Lyotard calls “patchworks”: “A (yet to be defined) group of 
heterogeneous spaces, a great patchwork, composed of nothing but 
minor singularities, becomes apparent: the mirror, in which they 
should realize their national entity, cracks. The decadence of such a 
staging, such a “spectacle” was named politics. Europe descended to 
define the elementary political groups; whilst the masters tried to 
unify top-down, the little people renewed character bottom-up.” 
Lyotard 1977, pp. 37–38 (my translation). 
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also try to complicate and deconstruct the knowing transmission of
durable oppositional pairs such as “good” and “evil”, “pure” and
“mixed” or “entity” and “multitude” against every hermeneutic
economy.
The aim of paying attention to this varied and plural genesis of
the occidental nomos and occidental rationality denoted a decisive
revision and reorientation for thinking about and implementing
human rights. A human rights instrument that is inspired by univer-
sal rationality and its practical consequences calls for a correspond-
ing centered and vertically hierarchical law enforcement. By com-
parison, attention may be paid to a plural and decentralized genesis
of rights which, in the view of migrants and the foreign, calls for evi-
dence, an orientation towards processes of networking, the constitu-
tion of borders and the development of trans-juridical forms of
moral obligation which firstly has to be prepared and analyzed. Ac-
cordingly, the traditional forms of human rights enforcement based
on the UN or national institutions would be firmly challenged and
become obsolete due to human rights ethics aiming at solidarity and
justice.
The intensive correlation between human rights discourse and
human rights practice would no longer need a normative justifica-
tion. In fact, a description of their social genesis and constitutions as
well as their emergence within the juridical and ethical context
would suffice. With such a phenomenology of human rights genesis it
could be demonstrated that human rights already commence in the
relationship to the other and while encountering the latter. They al-
ready seem to be in force without even having been drafted as a le-
gal institution and the word of the law. They rather constitute a pre-
legal experience that becomes apparent in the relation of the own
and the foreign, the self and the other. Human rights can only form
and articulate themselves in the shape of requirements and pleas
directed at some other in an unrecognized and unnameable way.
The formation of human rights within a law of rationality that
“categorically” commands the other asks, and for this reason pre-
vents, its early abolition by homogeneous rationality:
In this respect, not only would a precise deconstruction of Kantian practi-
cal reason, but also the philosophy of human rights, be necessary in order 
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to establish illustrative insights in the “Islamic” discourse on human rights, 
but unfortunately it remains within the borders of a certain logocentrism. 2
It is particularly because of this nature of the genesis of human
rights that they cannot be set at rest and deprived of their annoying
power. I have to answer the concrete and unique demand of the for-
eign and I cannot avoid or return it to my responsibility. In Bernhard
Waldenfels’ words, this could be considered as an attempt to
[…] gain the commitment of the nomos from the core of a foreign request 
and not from the universal nomos that precedes this request and steals its 
uniqueness.3
The characteristic of human rights, as opposed to other rights, is
that they precede and at the same time transcend them. Human
rights as rights of the other turn into the constitutive condition of
rights in general. Their measurement is not abstract rationality, but
they themselves are “the measurement of rights”4, as Emmanuel
Levinas says. This is precisely the reason why human rights consti-
tute such a peculiar element that oscillates between law and ethics
without enduringly fitting into one or the other. They qualify for an
ethics of law which is orientated towards ethics when it wants to do
justice to the other.
Human rights can always and everywhere serve as an ethics of
national law for the sake of verifying and questioning justice and
the legitimacy of national laws. However, we should also keep in
mind that human rights certainly have to operate within law,
namely national law with the separation of powers and democratic
control typical for the liberal constitutional state, in order to unfold
their justice. This leads to a paradoxical description of human rights
as the element that simultaneously substantiates and questions na-
tional law, yet is also mandatory. In their responsibility towards the
foreign, human rights precede law in general; they challenge it and
fall into oblivion as soon as the first structures of solidarity and jus-
tice emerge. The true meaning of human rights lastly becomes ap-
parent as that which cannot yet be named, in that it abstracts as a
                                             
2 Bielefeldt 1998, p. 56 (my translation). 
3 Waldenfels 1995, p. 313 (my translation). 
4 Levinas 1987, p. 176. Cf. also Delhom 2000, p. 311, on the problem of 
human rights in the aftermath of the “ethics of the other”. 
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“gift” beyond exchange and predictability. 5 Yet, it is this very
withdrawal and namelessness from which human rights consti-
tutes a constant claim for an increase, for more justice for the other.
Human rights undermine the uniqueness and freedom of the hu-
man being in their movement towards anonymity and symmetry
of law and state. The specialization and diversity of the foreign also
speaks to us in the form of human rights and calls for a peculiar
universality that never ends and has to be named time and again, a
“universality” which can only be gained via the “appeal”6 of the
foreign and the other.
It is presumably agreed that human rights constitute an
achievement of culture or, in the plural form, cultures. Law and
rights emerge in the course of and in the making of a cultural proc-
ess. They are certainly not the first and probably not the most impor-
tant products of a culture. However, there is no doubt that rights,
whether they are written down as positive law or internalized as
unwritten natural justice, are a compelling part of an advanced cul-
tural stage of development. The more profoundly culture and law
are intertwined, the more decisive it is to differentiate them.
A culture comprises more than just rights that apply within in a
culture; a right exceeds the role that the culture has envisaged. For
instance, the word “legal culture” indicates that the law that is for-
mally and contentwise practiced in the respective culture can be in-
scribed in the frame of a cultural characteristic. Since we talk about
different “legal cultures”, it is clear that there is a variety of con-
tents, understandings and practices of law. A “culture” becomes
the specific content and form of expression of a right.
However, by talking about culture in a more comprehensive
way, transcending the respective law, the specific facilitation condi-
tions of law within a certain temporal, spatial and social context are
addressed. There is — and this is indicated by the term “legal cul-
ture” — an entanglement between the specific content and forms of
expression of a law, on the one hand, and the enabling conditions of
the whole cultural reference point on the other. The uncovering
                                             
5 There is the “ethics of gift” for a “different” philosophy of human 
rights that is somehow based on Derrida. Cf. Derrida 1991; see also 
Wetzel and Rabaté 1993. 
6 Compare the pre-juridical but nevertheless normative conception of 
the “appeal” (German: “Anspruch”) in the thinking of Bernhard 
Waldenfels: Waldenfels 1994, pp. 193ff.  
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and analysis of such an entanglement is not insignificant, and of
more than the random interest that it prima facie seems to be. Where
rights compete and where the origin of a legal conception is con-
tested it shows that the question of the entanglement of a specific
culture of a right — that is, a legal culture — and of the general cul-
tural conditions of rights gives some indication of the future possi-
bilities for development and connection.
The Cul tural  Origin of  Human Rights:  
Universal ism versus Relat iv ism 
The question of whether there is a culture-specific origin of human
rights and therefore a specific legal culture is of fundamental mean-
ing for the transcultural acceptance that is the precondition for the
continued existence of human rights institutions in the global con-
text.7 The debate on cultural relativism and universalism in human
rights revolves around the fact that on the one hand, there are dif-
ferent legal cultures, but no general and universal law that is inde-
pendent from a supporting culture; on the other, there is respect for
the diversity of cultures, but common rationality is turned into a le-
gal norm. 
Moreover, there is a universalistic perspective within human
rights theory which states that the historical development of rights
has reached a universal level in the final stage of modernization.
Whilst the cultural relativistic position stands for the non-
transferability of legal norms and legal traditions, the universalistic
positions assume that certain legal norms have always been on
hand in all cultures, or necessarily emerge in the state of moderni-
zation that occurs after traditional societies finish their historical
phase. The first insist on the irreconcilable difference of cultures;
the latter question whether there is such a difference at all. Both
perspectives seem to agree that the structural and relational condi-
tions of the emergence and demise of cultures as well as of their
specific areas are unknown and consciously neglected.
Assuming that both cultural relativism and universalism sup-
port, as their central task, human rights as formulated in the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, a few questions arise. In
view of the known empirical differences and the current clash of
                                             
7 See also Hamm 2003, pp. 22ff. 
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cultures — and special reference should be made to the confronta-
tion between the Judeo-Christian modernized West and the Islamic
East — the question arises for both parties as to how to overcome
this conflict of cultures. This conflict might be rather paradigmatic
in light of the current global political situation, since there is a mul-
titude of “cultural” differences many times greater than those of
the Judeo-Christian and Islamic world.
How can cultural difference, which also comprises difference in
legal cultures, be bypassed so that an expansive development of
human rights institutions may follow? Subsequently, it has to be
asked: to what extent might it be possible to derive human rights
from different legal cultures? And this leads to the question of an ac-
tual policy of human rights that operates with corresponding strate-
gies at international level and within the framework of the United
Nations. Is it possible that such a human rights policy based on nu-
merous national and non-government organizations can meet the
cultural differences of states and nations? And what about the para-
digm of the political as opposed to to the paradigm of the culture?
The assumption here is that considerations of relativism and
universalism should aim at a broad creation of respect for human
rights. If such a pragmatic intention is put at the forefront of the cul-
tural relevance of human rights, then one will be engaged with
thinking about human right norms in cultures and political systems
that have explicit reservations against “Western” human rights,
rather than considering a new justification for human rights. Human
rights are probably regarded in a rather skeptical way in those cul-
tures, because they seem to be just another symbol of Western cul-
ture’s quest for hegemonic power. At the same time, this pragmatic
orientation also has to consider the genesis of cultures and their dif-
ferences as well as their relationship to each other.8 Without reflect-
ing on and understanding cultural processes, the envisaged conver-
gence and connections cannot be made. The question of historical-
cultural origin is of high importance here.
Within the course of the Western debate on human rights there
have been clearly more diverging opinions of the cultural genesis
of human rights. Against the broad understanding that human
rights have their origin in the French Revolution, Georg Jellinek ar-
                                             
8 See also Hamm and Nuscheler (1995, pp. 21f.) on the necessary and 
juridical cohesion of “equality” and “difference”. 
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gues at the end of the 19th century that the Déclaration des Droits de
l’Homme et des Citoyens is based on the Virginia Bill of Rights. His aim
was to liberate human rights from the mental-national surround-
ing of radical French Jacobinism and to offer it to German society
and politics. By tracing back human rights to the Virginia Bill of
Rights they are at the same time connected to the Protestant tradi-
tion.9 The assumption that the reformatory model of the free Chris-
tian should be regarded as some kind of “ancient human right” and
that human rights therefore should be ascribed to their Protestant
cultural line is of importance here. Jellinek emphatically connects
human rights to religious evolution:
The idea to determine indefeasible, inherent, sanctified rights of the indi-
vidual is not of political but of religious origin. What has been considered 
as an achievement of the Revolution truly dates back to the Reformation 
and its battles.10
The conflicts during the Reformation were certainly much more
than just religious debates, since they were accompanied, if not car-
ried, by a social and political movement and its objectives. In this
vein, Wolfgang Fikentscher develops the thesis that human rights
have their origin in the campaigns of the Dutch Protestants against
the Catholic Spanish. The secular origin of human rights would not
carry very far and would nowadays actually lead to a “Christian
mission”11 in the “Third World” without one realizing it.
However, arguing that human rights are derived from a certain
cultural and religious background points to the high relevance of
the evolutionary thesis. The oppositional thesis follows quickly and
the Protestant cultural derivation of human rights was rejected
during the first half of the 20th century. The development of human
rights norms from a scholastic naturalistic tradition ties to the
thinking of Thomas Aquinas and was concerned with the conse-
quent embedding within a Catholic line of reflection.12 The Catho-
lic interpretation of human rights that puts special emphasis on the
continuity of the central content of their tradition with human
rights norms presents in some ways a reversal of secularized or
                                             
 9 Cf. Jellinek 1974, pp. 5ff.  
10 Ibid., pp. 53f. (my translation). 
11 Fikentscher 1987, p. 64. 
12 Cf. Merks 1981, pp. 161ff. 
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Protestant moral demands. However, there is a heretical moment
within the religious traditions at the end of the 19th and beginning
of the 20th century, since the two Christian churches acknowl-
edged human rights only in the 20th century, during the 1960s. This
striking reluctance to embrace human rights goes back to the aspect
of human rights that is not specifically directed towards Christian-
ity. During the 70s the pontifical nuncio still complained about the
Declaration of Human Rights and the subsequent Covenants: 
Yes indeed, it is not an easy task to acknowledge that the name of God is 
not stated in this document.13
Paulus Lenz-Medoc rejects this request, but only to indicate that re-
ferring to God within the Declaration of Human Rights would be tan-
tamount to blasphemy, since one would force non-believers and
heathens to call upon a God they do not know or who could even
be overturned. He indeed rejects the explicit naming of God in hu-
man rights documents of the United Nations; however, he still
wants to derive human rights from their Christian tradition and
disagrees with the efforts to find their origin within Greek philoso-
phy, which made a distinction between the “free” and the “unfree”:
Here, Christianity breaks in and offers a different idea of man: we are all 
children of God, everybody is assigned to live according to their appoint-
ment to become God’s own likeness. For this reason, a term of human be-
ings, a term of persons has entered our history that has not been preceded 
or followed by anything like it.14
A true universalistic approach to human rights has only become
possible, according to Lenz-Medoc, in the aftermath of Christian
belief and thinking. As emancipated as this argumentation seemed
to be in Christian-Catholic discourse, it equally disrupts the debate
between Christianity and Islam. The latter apparently feels vindi-
cated in the assumption that the origin of human rights from a
Christian tradition makes obsolete a sustainable debate on the enti-
tlement of human rights, as they are also written down in the
Covenants of 1966.
                                             
13 According to Lenz-Medoc 1981, p. 214 (my translation). 
14 Ibid., p. 205 (my translation). 
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Yet Islamic access to human rights and their development is
anything but homogenous or coherent; their proponents and op-
ponents of human rights also fight and they again can be divided
into a multitude of subgroups, of which more later.
Opening up human rights to the traditions of non-Christian cul-
tures can only be achieved by tracing back human rights to a secu-
lar philosophical tradition; this applies at least when the tradition is
clearly assigned to a closed and coherent cultural area. In this vein,
Georg Picht indicates that, since he believes that human rights are
deduced from stoical philosophy, the
[…] utopia of a global human rights system can only be considered as an 
empty delusion.15
Metaphysical requirements for the understanding of human rights
are missing which would decrease the chance of global respect for
human rights. Picht proves himself to be a cultural relativistic critic
of human rights implementation without abjuring the project of
human rights as such. It is nevertheless astonishing that a careful
author such as Picht does not address cultural genesis as such and
assumes the homogeneity of cultural traditions. Newer debates on
the cultural problem of human rights implicitly seem to follow this
cultural-theoretical paradigm, but they are concerned with avoid-
ing the problems incurred when deriving human rights from a
Western cultural tradition. 
Modernizat ion and Cul ture  
According to Dieter Senghaas there is a need to unhinge human
rights from their specific culture and to ascribe them to the result of
disputes that have led to a “civilization against somebody’s will” in
order to justify transcultural norms, norms that human rights should
be. In other words, the relation of human rights to a culture is lev-
elled by the fact that rights possess something contingent and deeply
modernistic; they are too new to belong to a cultural tradition. Ac-
cording to Senghaas it should be considered that
European values, insofar as they are directed to all human beings and as 
such directed towards a mass foundation, have only recently been accepted in 
                                             
15 Picht 1980, p. 127 (my translation). 
ALFRED HIRSCH
30
the Western world; that in this respect the thinking and feeling in Europe is 
different to its long ”prehistory,” that especially the practical translation of 
those values into institutional provisions as they underlie the democratic 
and constitutional state are rather new; that “European values” are due to 
a modern and highly particular constellation.16
The thesis based on these considerations rejects the factor of “cul-
ture” and regards modernization as a radical break with conven-
tions. Individual protective rights, as initially eked out with Magna
Charta and later on with the habeas corpus, leading to constitutional
structures with enforceable civil rights in the following centuries,
constitute such a push in modernization which cannot be explained
by preceding traditions, as Senghaas explains. The same is true for
the separation of church and state, which could hardly be deduced
from the recommendation that 
The emperor should be given the things that belong to him; God should be 
given the things that belong to him.  
The secular state as well as universal suffrage and the emancipation
of women are a “late product” of modernity.17 They cannot be ex-
plained with the help of structures or the content of the preceding
specific cultural history, but rather by referring to a radical break
with the latter. Here, the assumption that a civilizing moderniza-
tion leads to an abolition of culture or the establishment of a “non-
culture” becomes apparent. The purpose behind this argumenta-
tion might ennoble this reasoning, but it does not cover it from a
structural-logical perspective. The antagonistic powers that oppose
certain components of a certain culture and in extreme cases even
neglect them are still strongly characterized by this culture. Even
emancipations and fractures with cultural traditions do not just fall
into one’s lap, but have arisen as antagonistic and diverging pow-
ers within a certain cultural system. The other, diverging from a
culture, which only appears at the inner and outer margins of the
culture, can only emerge here because its contours and its content
are formed by these margins and their relation to the things lying
beyond the margin.
                                             
16 Senghaas 1998, p. 19 (my translation). 
17 Cf. Ibid., pp. 200–201 (my translation). 
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Knowing about the possibility of those dialectical objections,
Heiner Bielefeldt tries to mitigate the thesis of radical break with
cultural tradition, without abandoning its essential argumentative
consequences. This becomes clear when he writes:
Other than in earlier times the modern human being cannot refer back to 
the more or less unquestioned validity of authoritative traditions, but 
rather has to struggle for normative orientation, as an individual person as 
well as within the community […]. In opposition to traditional ideas of a 
given normativity, human rights can be understood as elements of a “post-
traditional” normative thinking in which norms can and should be subject 
to critical reflection and communication.18
“To struggle for normative orientation” does not mean to jump
from scratch to the “post” of a certain cultural situation. Likewise,
“critical reflection” and “communication” of norms cannot com-
pletely abandon the symbols and interpretation patterns that are
culturally and traditionally predefined. They need themselves
within their critical alienation. They are ultimately reserved for
skilful play and intelligent strategies of a post-critical thinking that
settles down in the differential intervals and on the margins of the
differential order to figure out to what extent it can remove itself
from its own structural and semantic conditions. 
Bielefeldt anticipates the consequences stemming from cul-
tural-philosophical thinking about identity and only holds against
them with reassurance and partial revision: 
An abstract dichotomization of tradition and modernity would cause prob-
lems for the universality of human rights, since respect for human rights 
would be conceptually limited to a circle of human beings that have liber-
ated themselves from their religious, ideological and cultural tradition 
(whether allegedly or actually). Such an approach may consequently lead 
to the loss of human rights universality within the modernistic ideology of 
process, which may have imperialistic effects such as the equation of uni-
versal human rights with a particular canon of occidental values.19
However, it is disputable that the thesis of modernization qua re-
quirement for a universal realization of human rights entitlements
can be independently thought of, detached from the “idea of pro-
                                             
18 Bielefeldt 1998, p. 125 (my translation). 
19 Ibid. (my translation). 
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gress” for which the Western process of modernization serves as
role model. How can we think independently about such a his-
torical development of concrete changes in Western culture and
the cultures they came into contact with in this specific and irre-
versible way? There might be salient and radical differences be-
tween “pre-modern” and “modern” systems, but it remains a dif-
ference that relates two phases of a certain cultural tradition and
intertwines them. On that note, the modernization of an Arab cul-
ture unfolds in a way related to this difference, as does a pre-
modern Asian or the Native American culture. The insistent rejec-
tion of an entanglement of modernity and cultural tradition nour-
ishes the suspicion that something is supposed to be decoupled in
a theoretical way, which has proved to be a conflicting network of
different cultures. It is not sufficient to counter the suspicion of a
“cultural essentialism” by claiming human rights to be independ-
ent of a culture in principle and by making them the final product
of a break with culture and tradition that takes place in stages.
Even though human rights seem to be freed of the suspicion of be-
ing ethnocentric, this is replaced by the pattern of a development
and break with development that should be carried out in differ-
ent cultures along the lines of the Western model.
The underlying logic here avoids the pitfalls of the universaliza-
tion of one’s own Western, European culture and its rationality at
the cost of universalization of the “break with culture” that takes
place within modernity. This is also suggested by Senghaas: This
development process contains, in some parts of Europe earlier than
in other parts, a historically unprecedented rebuilding of politics,
society, economy and culture. Traditional societies became modern
ones; societies of illiterates as well as of human beings living in
poor conditions turned into societies with competent, confident
human beings living in urban areas of high population density and
who were sensible of their new interests and identities and who
politicized and organized themselves.20 Occidental rationality no
longer serves as the parameter of a universal rationality, but rather
the development process of the occidental societies is universalized
and becomes the paradigm for an exemplary “past” and “first” for
all other cultures. Suggesting this superiority of occidental devel-
                                             
20 Senghaas 1998. 
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opment silently implies that other cultures, ethnicities and societies
are delayed in their development and are affected by social, politi-
cal and economic backwardness. Assuming the necessity of a
chronological passage of certain civilizing phases also implies be-
ing convinced of a coherent development of humankind that ex-
cludes aspects of non-contemporary and alternative ways of de-
velopment. The foreign culture is reduced in its eigenvalue or is
completely abolished.21
The “acting,” “confident” and “autonomous” human being en-
joys an outstanding role that makes him or her the only type of a fu-
ture humanity worth copying. Supposing that this type of human
being is the exemplary endpoint of the development of humankind
also means declaring Western individualism and subject-centrism to
be the telos of a historical universal development process. Both the
exemplariness of the process of modernization as well as the para-
digmatic genesis of an autonomous and subject-centered humanity
imputes that history unfolds as a story of improvement. Such think-
ing about history quickly reveals as a specific occidental endowment
of historical processes with meaning, and also as disavowing those
belligerent social, political, and ethnic catastrophes that have been
and still are an integral part of modernity itself. Becoming deaf and
blind to the developments and achievements of other cultures is
closely connected to the arrogant assumption that the occidental
progress story unfolds qua modernization. Its “development graph”
carries no weight for occidental civilization and cannot be captured
by our symbolic systems and categories of meaning, and thus es-
capes the perception and understanding of occidental theorists on
modernization.
Cultural  Hegemony and Al lergy  
The insight into the constitutive differences and relations that sup-
port the civilized order and the allegedly weak or non-civilized sys-
tems and their history is out of tune at the same time. One should
ask about the role that the “non- or prehistoric” peoples of the for-
mer colonies play in the modernization process in Europe. It is
well-known that the exploitation of the colonies led to a — carefully
                                             
21 Cf. Waldenfels 1997, p. 35.  
ALFRED HIRSCH
34
speaking — change in development and repression in the colo-
nized countries, whilst a development stimulus took place in the
colonizing countries. The slave trade and the deployment of slaves
in the American economy can hardly be separated from the associ-
ated achievements in industrialization and economic prosperity.
The import and transfer of goods and products from the colonies as
well as the adoption of production engineering and mass produc-
tion of raw materials have led to an accelerated modernization of
the economy and the civilization of the West. The contributions of
foreign cultures to the Western process of modernization can
hardly be ennumerated or captured in any real degree.
To measure these immense achievements, one only has to bring to mind 
America’s contribution to the civilization of the Old World. There firstly 
are potatoes, rubber, tobacco and Coka (the basis for modern anesthesia), 
which, although in very different ways, comprise the four pillars of West-
ern culture; then there is maize and the peanut, which should have revolu-
tionized the African economy, perhaps even before they distributed the 
nourishment around in Europe; then cocoa, vanilla, tomatoes, the pineap-
ple, pimento, several kinds of beans, cotton and pumpkin.22
However, throughout the whole of occidental history, scientific
knowledge of maths, geography, physics, philosophy and botany
were imported from India, Arabia and China and other advanced
civilizations, without which the civilizing development of the occi-
dental culture would not have been possible. Cultural and civiliz-
ing processes of different cultures that have been in touch in a more
or less intensive way never proceed in parallel, but rather inter-
leave, dynamize or inhibit each other, interfere with each other and
lead to pointed defense reactions that only occur in certain forms of
encounters of cultures.
A colonization, for example, that perceives itself as the legiti-
mate dominance of a culturally deficient country and nation by a
culturally superior society, provokes counter-reactions and defen-
sive attitudes that are able to redirect history and the civilizing de-
velopment of this country and this nation. The “barbarian” or the
“savage” does by no means always reject the assigned position and
role. Often the opposite case comes to pass. The “barbarian” and
                                             
22 Lévi-Strauss 1996, p. 189 (my translation). 
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the “savage” adopt the role they usurp by force.23 The discrepancy
that defines them promotes allergies and reactions that they de-
velop against the hegemonic culture of allegedly civilized and cul-
turally superior peoples.
On the contrary, numerous and complex correlations and re-
pulsions lead to the development of differences between the inter-
acting cultures that gain a size and complexity which is hardly
manageable, especially at the level of the social and political. The
long-lasting relations and differences between the Christian Euro-
pean and Islamic worlds constitute an especially haunting exam-
ple. Warlike confrontation during the post-Roman era gave way to
a time of long and peaceful co-existence between Islam and Chris-
tianity in Europe.
The reciprocal, though asymmetrical, relation between Islamic
and Christian culture during the turn of the century in Spain was es-
pecially remarkable. The Islamic culture that was of high standing
and widely respected in Christian Europe was looking for an active
reception of and debate with occidental culture. The best known ex-
ample is the reception of Aristotle by the Islamic cleric and scholar
Averoes. This heyday of reciprocal respect that has left its marks in
literature, architecture, arts and jurisprudence made way for endur-
ing supremacy and the colonization of the Arabic-Islamic region
through Europe and America after the hegemonic claim of the Turks
during the 16thcentury and the occupation of Vienna.
The changing relations and differences between the Islamic and
the Judeo-Christian world are particularly remarkable. Rather than
attempting to indicate their scope and content, one may refer to the
estimation of the Islamic-Arab culture as “backward” and “primi-
tive” that is common in Western Europe. According to our own
phylogenetic fantasies of process, the Christian West considers the
Islamic-Arab world to be trapped in the “gloomy Middle Ages”.
An awareness of superiority to Islamic culture is especially distinct
in Europe and America and therefore constitutes the prerequisite
for Western/Christian ambitions to civilize, something we are wit-
nessing at the moment.24
                                             
23 Cf. Schneider 1997, pp. 93ff.  
24 The historically changeable interlacing and confrontation of the 
Judeo-Christian and Islamic-Arab culture has only exemplary char-
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The standards that are brought to the Islamic-Arab cultural
world by the West are mostly provided with the title of human
rights and laid out as the primary cultural condition for recogni-
tion. Given the insistence of the Western civilizing request, the Is-
lamic world alternates between adopting the role of a “medieval”,
retarding, violent culture and asserting a normative initiative of
human rights within the context of Islamic sources. Mostly, how-
ever, human rights requirements are met with skepticism. Accord-
ing to Udo Steinbach this is due to the fact that the West constantly
impinges on its “upheld principles” and also considers
[…] the realization of Western interests and dealing with human rights […] 
in one and the same context.25
Additionally, international institutions, which are widely created
by the West, do not possess corresponding levels of trust as found
in Europe. Quite the contrary: human rights are identified with the
hegemonic claim of the Christian-Western world and are therefore
seldom considered very seriously. Conversely, human rights pro-
ponents of the Western hemisphere do not show any willingness to
enter into an open and intercultural dialog that addresses human
rights norms which are believed to be universal. 
Western reservations center on the absent separation of religion
and state. Secularism and the creation of a secular community is
considered an important aspect for the unfolding of human rights
standards. For many Islamic states this means that religious orders
and norms, as they are grounded in Shari’ah, are simultaneously
the legal basis of the state. This leads to the fact that Islamic law
provides bodily punishments that may also include amputation.
Moreover, there is no religious freedom within the Islamic legal
systems and no true sexual equality. Saudi Arabia opposed article
18 of the Declaration of Human Rights, which provided for religious
freedom and the free change of religions at an already very early
stage. In some traditional Islamic codes of law the death penalty
follows apostasy.26 The death penalty against such persons was
                                             
acter in this context, since there is a multitude of different, possibly 
more terse contingencies of traditional cultural worlds. 
25 Steinbach 2002, p. 111. 
26 See also Aldeeb Abu-Salieh 1994. 
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imposed and implemented a few times in Iran and Sudan during
the past decades.27
Discrimination against women within Islam is expressed, for
example, in the fact that a woman is disadvantaged with regard to
divorce and inheritance law. From the perspective of certain Is-
lamic circles this is not considered an obstacle to respecting human
rights. They rather tend to claim human rights norms and their de-
velopment for Islamic culture. The most influential attempt of this
kind was the Cairo Declaration in 1990 which contained an expla-
nation of human rights in Islam. The declaration was adopted and
issued by the foreign ministers of the member states of the organi-
zation of The Islamic Conference. In many respects the declaration
seems to resemble the UN Declaration of Human Rights but article 24
clearly reveals the main issue:
All the rights and freedoms stipulated in this Declaration are subject to the 
Islamic Shari’ah. 
Furthermore, article 25 states:
The Islamic Shari’ah is the only source of reference for the explanation or 
clarification of any of the articles of this Declaration. 
Without doubt, based on the Declaration of Human Rights from 1948
and the two Covenants from 1966, these are clearly provisional
clauses, which restrict the right to live and bodily integrity in article
2 or, for example, freedom of speech in article 22 of the UN Human
Rights Charter.
Furthermore, from a Western perspective, unacceptable restric-
tions of human rights as important as the right of “personal status”
(religious restrictions on marriage — which applies to Israel as
well) could be named. Western proponents of the UN Covenants
are certain:
The Cairo Declaration proves to be a political document, which knowingly 
exposes the continuity of the United Nations’ universal human right stan-
dards. At the same moment the declaration sets an example for the ten-
dency of a one-sided Islamic occupation of the perception of human rights 
in the ongoing Islamic human rights debate comparable with the Western 
                                             
27 Cf. Amnesty International 1997. 
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perception of human rights as “occidental values,“ leaving no room for in-
ter-cultural discourse.28
One could object that current Islamic culture does not open up itself
to the extensively universal human rights norm influenced by the
West. However, if you consider that secularity is based on the po-
litical commonwealth of the Western world and that it is a re-
quirement and validation of a trans-religious right, the extent of
cultural differences between the Islamic and the Christian world
become evident at this point. For a Muslim it is simply not under-
standable that a human by himself, as an abstract universal as-
sumption, independent of his society’s influential culture and his
religion, is led to have rights in the first place. Against this back-
drop it should become apparent that the importance — for the
European-influenced perception of human rights — of the inde-
pendence and individuality of a human being cannot be shared by
Islam.
In an Islamic dimension […]  the human being acts and is responsible to 
God’s light of revealed words. As a “representative” he remains subordi-
nate to him. Human individuality does not lead to an absolutization of the 
individual and one’s ego. The autonomous human being, as developed in 
Europe’s modern era, who acts according to an inner moral law, is hardly 
understandable for a religious Muslim.29
From a perspective influenced by occidental culture, one might
complain about this and wish to change it. Nevertheless, the oppo-
sition of the Islamic world culturally and philosophically shows
that a human being does not delineate its character in an abstract
humankind, but takes shape in concrete cultural, temporal and
spatial conditions as well as in symbolic structures and semantics. 
Not until the difference of this diversity of human genesis is
recognized and taken seriously throughout different cultures
might an endless normative process of acquisition of qualities or
knowledge, as a dialog between cultures, create universality. This
would laterally grow and change into a concrete encounter of for-
eign, but politically and socially reliant cultures. 
                                             
28 Bielefeldt 1998, p. 137 (my translation). 
29 Steinbach 2002, pp. 109–110 (own translation). 
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The generation of human rights between cultures should be
thought of as a greater and endless language which steadily
emerges in an ongoing translation process of many different lan-
guages, in which meaningful words and minor allusions nestle to-




Buddhism and the Idea of Human Rights. 
Resonances and Dissonances1
PERRY SCHMIDT-LEUKEL
In 1991 L.P.N. Perera, Professor of P li and Buddhist Studies in Sri
Lanka, published a Buddhist commentary on the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights. In this commentary Perera tries to show that
in the P li canon, i.e. the canonical scriptures of Therav da Bud-
dhism, for every single article of the Human Rights Declaration a
substantial parallel or at least a statement with a similar tendency
can be found. Indeed, says Perera, Article 1, which affirms the dig-
nity and rights of all humans, “is in complete accord with Buddhist
thought, and may be said to be nothing new to Buddhism in con-
ception”.2 In contrast, the Buddhist Peter Junger, Professor of Law
at the University of Cleveland, Ohio, judged in 1995 that
[…] though followers of Buddhist traditions do value most, if not all, of the 
interests underlying the rhetoric of human rights, they may not have much 
use for the label itself, which is, after all, a product of the traditions of 
Western Europe and the parochial histories of that region. 3
                                             
1 This is a slightly revised version of a paper previously published in 
Studies in Interreligious Dialogue 14 (2004), pp. 216–234, and in Journal 
of Buddhist-Christian Studies 26 (2006), pp. 33–49. 
2 Perera 1991, p. 21. 
3 Junger 1998, p. 56. 
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Junger goes on to say that
[…] the concept of human rights is not likely to be useful in […] following 
the Buddha dharma.4
Thus Perera and Junger agree that the content of the various hu-
man rights is acceptable for Buddhists. However, they disagree
strongly in their evaluation of the idea of human rights in itself. In
this respect Damien Keown has rightly argued that the crucial
question of “Buddhism and Human Rights” is not so much
whether Buddhism can accept any particular human right but
rather whether the idea of human rights as such can find a philoso-
phical justification within the “overall Buddhist vision of individ-
ual and social good”.5
It is this problem that I would like to pursue in this paper. In the
first part I will sketch some basic characteristics of the idea of hu-
man rights. In the second part I will point out what resonances this
idea finds in Buddhism or by which Buddhist concepts the human
rights idea can be justified. And finally, in the third part, I will deal
with the question of potential dissonances between the idea of hu-
man rights and Buddhist concepts.
On the Nature of  Human Rights 
With the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
1948 and the various subsequent human rights conventions the
rights of individuals were for the first time inscribed into interna-
tional law, which had previously recognized only collectives as le-
gal subjects. By formulating universal rights as valid for every indi-
vidual human being regardless of race, color, sex, religion, birth, etc.
the Universal Declaration points to the most important feature of the
idea of human rights: the protection of the individual or, to be more
precise, the protection of the individual against powerful institu-
tions of the state, society, religion or others. It is individual self-
determination and free agency that are protected through human
rights. Human rights define the minimum of what is necessary in
order to guarantee the freedom of individual agency and the free-
                                             
4 Junger 1998, p. 55. 
5 Keown 1998, p. 24. 
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dom of self-determination. By the definition of inalienable rights,6
the idea of human rights sets limits to those collectives and institu-
tions in which we usually live, limits which for the sake of the basic
liberty of the individual are not to be transgressed. Michael Ig-
natieff summarizes this understanding of human rights with the
words: “rights exist to protect individuals,”7 and “they are worth
having only if they can be enforced against institutions like the fam-
ily, the state, and the church”.8 Therefore “moral individualism” is
“the core of the Universal Declaration”.9
It is true that the further development of the human rights de-
bate, particularly within the context of the United Nations, has led
to an extension of the idea of human rights to collective rights and
collective legal entities by including among human rights, for ex-
ample, a nation’s right to self-determination, the right to peace and
the right to development. However, in my opinion it would be
highly problematic to take this as relativizing the understanding of
human rights as essentially protecting the rights of the individual.10
Such collective human rights should be regarded rather as articu-
                                             
 6 These rights include, for example, the right to life and security, the 
right to freedom from torture, inhuman treatment and discrimina-
tion, the right to protection against arbitrary arrest, the right to fair 
legal proceedings, the right to asylum, the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion, to freedom of opinion and expres-
sion, the right to associate and assemble, to freedom of movement, 
to free choice of one’s spouse or mate, the right to own property, to 
free choice of employment, etc. 
 7 Ignatieff 2001, p. 67. 
 8 Ibid., pp. 66f. 
 9 Ibid., p. 66. 
10 The statements in von Senger 1998 do not appear to be entirely free 
from this tendency. Von Senger’s harsh criticism of the “Western” 
idea “that in principle human rights should be exclusively a matter 
of the right of the individual to protection” (von Senger 1998, p. 73), 
is associated with startling restraint concerning the violation of just 
such human rights throughout the People’s Republic of China. It 
must appear particularly disturbing that von Senger writes without 
any further commentary and seemingly approvingly of China’s ac-
tion — “China thus stood up ‘for collective human rights, such as 
the right of all nations to self-determination’” (von Senger 1998, p. 
73) — not even mentioning China’s occupation of Tibet. 
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lating wider settings and conditions for the protection of the indi-
vidual in the sense that, for example, the right to a healthy eco-
nomic development guaranteeing the satisfaction of the basic exis-
tential needs of a state’s citizens is necessary, because hunger does
not restrict human agency any less than arbitrary imprisonment
does.11
If human rights are understood primarily as rights for the pro-
tection of individuals, then a further crucial aspect is that these
rights hold for all individuals in an equal way and that therefore the
claim of their validity is inevitably universal. It is the principle of
equality through which the moral character of the human rights
idea becomes particularly clear. For the principle of equality rests
on the “Golden Rule,” so that all others are to be protected against
abuse in the same way that one would claim this for oneself.12 And
from the principle of equality follows the claim to the universal va-
lidity of the idea of human rights. For the equal validity for all indi-
viduals entails universal validity. This takes us to a problem which
has moved more and more to the center of the current human
rights debate: the question of how to justify the claim to universal
validity of the human rights idea within the horizon of different cul-
tures, religions, and ideologies. 
The view that human rights apply to all individuals equally, ir-
respective of any particulars of sex, race, color, nationality, social
position, etc., can also be expressed by saying that these rights have
to be adjudicated to humans as humans, that is on the basis of their
humanness alone and that this is the reason why they are called
human rights. This seems to suggest that the universal validity of
human rights needs to be derived from human nature or more pre-
cisely from the dignity of that nature. Although the 1948 Universal
Declaration abstains consciously from giving any justification of
human rights, 13 it nevertheless indicates a close connection be-
tween human rights and human dignity by mentioning both in one
breath in the preamble and in Article 1. However, a justification of
the universal validity of human rights by having recourse to uni-
versal human dignity is not without problems. On the one hand,
                                             
11 Cf. Gutmann 2001, pp. xi–xiii. 
12 Ignatieff 2001, pp. 4, 88f. 
13 Morsink 1999, pp. 281–302. 
BUDDHISM AND THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS
45
there is a variety of culturally rather diverse concepts of human
dignity. And, on the other, there are some clear examples to show
that the idea of human dignity does not only support equality be-
fore the law, but also inequality. One has only to recall the numer-
ous instances in which a legally restricted status of women is justi-
fied by an alleged specific womanly dignity.14 Therefore, I would
support Ignatieff’s suggestion that within the context of justifying
human rights, dignity should be restricted sharply to the dignity of
free individual agency and self-determination. Beyond that, it should be
left precisely to this individual freedom as to how he or she wants
to understand his/her dignity in more detail.15 Can the different
cultures and religions agree on such a restriction? This question
provides a kind of litmus test, for the freedom of men and women
to decide for themselves how they want to understand their own
human dignity is a central implication of the human right to reli-
gious liberty. 
Ignatieff concedes that the specific association of the idea of
human rights with the idea of human dignity and the idea of free
individual self-determination is of Western origin. But he rightly
insists that the question of origin does not necessarily determine
the range of validity.16 This takes us to the center of the relativist cri-
tique of the idea of human rights, which has been summarized (but
not approvingly) by Diane Orentlicher: 
What we call “universal” human rights are, in fact, an expression above all 
of Western values derived from the Enlightenment. Understood in this 
light, the human rights idea is at best misguided in its core claim that it 
embodies universal values — and at worst a blend of moral hubris and cul-
tural imperialism.17
In the discussion of the relativist critique18 two things are worth
mentioning. First, in principle it is possible to base the human
rights idea — even and particularly in its hard core of a “moral in-
                                             
14 Ignatieff 2001, p. 164. 
15 Ibid., pp. 164ff. 
16 Ibid., p. 166. 
17 Orentlicher 2001, pp. 141f. 
18 For a comprehensive and precise summary of all relevant argument 
against cultural relativism in connection with the human rights is-
sue see Paul (2002). 
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dividualism” — on more than just one foundation only. One can
think of philosophical justifications coming from different cultural
and religious origins but nevertheless concurring in their endorse-
ment of the idea of human rights. Second, in the face of the relativist
critique it should not be forgotten that opposition is exactly what
has to be expected when it comes to the idea of human rights, pre-
cisely because its point is the protection of the individual agent
against collectives, institutions, traditions, religions, etc. that are too
powerful. This in itself seems to be an intercultural universal. In the
West the idea of human rights had to be pushed through against a
fierce and persistent resistance coming from political and religious
authorities. Pope Leo XIII, for instance, accused human rights of be-
ing “unrestrained doctrines of liberty”19 and Pope Gregory XVI
designated the idea of a right to religious liberty as “madness”.20
Hence, one should not be surprised if the idea of human rights
meets with comparable resistance in other civilizations. Surprise
would be rather appropriate if that did not occur, for then one
should fear that the idea of human rights has become so wishy-
washy that it no longer appears as something that is to be taken se-
riously by those powers against whom it is directed. Thus, when it
comes to the universality of human rights what is at stake is also
and in particular the universality of critical standards, which may
have to be asserted against ancient traditions, whether of Western
or of any other civilization. In this respect it is quite encouraging to
see that the Fourteenth Dalai Lama — despite being himself a high
representative of an ancient tradition — acknowledges exactly this
critical function of human rights: 
Diversity and traditions can never justify the violations of human rights. 
Thus discrimination of persons from a different race, of women, and of 
weaker sections of society may be traditional in some regions, but if they 
are inconsistent with universally recognized human rights, these forms of 
behaviour must change. The universal principles of equality of all human 
beings must take precedence.21
                                             
19 Encyclical Immortale Dei, 1885. 
20 Encyclical Mirari Vos, 1832. 
21 From the address of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama during The World 
Conference on Human Rights 1993 (Dalai Lama 1998, p. xix).  
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However, given the more recent developments within the so-called
“Shugden Controversy,” it needs to be questioned to what extent
the current Dalai Lama and his administration are serious about the
right to religious liberty.22 This leads us to the proper topic of this
paper: the relationship between the human rights idea and Bud-
dhism, or better, the question of which resonances and dissonances
the human rights idea finds in Buddhism. 
Resonances
When looking for Buddhist resonances with the idea of human
rights two issues need to be distinguished: firstly, can Buddhism
make any positive sense of the idea of “rights” and, secondly, does
it allow for the idea of rights that protect the “individual” or more
precisely individual self-determination? 
At least since the reign of emperor A oka (middle of the 3rd 
century BCE), Buddhism has presented itself as a politically and 
socially formative factor, and this was probably just about one 
hundred years after the Buddha’s death.23 To my mind, this did 
not require a radical transformation of Buddhism, for contrary to 
a prejudice still widespread in the West, Buddhism was right 
from the beginning by no means a purely individualistic and es-
capist doctrine of salvation.24 Rather, we find already in the P li
canon a number of ancient texts which demonstrate not only an 
obvious interest in questions of common ethics but also apply 
specific features of the Buddhist explanation of the origin and re-
moval of suffering to the social and political sphere, that is, to 
war, social discord, crime, poverty, legal insecurity, etc. The tradi-
tional Buddhist answer to these issues revolves around the idea of 
                                             
22 An overview over the various aspects of this controversy and the 
repeated accusation of human rights violations can be gained from 
the article “Dorje Shugden controversy” in the English Wikipedia: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dorje_Shugden_Controversy. 
23 According to the shorter chronology which is nowadays accepted 
by many scholars the dates of the Buddha’s life would be some-
thing like 448–368 BCE. On the problems of dating the Buddha see 
Bechert 1986. 
24 Schmidt-Leukel 1997. 
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a Buddhist monarchy, i.e. around the idea of a king ruling the 
country according to the moral principles of the dharma:25
[…] the king, the ruler of the world, the dharmic dharma-king [P. dhammiko 
dhammar ja] relies just on dharma; honours dharma, reveres dharma, esteems 
dharma; with dharma as his standard, with dharma as his banner, with 
dharma as his mandate, he sets a dharma watch and bar and ward for folk 
within his realm […] for warrior and camp follower, for brahman and for 
householder, for town and country folk, for recluse and for godly man, for 
beast and bird alike.26
In this context the word dharma has a fairly broad meaning. It is
usually translated as “law” but means much more than that. In the
Buddhist context it signifies primarily the teaching of the Buddha
which, however, is not regarded as the Buddha’s invention but as
something that the Buddha has rediscovered, like a forgotten city
overgrown by the jungle.27 Accordingly, Buddha’s teaching reflects
a kind of cosmic law which describes the basic syntax of all life —
suffering, its causes, its ultimate appeasing in nirv a as well as the
path leading to the removal of suffering and, as an integral part of
this, morality and justice.
While the dharma has therefore a transtemporary validity, this
does not, in traditional Buddhist understanding, hold for monar-
chy itself. According to an ancient myth, codified in the P li canon,
monarchy is based on a kind of social contract. In primordial times
the idea of private property arose among human beings due to
their greed. As a result of private property and greed, theft, lies,
and violence became rife and so it was resolved to appoint a king.
By the power conferred on him to dispense justice, the elected king
should fight the evils that had arisen and should be paid for this by
the citizens of his state.28 However, the powers and duties of a king
                                             
25 On the concept of the Dharmar ja see Chakravarti 1996, p. 150–176 
and Collins 1998, pp. 414–496. 
26 A guttara-Nik ya V.133 (PTS III 149). The translation follows Hare 
1934, p. 115. I have substituted the more common Sanskrit form 
dharma for the P li form dhamma.
27 Sa yutta-Nik ya 12.65. 
28 Aggañña Sutta, D gha-Nik ya 27. 
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are not confined to this particular form of power.29 In correspon-
dence with the basic Buddhist insight that painful phenomena are
best removed by removing their causes, it also counts among the
king’s duties to provide financial aid for the poor30 and to make
sensible economic investments31 in order to fight poverty as one of
the major causes of all sorts of social evil. The Buddhist scriptures
contain several lists of a king’s virtues and duties,32 among them
the particularly important scheme of the ten virtues of a dharma-
king (P. dasa r jadhamm ), which are: generosity, morality, spirit of
sacrifice, integrity, moderation, spiritual discipline, peaceableness,
nonviolence, forbearance, and non-offensiveness (P. d na, s la,
paricc ga, ajjava, maddava, tapas, akkodha, avihi s , khanti, avirodhana).
In a symposium on “Buddhism and Human Rights”33 Damien
Keown suggested that the Buddhist concept of duties and virtues
of the king determined by the dharma anticipates the modern idea
of rights and human rights in an “embryonic form”.34 Underlying
Keown’s suggestion is the argument that justice can be expressed
both ways, by rights and by duties: someone’s right expresses the
entitlement to be treated justly and someone’s duty expresses the
                                             
29 The king’s judiciary power is particularly significant since in gen-
eral the moral high ethos of Buddhism demands absolute nonvio-
lence. Therefore, the realpolitik considerations of ancient Buddhist 
scriptures on the justification of the exertion of force by the king 
should always be seen against the background of the Buddhist uto-
pia of an entirely nonviolent rule; cf. the extensive evidence given in 
Collins 1998, pp. 419–496. If the aim of the modern human rights 
idea is the protection of the individual against governmental force, 
then one could hold that in a sense the Buddhist texts are, right 
from the beginning, committed to such a view and therefore do not 
ask when and why government force should be restricted but, on 
the contrary, when and why it should be permitted at all. On the 
more general question of Buddhism and violence see Schmidt-
Leukel 2004. 
30 D gha-Nik ya 26. 
31 D gha-Nik ya 5. 
32 Collins 1998, pp. 460ff. 
33 This symposium was carried out as an on-line conference in 1995 by 
the Journal of Buddhist Ethics and was later published in print (Ke-
own et al. 1998). 
34 Keown 1998, p. 22. 
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obligation to treat others justly. From this Keown concludes that
rights and duties can be mutually deduced. Therefore, even if the
Buddhist dharma does not speak of rights but of duties, rights can
nevertheless be deduced from it by the following model:
If under dharma it is the duty of a king (or political authority) to dispense 
justice impartially, then subjects (citizens) may be said to have a “right” to 
just and impartial treatment before the law.35
Keown extends this argument to the whole of Buddhist morality,
so that, in his view, different rights emerge from the various moral
precepts of Buddhism: for example, the right to life from the pre-
cept not to kill, the right to property from the precept not to steal,
etc.36 In other words, the modern ideas of rights in general and of
human rights in particular are not explicitly mentioned in the tra-
ditional Buddhist scriptures but, according to Keown, can be ex-
trapolated from the explicitly stated dharma-related duties. 
Against Keown Craig Ihara has argued that while it is true that
from every right a corresponding duty can be deduced, the con-
verse does not hold — that is, one cannot deduce from every duty
(or Buddhist moral precept) the claim to a corresponding right.37 In
my mind it is true that there are forms of responsibilities which go
beyond that what can be described as satisfying or respecting a par-
ticular right. Therefore, Ihara is correct in that it is not possible to
deduce from every duty or responsibility someone else’s legal
claim or right to that. From the moral precept to give generously,
for it example, one cannot deduce the right to receive plentifully.
Or from the moral obligation to speak the truth no right can be de-
duced never to be lied at. However, as Ihara himself has to admit,
the converse is perfectly correct: legitimate rights lead to the moral
duty of others to respect or not to violate these rights. So if I have in
specific situations the right to learn the truth, it does trigger the
duty of the other to tell me the truth. This is of crucial importance
for the idea of human rights, for stating particular human rights
means making a serious appeal to the duty of the powerful not to
violate these rights. Therefore, in the end, Keown is right insofar as
                                             
35 Keown 1998, p. 21. 
36 Ibid., pp. 31–33. 
37 Ihara 1998, p. 45. 
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at least some specific moral duties of kings, as stated in traditional
Buddhism, may be understood as expressing an appeal that would
in substance correspond to the idea of rights. Regarding the Bud-
dhist conviction that a king should rule in accordance with the
dharma, one may indeed assume that this is backed by the feeling
that such a dharmic exercise of power is highly desirable, particu-
larly from the perspective of the subjects. In any case, it is a familiar
view of the early Buddhist texts that kings are among those things
from which or whom one needs protection. For, in a frequently ap-
pearing standard formula kings are mentioned in one breath with
fire and water, robbers and bad heirs.38 Hence, it does not seem to
be totally misleading to assume that the demand for an exercise of
power in accordance with the dharma was also motivated by the in-
tention to protect the subject from “royal” catastrophes. This is cer-
tainly not yet the same as the modern formulation of the idea of
human rights. However, it is compatible with it or — more strongly
— predisposed to it. One can hardly expect much more from texts
which are more than 2000 years old.
But what about the question so central to the idea of human
rights, the question of justifying the worth of individual self-
determination and free agency? Does Buddhism have a solid and
sound basis for human dignity in the sense of the dignity of the free
individual that must be respected and protected? A number of
Buddhist authors,39 including the Burmese Nobel Peace Prize Lau-
reate Aung San Suu Kyi,40 have answered the question of how to
justify human dignity in Buddhism by hinting at the specific status
of human beings in respect of their potential for enlightenment and
liberation. One should recall first that in Buddhism human beings
do not occupy an absolutely privileged position but are seen
against the doctrine of rebirth as being continuous with all “sen-
                                             
38 Cf., for example, A guttara-Nik ya V.41; Majjhima-Nik ya 13. 
39 Keown 1998, pp. 29f; Harvey 2000, pp. 36f and 118ff; Perera 1991, 
pp. 21–24; Thurman 1988, p. 152f; Chamarik 1985, p. 76f. 
40 Aung San Suu Kyi 1991, p. 174: “Buddhism […] places the greatest 
value on man, who alone of all beings can achieve the supreme state 
of Buddhahood. Each man has in him the potential to realise the 
truth through his own will and endeavour and to help others to re-




tient beings,” that is, with all forms of existence in which rebirth can
take place. Within the context of the human rights debate, Bud-
dhists have therefore repeatedly pointed to an additional need for
animal rights.41 However, the fact that the Buddhist understanding
of human beings42 does not allocate to them an absolutely excep-
tional position entails by no means an indiscriminate levelling. Re-
birth as a human being is regarded as particularly precious because
it carries the most favourable conditions for progress on the Bud-
dhist path of salvation. Therefore it is usually assumed that
enlightenment can be achieved only in human form. Subhuman
forms of existence, i.e. as animals, ghosts or beings in hell, leave no
or too little room for free moral and spiritual action and the life of
the gods is too pleasant for gaining full insight into the basically
unsatisfactory character of sa s ric existence.43 The Buddhist scrip-
tures repeatedly praise existence in human form as particularly
precious with regards to its specific prospects for enlightenment
and salvation.44 And this implies the specific worth of individual
self-determination and free agency. Thus the Buddha admonished
his disciples shortly before he died with the words:
Be islands unto yourselves! Be a refuge to yourselves; do not take to your-
selves any other refuge. See dharma as an island, see dharma as a refuge. Do 
not take to yourselves any other refuge.45
This does not imply any sort of inclination to post-modern or pre-
modern arbitrariness. There is no doubt that the dharma is objec-
tively given and definitely proclaimed by the Buddha and is as
such the “island” or “refuge”. However, what is important for in-
dividual progress on the path of salvation is nothing but personal
appropriation through one’s own understanding and experience,
and in this sense everyone must be one’s own “island” or “refuge”.
Accordingly, the Buddha says in his well known discourse to the
K l mas:
                                             
41 Keown 1998, pp. 34f; Harvey 2000, p. 120; Unno 1988, pp. 143f. 
42 Cf. Schmidt-Leukel 1999. 
43 Cf. Schlingloff 1963, pp. 42f; Harvey 2000, p. 30. 
44 For example, Majjhima-Nik ya 129; Bodhicary vat ra VII.14. 
45 D gha-Nik ya 16. 
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Be ye not misled by report or tradition or hearsay. Be not misled by profi-
ciency in the collections [or scriptures], nor by mere logic or inference, nor 
after considering reasons, nor after reflection on and approval of some the-
ory, nor because it fits becoming, nor out of respect for a recluse (who 
holds it). But, K l mas, when you know for yourselves: these things are 
unprofitable, these things are blameworthy, these things are censured by 
the intelligent; these things, when performed and undertaken, conduce to 
loss and sorrow, — then indeed do ye reject them […] But if at any time 
you know of yourselves: These things are profitable, they are blameless, 
they are praised by the intelligent: these things, when performed and un-
dertaken, conduce to profit and happiness, — then K l mas, do ye, having 
undertaken them, abide therein.46
The personal responsibility of humans for their deeds and their
consequences is also at the center of the Buddhist teaching on karma
and is emphasized by the standard formula: “I myself am respon-
sible for my deed, I am the heir to my deed,”47 meaning that a good
or bad spiritual development is rooted in the direct responsibility
of the individual. The accentuation of personal responsibility
seems also to be one reason for the Buddhist critique of the caste
system (one’s deeds, rather than one’s birth, show an individual’s
worth),48 for the affirmation of an (at least in principle) equal status
of the sexes,49 for the critique of deterministic understandings of
karma and deterministic versions of theism as well as for the rejec-
tion of the materialistic idea that everything happens purely by
chance.50
Moreover, for Buddhism there is no contradiction between re-
sponsibility for oneself and responsibility for one’s fellow humans
or beings.51 Both are seen to belong closely together: “Protecting
                                             
46 A guttara-Nik ya III.66; translation from Woodward 1932, p. 173. 
47 A guttara-Nik ya X.48; similarly V.161. 
48 Cf. Sutta-Nip ta 136. 
49 Cf. Sutta-Nip ta 609. See also Vinaya-Pitaka, Cullavagga X. 1, where 
the fact that women have the same spiritual faculties as men is 
given as the decisive reason for the foundation of the nuns’ order. 
50 For the criticism of these three views see A guttara-Nik ya III.62. 
51 This is rightly stressed by King (2000) as a key aspect of Buddhist 
ethics. However, King is in danger of confounding the idea of hu-
man rights with Buddhist ethics in general and thus misses the cru-
cial point of the protection of free individual agency. But despite the 
moral intuition behind the idea of human rights, having a religious 
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oneself, one protects others; protecting others, one protects one-
self”.52 A central foundation for this is the so-called “Golden Rule,”
which is also well-known in Buddhism:
For a state that is not pleasant or delightful to me must be so to him also; 
and a state that is not pleasing or delightful to me, how could I inflict that 
upon another?53
And this in turn is based on the fundamental insight that all beings
“[…] yearn for happiness and recoil from pain”.54
Given the high value that traditional Buddhism attributes to the
direct responsibility of the individual, it is not surprising that some
Buddhists commit themselves to the protection of individual free-
dom, also on the level of legislation, that is, to an undivided validity
of those human rights which are instrumental to this protection. An
outstanding example of this is Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, the
founder of Indian Neo-Buddhism and the father of the Indian con-
stitution. The legal abolition of caste distinctions through the In-
dian constitution in 1949 and the constitutional guarantee of hu-
man rights are primarily Ambedkar’s work55 and for him an ex-
pression of his Buddhist convictions.56
The organisers of the symposium on “Buddhism and Human
Rights,” mentioned above, issued a Declaration of Interdependence57
which seems to be meant as a kind of draft Buddhist equivalent to
or endorsement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The
first paragraph of the preamble summarises the Buddhist founda-
tions for the idea of human rights in the following way: 
                                             
ethics, even a very impressive one, is not the same as supporting 
human rights. 
52 Sa yutta-Nik ya 47.19. 
53 Sa yutta-Nik ya, as quoted in Harvey 2000, p. 33. 
54 Majjhima-Nik ya 51. 
55 See Ambedkar’s respective memorandum “States and Minorities” 
from 1947 with drafts and comments on the relevant paragraphs of 
the constitution in preparation in Ambedkar 1989, pp. 381–449. 
Ambedkar holds (ibid., p. 409) “that the individual has certain inal-
ienable rights which must be guaranteed to him by the Constitu-
tion” and “The purpose is to protect the liberty of the individual 
[…]” 
56 Cf. Jürgens 1994, pp. 222ff. 
57 Cf. Keown et al. 1998, pp. 221f. and Harvey 2000, pp. 121f. 
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Those who have the good fortune to have a “rare and precious human re-
birth,” with all its potential for awareness, sensitivity, and freedom, have a 
duty to not abuse the rights of others to partake of the possibilities of moral 
and spiritual flourishing offered by human existence. Such flourishing is 
only possible when certain conditions relating to physical existence and so-
cial freedom are maintained. Human beings, furthermore, have an obliga-
tion to treat other forms of life with the respect commensurate to their na-
tures.58
Despite the Buddhist potential for a positive affirmation of the idea
of human rights, the relationship between Buddhism and this idea
is not entirely free from tension. Thus, for the last part of my paper I
would like to deal with some of those dissonances. 
Dissonances
In the thirteenth century the poet R macandra composed the fol-
lowing verses after his conversion to Buddhism:
When the idea of an ego arises, 
it will also procreate egotism. 
Soon the latter will produce the greed for being, 
and that begets from moment to moment delusion. 
[…] 
The root of suffering is this idea of an ego. 
Cut it off from me, O Jina, with the sword of your word.59
In these verses R macandra summarizes the Buddhist belief that
the idea of an ego or “I” is one of the main reasons for the human
predicament. Some Buddhist authors have criticized the idea of
human rights using the argument that it would promote this idea
of an ego and the egotism so closely linked to it.60 Craig Ihara, for
                                             
58 Harvey 2000, p. 121. 
59 R macandra, translated in Otto 1917, pp. 155f. 
60 Cf. Harvey 2000, p. 119: “Buddhists are sometimes unhappy using 
the language of ‘rights’ as they may associate it with people ‘de-
manding their rights’ in an aggressive, self-centered way, and may 
question whether talk of ‘inalienable rights’ implies some unchang-
ing, essential Self that ‘has’ these, which is out of accord with Bud-
dhism’s teaching on the nature of selfhood.” Harvey himself, how-
ever, defends the human rights idea against this criticism by argu-
ing (2000, p. 119) that “[…] while aggressively demanding rights is 
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instance, says “[…] invoking rights has the inevitable effect of em-
phasizing individuals and their status, thereby strengthening the
illusion of self. While Buddhism has a holistic view of life, the rights
perspective is essentially atomistic”.61 Therefore Ihara holds 
[…] that rights in the sense of subjective entitlements are conceptually in-
compatible with classical Buddhist ethics and their introduction would re-
quire a fundamental conceptual transformation […] The change to a mod-
ern concept of rights is one from conceptualizing duties and obligations as 
the role-responsibilities of persons in a cooperative scheme to seeing them 
as constraints on individuals in their interactions with other individuals all 
of whom are otherwise free to pursue their own objectives.62
Ihara’s view that the Buddhist dharma and the associated ideal of
the dharma-king must not be understood in the sense of the idea of
rights finds a vivid illustration or even radicalization in the idea of a
“Dictatorial Dhammic Socialism” from the eminent Thai Buddhist
reformer, Bhikkhu Buddhad sa.63 For Buddhad sa the first prior-
ity of every political system must be the well-being of the commu-
nity. To this the freedom of the individual must be unequivocally
subordinate.64 Moreover, the concept of freedom is, according to
Buddhad sa, in itself highly ambiguous. From a Buddhist perspec-
tive, the individual is controlled by negative, selfish tendencies and
                                             
not in tune with the spirit of Buddhism, being calmly firm and de-
termined in upholding rights, particularly of other people, is so. On 
the matter of what ‘has’ the rights, […] one can simply say that liv-
ing, changing, vulnerable beings are, conventionally, the ‘owners’ of 
rights, with the locus of their value seen as their ability to suffer, 
their very vulnerability, and their potential for enlightenment […]” 
61 Ihara 1998, p. 51, ft. 21. Cf. also Unno 1988, p. 144: “[…] the most dif-
ficult problem in considering the nature of personal rights is the 
ego-centeredness that lurks in its background.” For a similar ten-
dency see Inada 1998, pp. 4 and 6.  
62 Ihara 1998, pp. 48f. 
63 Cf. “A Dictatorial Dhammic Socialism,” in Buddhad sa 1989, 
pp. 182–193. On the life and work of Buddhad sa see Jackson 2003. 
64 Buddhad sa 1989, p. 185: “If we think of politics as something that 
concerns groups of people living together, then the emphasis of a 
political system would be the well-being of the entire group. Free-
dom, on the other hand, is an individual matter. An emphasis on 
personal freedom shifts the focus from the group to the individual. 
Such a focus is at odds with the meaning of politics.” 
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it is precisely this with which liberalism’s concept of freedom can-
not effectively deal:
Liberalism cannot provide a basis for social utility because it promotes self-
ishness, individual benefits rather than social benefits.65
But a liberal concept of freedom is also the basis of liberal democracy
— which therefore has to be rejected too. For Buddhad sa, true free-
dom consists in conquering all selfish tendencies. Socialism with dic-
tatorial features, being opposed to the liberal ideal of individual
freedom, is therefore more suitable for dealing adequately with the
problem of selfishness than liberal democracy.66 However, it is nec-
essary that the socialist dictator follow the dharma and manifests —
in accordance with the ancient Buddhist ideal of the dharma-king —
the ten virtues of kingship:67 “If a good person is the ruler the dicta-
torial socialism will be good, but a bad person will produce an unac-
ceptable type of socialism. A ruler who embodies the ten royal vir-
tues will be the best kind of socialist dictator”.68
Such an ideal Buddhist dictator, says Buddhad sa, will look af-
ter his people the way good parents look after their children.69
Above all, he will “promote the common good” and “abolish the
evil of private, selfish interest”.70 But how is that to be achieved?
Among Buddhad sa’s disciples some illuminating suggestions
                                             
65 Buddhad sa 1989, p. 184. 
66 Ibid., pp. 184f. and 189. In Buddhad sa’s later writings (from the 
1980’s on) one can find some more positive comments on democ-
racy, but he still recommended a Buddhist dictatorship. Cf. Jackson 
2003, pp. 246–251. 
67 Cf. Buddhad sa 1989, p. 191. In this connection it is worth mention-
ing that Aung San Suu Kyi bases the goals of the Burmese democ-
racy movement on the traditional concept of Buddhist kingship as 
well. However, she emphasises (Aung San Suu Kyi 1991, pp. 172f.) 
that, according to the myth, the first king had been elected and she 
interprets the tenth of the ten kingship virtues (avirodha = literally: 
“non-opposition”) as “non-opposition to the will of the people” and 
thus as “a Buddhist endorsement of democracy”. 
68 Buddhad sa 1989, p. 192. 
69 Ibid., p. 193. 
70 Ibid., p. 191. 
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have been made,71 such as: the removal of capitalism in favor of an
“economic structure of […] contentment […] moderation […] and
self-reliance,” oriented by the example of rural cultures; “healthy
sexuality within healthy families;” promotion of indigenous, local
entertainment, songs, and dance; promotion of healthy and crea-
tive forms of sports and play; new ways of education which — in
the long run — might even render schools and universities unnec-
essary; removal of rich and powerful religious institutions; removal
of political parties; promotion of the awareness of “the need […] to
make sacrifices, let go of self, and give up selfish interests for the
good of society;”72 installation of a general system of monitoring,
including something like “moral ombudspersons,” “empowered
to […] investigate, and sanction,” etc.73
Such views take us right into the intensive and partly heated
debate which has become known as the controversy on “Asian
values”. During the 1990s political leaders of various Asian states,
headed by Malaysia and Singapore and markedly supported by
China, have repeatedly criticized the idea of human rights as being
too Western and contended in particular that the individualism on
which it is based is opposed to community-oriented “Asian val-
ues”.74 For some countries like China, Vietnam, Burma (or Myan-
mar) and others, it is only too obvious that this argument was used
to distract attention from considerable violations of human rights
                                             
71 The following examples are from Santikaro Bhikkhu, who was for 
many years Buddhad sa’s interpreter and co-worker. Cf. Santikaro 
Bhikkhu 1997. 
72 Santikaro Bhikkhu 1997, p. 126. 
73 Ibid., p. 149. Buddhad sa was also aware that a “Dictatorial 
Dhammic Socialism” could not be realized without force, appealing 
for this to the example of Emperor A oka: “He purified the sa gha
by wiping out the heretics, and he insisted on right behavior on the 
part of all classes of people. A oka was not a tyrant, however. He 
was a gentle person who acted for the good of the whole society. He 
constructed wells and assembly halls, and had various kinds of fruit 
trees planted for the benefit of all. He was ‘dictatorial’ in the sense 
that if his subjects did not do these public works as commanded, 
they were punished.” (Buddhad sa 1989, p. 190) Therefore, it is not 
entirely correct when Donald Swearer (1996, p. 143) claims that 
“Buddhad sa flatly condemns violence”. 
74 Cf. Langlois 2001; Bell 1999; Paul 1998. 
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within their own states or to escape international criticism.75 But
underlying some of the Asian voices is clearly the genuine concern
that a liberal individualistic ethos in conjunction with a legalistic,
aggressive and consumerist attitude does not meet traditional val-
ues of Asian societies, i.e. social harmony, respect for family and
authorities and, in particular, emphasis on duty and responsibility
rather than on rights that can be claimed.
Such concerns should not be easily dismissed. Bhikkhu Parekh
has rightly pointed out that, on the one hand, emphasizing “Asian
values” “[…] is vulnerable to the collectivist danger and unlikely to
create a culture conducive to the development of individuality and
choice” but that, on the other hand, a one-sided liberal stress on
rights is hardly able “to nurture the spirit of community and social
responsibility”.76 This statement marks a good starting-point for
understanding that both sides, the representatives of “Asian values”
and the defenders of “Western Liberalism”, could learn from each
other and in a sense complement each other,77 although not on the
same level exactly — i.e. not on the legal level of those minimal pro-
tective rights which are meant to guard the freedom of the individ-
ual from powerful communities and institutions. It is true that em-
phasizing such individual protective rights is not enough for pro-
moting moral sensitivity and social responsibility. Responsibility ex-
ceeds that which can be secured legally. Therefore, it makes a great
deal of sense to identify, in addition to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, an intercultural and inter-religious basis for a Univer-
                                             
75 Cf. Twiss 1998, pp. 158f; Powers 1998, p. 176; Parekh 2000, pp. 140f. 
76 Parekh 2000, p. 138. 
77 On this see also the view of Sumner B. Twiss: “Human rights are in-
tended to be compatible not only with traditions that emphasize the 
primacy of individuals within the community (true of many West-
ern societies) but also with traditions that may emphasize the pri-
macy of community and the way that individuals contribute to it 
(true of many non-Western societies). In effect, international human 
rights are intended to advance a balancing and integration of indi-
vidual and community interests for both more individualistic and 
more communitarian societies, in an attempt to avoid the patho-
logical extremes of individual freedom without communal solidar-
ity and communal solidarity without individual freedom […] There 
can be different viable social patterns between these two extremes.” 
(Twiss 1998, p. 162) 
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sal Declaration of Human Responsibilities as it had been intended
within the context of the “Global Ethic Project”.78 Human responsi-
bilities and human rights should complement rather than supersede
each other. Emphasizing social and moral responsibility must not
lead to a removal of that basic intuition of human rights that seeks
legal protection for the individual’s freedom of self-determination.
On the other hand this right cannot prevail without any limitations.
It finds its limit — as already stated in the 1948 Declaration — at the
rights of others and “the just requirements of morality, public order
and the general welfare”. But it must not be crushed by the latter. 
This, however, seems to be the danger of concepts such as
Buddhad sa’s “Dictatorial Dhammic Socialism”. The problem,
which is here particularly obvious, consists in the intention to force
the high ethos of Buddhist morality on an entire society.79 But,
among other things, it is precisely a tutelage like this against which
human rights ought to protect people. This is not a specific problem
of Buddhism but a problem of religion and human rights in gen-
eral. The crucial challenge for religions is therefore to support the
key intention of the idea of human rights, even and in particular if
this entails restricting the power of religious institutions. I think
that in principle Buddhists could and should make this intention
their own. Not only because — as the Thai Buddhist and scholar of
politics, Saneh Chamarik, has rightly remarked — well-intentioned
dictatorships can only too easily end up with horrendous subjuga-
tion but also because religious tutelage ultimately contradicts the
Buddhist respect for the individual’s own spiritual responsibility.80
What happens if someone living under such a dharma dictatorship
                                             
78 Cf. Küng 1997, esp. pp. 91–113; Küng and Schmidt 1998. 
79 In his analysis of the political ideas of Buddhad sa and his followers 
May (2003) has rightly seen that underlying Buddhad sa’s “Dham-
mic socialism” are the ideals of the Buddhist monastic community 
(May 2003, pp. 96ff). But in this otherwise sensible and highly com-
mendable study May is surprisingly uncritical about the dangers to 
the individual’s freedom (and hence for a key value of the idea of 
human rights) resulting from the attempts of religious communities 
to make their own specific norms compulsory for a society. I agree 
with Swearer (1996, p. 144) who argues that Buddhad sa’s vision of a 
society founded on the norms of the dharma fits better with voluntary 
religious communities than with political systems. 
80 Chamarik 1985, pp. 84f. and 87. 
BUDDHISM AND THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS
61
does not share the high ideals of Buddhism and prefers rather to be
selfish and greedy? What happens if someone likes to indulge in
pleasures which, from a Buddhist perspective, are inferior or “un-
healthy” or enjoys different music and dances from folk music and
folk dancing? What happens if someone would like to retain reli-
gious institutions, political parties and universities? Will methods
of intensified education then be imposed? I think that Buddha-
d sa’s and his disciples’ suggestions are as naive as they are peril-
ous. Asia has had enough painful experiences with analogous vi-
sions from communists.81 Buddhists who accept the idea of human
rights can support specific Buddhist values and ideals by the old
means of preaching, the lived example and, of course, by all sorts of
constructive social co-operation but not by dictatorial force. The
spirit of human rights demands that Buddhists respect and try to
protect the freedom of individuals even, and in particular, if they
want to understand themselves other than in a Buddhist sense.
That such ideas are not only modern and exclusively Western is
perhaps illustrated by the following instructions from the vinaya,
the monastic rule, of the M lasarv stiv dins: 
If — says the vinaya — one has to carry out some building measure for the 
Buddha and if for this reason one has to cut a tree which is inhabited by a 
tree-deity, then one should present to this tree-deity incense, flowers and 
offerings and subsequently expound to the deity the wholesome forms of 
conduct and after that ask the deity to move into a different tree just be-
cause this tree is needed for the Buddha. If, however, the deity refuses to 
leave the tree then “one shall praise to the deity the advantages of generos-
ity and explain the disadvantages of miserliness and greed”. But if even 
that is of no use and the deity still refuses to leave its tree, then — says the 
instruction — “one is not allowed to cut it”.82
                                             
81 It is evident that there have been various links between the ethical 
ideas of Asian Communist movements and Buddhist morality. It 
would be worth exploring those links in more detail. For a thorough 
record of the relations between Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge and 
Buddhism see the important new study Harris 2007, pp. 57–101. 
Harris suggests that Pol Pot’s (who had himself been a Buddhist 
monk at some stage) “frequent attacks on individualism” may de-
rive from his Buddhist past (cf. ibid., p. 83). 
82 T. 1428: 23.776a. I am very grateful to Professor Dr. Lambert 
Schmithausen, who drew my attention to this passage and kindly 
translated it for me from the Chinese. 
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Therav da Buddhism and Human Rights.
Perspectives from Thai Buddhism1
MARTIN SEEGER
In this article I intend to pursue two major objectives. Firstly, I want
to examine current debates in which ideas and practices in Thai
Therav da Buddhism2 have repeatedly been perceived as being not
in line with or problematic with regard to human rights. In particu-
lar “freedom of religion” has become the subject of debate in the
course of various controversies that have taken place in Thai Bud-
dhism during the last twenty years. There has been considerable dis-
                                             
1 In this paper, I have adopted a standardized phoneticization of Thai 
script except with cases where the author’s or person’s name men-
tioned in this paper has an established form of transliteration. Some 
of the texts that I refer to in this paper are bilingual, i.e. in Thai and 
English. In these cases, I give the reference of the passage I quote or 
refer to both for English and Thai (which is indicated by using a 
slash between the respective page numbers). All the translations 
from the Thai and P li are mine unless otherwise stated; in cases 
where an English translation was available this has been consulted. 
I would like to thank Dr Caroline Rose, Dr Justin McDaniel, and Mr 
Robin Moore for their valuable comments on this article. I am also 
grateful to Ajarn Dhanapon Somwang who sent me a number of 
texts that were important sources for this article.  
2 When using “Buddhism” or “Buddhist” in this article, this has to be 




cussion as to the extent to which this human right can be referred to
in order to legitimate deviation from traditional orthopraxy and or-
thodoxy. Focal points of my investigation will be the Thai nun-
ordination controversy and the debates revolving around the con-
troversial teachings of the Thai Buddhist movements Santi Asok and
Wat Phra Thammakai. Secondly, I will look at investigations of hu-
man rights concepts that have been put forward by influential think-
ers of Thai Therav da Buddhism. The rationale for this approach is
to identify and analyse the challenges and problems of the encounter
between Thai Therav da Buddhism and human rights, both on a
practical and theoretical level.
The Thai  Nun-Ordinat ion Controversy 
In the course of the ongoing controversy over the possibility of a 
revival of the vanished ordination lineage of Therav da nuns 
(P. bhikkhun ),3 the relationship between human rights and current 
“monastic law” (Th. kotmai khana song)4 and practice have repeat-
edly been debated in Thai society. It has been argued that the cur-
rent monastic law regarding ordination of bhikkhun s is at variance 
with human rights as enshrined in the Thai Constitution.5 Also, it 
has been argued that the Thai sa gha, i.e. the Thai Therav da mo-
nastic community, should change its hermeneutical approach to 
the P li canon in order to overcome its “anachronistic structure,”6
for the human rights of women “is at stake”.7 At the same time, 
however, it has been opined that constitutional law cannot be im-
                                             
3 See Seeger 2006a; Seeger 2007. 
4 When I use “monastic law” in this paper, I refer to the Thai Sa gha
Acts and all other regulations that have been promulgated by the 
Thai Sa gha Supreme Council (Th. Mahatherasamakhom). “Canon-
ical law,” however, refers to the monastic rules as they are outlined in 
the canonical texts of the vinayapi aka (“basket containing the monas-
tic discipline” which is one of the three sections of Therav da’s P li
canon, the “tripi aka” or the “Three Baskets”).  
5 Seeger 2006a, p. 160. All the debates regarding female ordination 
that I discuss in this paper took place under the Thai Constitution of 
1997 which was abolished in 2006. 
6 See Seeger 2007, p. 4. 
7 Suwanna Satha-anand 2001, p. 290; see also Suwannna Satha-anand, 
2007.
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posed upon Buddhism, that the Buddha’s teaching (P. dhamma-
vinaya) “should be above (Th. khuan yu nuea)” constitutional law8 or 
that
[…] when the “rule of the dhamma [P. dhamm dhipateyya]” is blended with 
“democracy [Th. prachathipatai],” society might become disunited [Th. taek-
yaek].9
It has also been argued that while Buddhist P li canonical law was
established by the Buddha, the most excellent being, constitutional
law has been drawn up by un-awakened human beings (P. puthu-
jjana) who
[…] still possess a great amount of defilements and cravings [Th. yang mi 
kilet tanha yu mak].10
To fully understand this summary of the arguments, it is worth re-
capitulating very briefly the background and major lines of dis-
agreement in the nun-ordination controversy.
The P li canon recounts11 that the Buddha allowed women to
be ordained into his monastic community (P. sa gha) only after
having been requested seven times for permission. He also made
eight special rules (P. a hagarudhamm ) a condition for their ordina-
tion.12 These eight rules not only prescribe the institutional subor-
dination of the female sa gha under the male monastic community
— one of them also requires women to be ordained both by the
male and the female sa gha (P. ubhatosa ghe).13 A variety of expla-
nations have been given as to why the Buddha established these
rules and seemingly only reluctantly allowed the establishment of
the nun-order. Whereas some Thai scholars doubt the authenticity
of these rules in their entirety, as they regard them to be at variance
with major parts of Buddha’s teaching, others have argued that by
establishing these rules the Buddha was responding to a patriar-
chal socio-cultural context in order to not endanger the success of
                                             
 8 Quoted in Rabiebrat Pongpanith 2546, pp. 62 and 143. 
 9 Senate Commission on Women, Youth and Elderly People Affairs, 
s.a., p. 41. 
10 Quoted in Rabiebrat Pongpanith 2546, p. 62. 
11 Vin.II.253–255; AN.IV.273–279. 




his recently founded religion. After all, there are numerous refer-
ences in the P li canon that clearly state that women have the po-
tential for awakening.14
Be this as it may, Thai Therav dins have perceived themselves as
guardians of the most original form of Buddhism that is believed to
be described in the P li canon.15 Here, it is believed that the Thera-
v da tradition has been extremely successful in painstakingly pre-
serving Buddha’s teaching (dhammavinaya) by making sure that
original teaching and practice have to a large extent remained un-
changed for the last 2500 years. The objective of this conservatism is
often expressed by quoting the words of the Buddha:
[…] the monks do not establish what has not been established, and do not 
abrogate what has been established […]16
In the late 1920s, when the possibility of Therav da bhikkhun ordina-
tion was publicly debated for the first time in Thai society, the then
Thai Supreme Patriarch (P. Sa ghar ja) promulgated a regulation
which forbade all Thai monks and novices from ordaining women
as apprentices (P. sikkham n ), novices (P. s ma er ) or nuns
(P. bhikkhun ). He explained that a valid s ma er ordination proce-
dure, as prescribed by P li canonical law, has to be performed with
the help of a (Therav da) bhikkhun . The bhikkhun order (of the
Therav da), however, he argued, ceased to exist “a long time ago”
(this is believed to have happened some 1,000 years ago). Conse-
quently, for him, the absence of the bhikkhun order rendered legiti-
mate ordination of female (Therav da) novices impossible.17 The
promulgation of the Thai Sa ghar ja is still valid today and was re-
portedly only recently endorsed by the current Sa ghar ja in 2001,
just three months after the beginning of the most recent attempt to
revive the vanished Therav da nun order in Thailand.18
The Thai scholar of religious studies Suwanna Satha-anand
perceives in the Buddha’s decision to allow women’s ordination in
                                             
14 See e.g. Vin.II.254–255; SN.I.33. 
15 See Seeger 2005; Seeger 2006a; Seeger 2007; Seeger 2009a. 
16 “[…] bhikkh  apaññatta  na paññapessanti, paññatta  na samucchindis-
santi […]” (DN.II.77); see also Seeger 2009a. 
17 Wirat Thiraphanmethi and Thongbai Thirananthangkun 2546, p. 459. 
18 For more details of this and previous attempts, see Seeger 2005, 
pp. 194–213; Seeger 2006a; Seeger 2007. 
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a patriarchal socio-cultural environment “a fine illustration of re-
specting women’s rights”.19 She argues that
[…] [t]he universality of Buddhist truth also required the Buddha to make 
the decision to support the human rights of women, at least with regards 
to religious practice.20
In a similar vein, the Thai Senate Commission on Women, Youth
and Elderly People Affairs perceives freedom of religion and gender
equality, as enshrined in modern constitutional texts and the UN
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, as being in conformity with Buddha’s teaching (dhamma-
vinaya), especially regarding the equal potential of awakening for
men and women.21 Both Suwanna Satha-anand and the Thai Senate
Commission argue that the current Thai sa gha should abandon its
traditional conservative practice with regards to female ordination
by following the example of the Buddha, who allowed female ordi-
nation. They maintain that this approach would also be in accor-
dance with the human rights of women.22
For the Thai scholar of Buddhism Pathomphong Phoprasitthi-
nan, however,
[…] to refer to modern human rights in order to cancel out [Th. lom] prin-
ciples which the Buddha laid down as regulations [P. buddhapaññatti] is in-
adequate [Th. phit kala thesa], as this would not be a matter of human rights 
but of human wrongs.23
According to his understanding, rights can only be invoked as long
as “morality” (Th. sinlatham) and established laws and practices
that have developed in specific communities are not undermined.
For him, maintaining human rights entails respect for the princi-
ples and practices of specific communities (Th. chumchon). As a
consequence of this, he expresses his opposition to the revival of
                                             
19 Suwanna Satha-anand 2001, p. 286. 
20 Ibid., p. 285. 
21 Senate Commission on Women, Youth and Elderly People Affairs, 
s.a., pp. 3–4, 57. 
22 Ibid., pp. 57–66; Suwanna Satha-anand 2001; Suwanna Satha-anand 
2007; see also Seeger 2006a, pp. 165–166. 
23 Pathomphong Phoprasitthinan 2545b, p. 62. In this passage “human 
rights” and “human wrongs” occur in English. 
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the Therav da nuns’ order, as this “cannot be reconciled with
[Therav da] canonical law”.24 Furthermore, he argues that if the
Therav da abandons its traditional conservatism regarding this
matter, the floodgates would potentially be opened to abolishing
other monastic practices that some people might perceive as being
in conflict with human rights. He mentions here as an example the
Buddha’s prohibition of the ordination of hermaphrodites (P. ubha-
to-byañjanaka).25 While apparently agreeing with the prohibition of
the Sa ghar ja of 1928, Pathomphong suggests that women’s 
rights should be interpreted on the basis of Thai culture. For him
this means that in order to allow women to develop their spiritual
potential more efficiently, alternative institutions for female practi-
tioners should be supported or developed.26
The Thai academic Kulavir Prapapornpipat, who describes
herself as a “Buddhist feminist,” however seems to have a quite dif-
ferent understanding in this respect. She argues that
[…] when the practical regulations of the sa gha were at odds with the 
principles of the country’s law, the Buddha had the sa gha conform to the 
law of the state in order to avoid conflict […]27
Consequently, she suggests that 
[…] those parts of the sa gha regulations and laws that are at variance with 
the principles of constitutional law [should be reconsidered].28
According to the Thai scholar-monk Phra Payutto, who is widely re-
garded as the foremost authority on the P li canon in Thailand,29
women undoubtedly have the right to become ordained. For him, to
refer to constitutionally guaranteed rights, however, is not valid in
this matter: he argues that while the right to become ordained still
exists, there is no one with the right to perform the ordination proce-
                                             
24 Pathomphong Phoprasitthinan 2545b, p. 64.  
25 See Vin.I.89; Vin.II.271. Pathomphong Phoprasitthinan 2545b, pp. 62–
63; see also Pathomphong Phoprasitthinan 2545a. 
26 Pathomphong Phoprasitthinan 2545b, pp. 64–65. 
27 Quoted in Seeger 2006a, p. 161. Bhikkhun  Dhammanand  argues 
similarly, see Nasak Atcimathon 2544, pp. 74–75.  
28 Quoted in Seeger 2006, p. 161. 
29 See Seeger 2005. 
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dure.30 According to him, at the moment, the ordination of female
Therav da nuns (bhikkhun ) is simply technically not possible (due to
there being no Therav da order to provide the nuns who have to
take part in a female ordination), and, as a consequence of this, he,
like Pathomphong, suggests either creating an alternative institution
or improving existing institutions.31
As for the Thai government during the time of these debates, it
seemed to have found this issue too difficult to deal with and de-
cided not to get involved in the nun-ordination controversy. In this
way, in 2002 the then Deputy Prime Minister Visanu Khruea-ngam
[…] stated repeatedly that the issue of women’s ordination, being a reli-
gious matter, was beyond the jurisdiction of the government.32
In 2004 the then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra
[…] said that the government was in full support of equal opportunities for 
women in all spheres, except for women’s ordination.33
He then continued,
The government has no idea how to deal with this issue of phiksuni
[bhikkhun ] ordination. We must withdraw from the matter.34
The “Sant i  Asok Case”
and the “Thammakai  Case” 
During the last three decades or so, several scandals and controver-
sies have severely unsettled the Thai sa gha. For the Thai sa gha ar-
guably the most unsettling and challenging of these, though, was
what has come to be known as the “Santi Asok Case” and the
“Thammakai Case”. In both of these cases Thai institutional sa gha
and what are believed to be more traditional forms of Thai Bud-
dhism have been critically challenged by the teachings and prac-
tices of the two popular Buddhist movements Santi Asok and Wat
Phra Thammakai (the latter has been far more popular in Thai soci-
ety, with hundreds of thousands of followers, whereas the former
                                             
30 Phra Payutto 2544, p. 12.  
31 See Seeger 2006a, pp. 171–172; Seeger 2009b. 
32 Varaporn Chamsanit 2006, p. 218. 
33 Ibid., p. 205. 
34 Cited in ibid., p. 205. 
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has followers in the thousands, possibly tens of thousands). Both of
these cases are characterized by an enormous complexity, demon-
strated by the huge number of publications, both in Thai and in
Western languages, that examine various aspects of these phenom-
ena or condemn or vindicate these two movements. Here, I will
solely focus on the debates that deal with the extent to which the
human right of freedom of religion can be referred to in order to le-
gitimate deviation from what has been perceived to be traditional
orthopraxy and orthodoxy of Thai Buddhism.
The Santi Asok case took place in the 1970s and 1980s and ulti-
mately resulted in the decision of the Mahatherasamakhom to de-
frock Samana Phothirak, the leader of the Santi Asok movement.
The Santi Asok movement is characterized by its strict practices of
abstinence, its rejection of the widespread superstitious beliefs and
practices in Thai Buddhism, its emphasis on anti-capitalism and
community life, and its vegetarianism. Samana Phothirak has been
accused of distorting a number of central P li canonical teachings,
for example by claiming that a person can concurrently be an ara-
hant (fully awakened one) and a bodhisatta (Buddha-to-be); that it is
legitimate according to P li canonical law that monks proclaim
their higher spiritual attainments (P. uttarimanussadhamma) in front
of non-monastics, which he himself repeatedly did; and, in connec-
tion with this point, that only beings on an advanced spiritual level
(P. ariyapuggala) are able to understand and propound correctly
P li canonical teachings;35 and that Therav da monks should be
vegetarians.36 In addition to this, in 1975, after he “had met many
obstacles” — for example, “he had been obstructed by the pedantic
application of sa gha rules and regulations” to which he was un-
able “to conform” — he declared his movement independent of the
Thai sa gha institution.37
In contrast to the Santi Asok movement, the Wat Phra Tham-
makai movement has not challenged the Thai institutional sa gha
in a direct and overt way, but has rather been trying to establish
close connections with it and other important Thai institutions,
such as the Royal Family, the military, the government, and banks.
This movement enjoys support from a number of high-ranking and
                                             
35 See Seeger 2005, p. 141. 
36 See Sunai Setbunsang 2537, pp. 62–63. 
37 Jackson 1989, pp. 161–162; see also Keyes 1999, pp. 129–130.  
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influential monks, some of whom are members of the Sa gha Su-
preme Council in Thailand, the Mahatherasamakhom. The Thai
sociologist Apinya Fuengfusakul wrote that
[…] Thammakai’s conformist disposition enables it to synthesize consumer-
ist competitive marketing and advertising strategy with the traditional belief 
of merit accumulation with ends up in the merchandization of merit […]38
At the height of the controversy, the spiritual leader of this move-
ment, Phra Thammachayo, was charged with, amongst other
things, embezzlement under secular law. At the same time, he was
accused of having claimed to possess higher spiritual attainments
39 and of spreading teachings that have been regarded as unortho-
dox from a Therav da doctrinal point of view. Severe criticism has
particularly been directed against the movement’s wide use of
miracles (P. p ih riya) and their teaching that nirv a (P. nibb na),
the soteriological goal of Buddhism, has the characteristic of a
Higher Self (P. att ), which is in conflict with traditional Thera-
v da’s view that “all and everything is no-self” (P. sabbe dhamm
anatt ), including nibb na.40
Teachings and practices of both of these movements have been
criticized heavily by a number of acknowledged Thai scholars,
academics, monks and social critics who are concerned about the
integrity and longevity of “original” Buddhism. These critics main-
tain that Santi Asok and Wat Phra Thammakai have distorted
Therav da Buddhism in its fundamental principles to an unac-
ceptable extent. Phra Payutto, who has been one of the most out-
spoken and widely heard critics of both these movements, explains
that while the Therav da allows for a lot of interpretational free-
dom, teachings and practices of Wat Phra Thammakai and Santi
                                             
38 Apinya Feungfusakul 1993, p. 195.  
39 According to P li canonical law, monks are not allowed to report 
their spiritual attainments to laypeople or novices. If the claim of 
possessing supernatural abilities or having attained transcendental 
states of mind is a deliberate lie, however, the respective monk has 
irredeemably lost his monkhood (in this case it does not matter if 
these claims have been made to monastics or laypeople). For more 
on this see h nissaro Bhikkhu 2007, pp. 93–108 and 318–321. 




Asok deviate from the normative and formative authoritative
source of the Therav da, the P li canon, to such an extent that they
cannot be regarded as Therav din. In numerous publications and
public speeches, Phra Payutto has systematically and in much de-
tail compared the P li canonical teachings with those of Santi Asok
and Wat Phra Thammakai. For him, distorting and abrogating ca-
nonical teachings, or adding interpolations to the P li canon, is the
“direct destruction of the essence of Buddhism”.41
For his criticism of Wat Phra Thammakai and Santi Asok, Phra
Payutto has himself repeatedly been criticized not only by propo-
nents of these movements but also by a number of Thai academics.
He was accused of “being narrow-minded” (Th. mi naeu khwamkhit
khapkhaep), “attached to the scriptures”, “a dogmatist” and “a pur-
ist” who tries “to prevent religious freedom and thus promot[es]
religious intolerance”.42
Phra Payutto, however, explains that people have the right and
freedom to disagree with the principles and teachings of Buddhism
and to leave Buddhism,43 but
[…] the freedom of religion doesn’t mean the freedom to alter […] or do 
whatever one wants with the religion.44
He maintains that
[…] human rights and constitutionally guaranteed freedom are meant to 
enhance righteous practice and should not be referred to in order to justify 
arbitrariness [Th. tham arai dai tam chop cai] or […] to destroy the essence of 
Buddhism.45
For him, the voluntary decision to join the monastic community by
the act of ordination implies that the new member accepts canoni-
                                             
41 Phra Payutto 2533, p. 64. This statement has to be understood in the 
context of Therav da Buddhism and refers only to the P li canon. It 
is not intended to criticize other Buddhist schools or their production 
of “new” texts, as these schools do not claim to be Therav da.
42 Sanitsuda Ekachai, in Bangkok Post, January 17th, 2000; see also Ol-
son 1995, p. 21; Seeger 2005, pp. 147–151; Wimuttinantha 2548, p. 10. 
43 Phra Payutto 2533, pp. 50–51. 
44 Phra Payutto 2533, pp. 79–80; see Phra Payutto and Rawi Phawilai 
2532, pp. 74–75. 
45 Phra Payutto 2533, p. 84. 
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cal law (P. vinaya)46 and adheres to Buddhist principles and teach-
ings.47 Monks have the freedom guaranteed by the Thai constitu-
tion to leave the Thai monastic community and are then not subject
to sa gha law any longer.48 Phra Payutto also maintains that the
sa gha has the right to deal with “impostors” (Th. bukkhon aepfaeng)
in accordance with the monastic mechanisms and regulations as
laid down by the Buddha.49
In line with Phra Payutto’s argument, the famous social critic
and proponent of the 1997 Thai constitution, Dr Prawet Wasi, ar-
gued that based on their human right of freedom of religion Wat
Phra Thammakai should either “split” from the Therav da and de-
clare themselves as a new cult (Th. latthi) or congregation (Th. ni-
kai), or adjust their views (P. di hi) and practices so that they are in
line with the Therav da.50 The well-known Bangkok Post columnist
Sanitsuda Ekachai maintains that Wat Phra Thammakai followers
do not “have the right to call their religious belief Therav da Bud-
dhism, because it is not”.51 The Wat Phra Thammakai movement,
however, has made clear that they do not regard themselves as a
new school or congregation (Th. nikai) but as an integral part of
“traditional Thai Buddhism”.52
This raises a number of important questions, of course. For ex-
ample, who is to be invested with the authority to expel monks
from the Therav da and how exactly is this to happen? Who de-
cides what constitutes unacceptable deviation from canonical
norm? What are the hermeneutical criteria to be taken in doing so?
And what is the role of the Thai state in all of this? If it has/should
have one, in what form and to what extent should the Thai state get
involved in religious controversies specifically, and in the Thai
sa gha institution more generally? Streckfuss and Templeton main-
tain that calling upon the state, as was done by some, “to deny [Wat
                                             
46 Phra Payutto and Rawi Phawilai 2532, p. 20; see also Phra Payutto 
2531, p. 11. 
47 Phra Payutto 2533, p. 78. 
48 Phra Payutto 2531, pp. 4 and 11. 
49 Phra Payutto 2533, p. 53. 
50 Prawet Wasi 2542, pp. 15 and 21–22. 
51 Bangkok Post, January 7th, 1999. 
52 Scott 2006, p. 216. Here, I will not discuss the semantic problems 




Phra Thammakai] the right to call themselves Therav da Bud-
dhists” is a “solution” which “is probably unacceptable in terms of
human rights”.
It is not for the government to determine whether Thammakai adherents 
[sic] are actually practising Buddhism or whether they can call themselves 
“Buddhists”.53
As demonstrated by numerous academic studies,54 there exists a
closely and complexly intertwined relationship between the Thai
state and the Thai sa gha, and it is because of this complexity that the
only thing I can do here is to hint at a few of the intricate issues that
are relevant to my discussion here. While some scholars have criti-
cized the Thai sa gha-state relationship as being unfavourable for
Thai Buddhism, others seem to believe that this liaison is necessary
for the continuity and integrity of Buddhism, for it has been argued
that the sa gha on its own would not be able to secure its “purity”
without support from the state, especially in terms of enforcing ca-
nonical law.55 A number of Thai academics have defended this close
relationship by arguing that it is necessary for the state to “help” the
monastic community by enforcing proper monastic behavior in or-
der to safeguard its “purity”. There has been concern that without
the “protection” of the state Thai Buddhism could be “destroyed”
(Th. wibat).56 In Thai history a number of legislative texts, such as the
different Sa gha Acts, regulations and resolutions, have been pro-
claimed with the aim to enforce “proper” monastic behavior and
administer the monastic community; it has also repeatedly been no-
ticed, though, that the Sa gha Acts have had the aim of enabling the
Thai state to “control” or “use” the monastic community for na-
tional-political ends.57 At the same time, however, it has also been
argued that “solely using the dhamma and monastic laws [vinaya]
like during the time of the Buddha is certainly not sufficient” nowa-
                                             
53 Streckfuss and Templeton 2002, p. 77. 
54 See, e.g., Jackson 1989; Ishii 1986; Swearer 1999; Tambiah 1976; Tay-
lor 1993.
55 See, e.g., Somparn Promta 2549, p. 18. 
56 See ibid., p. 18. 
57 See, e.g., Keyes 1971; Phiphat Phasutharachat 2549, pp. 327–330. 
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days for the protection of Buddhism in present times.58 The role of
the current Thai state is seen as being, or even expected to be, tied to
the traditional role of Thai kings, who by proclaiming Sa gha Acts or
other monastic laws and expelling “impostors” from the monastic
community were aiming to preserve the integrity and purity of
“original” Buddhism.59 By doing this, these Thai kings were follow-
ing the paradigms of Indian kings whose endeavor to protect “au-
thentic” Buddhism is described in post-canonical texts.
The independent Thai author Phiphat Phasutharachat argues,
however, that in this respect the traditional role of Thai kings can-
not be taken as a standard for the modern democratic Thai state
whose role should be confined to supporting the Thai sa gha. Ac-
cording to Phiphat, the Thai government should abstain from en-
forcing proper monastic conduct by law and punishment:60
The prohibition of monks from violating canonical law [vinaya] is not the 
business of the government. This prohibition is a violation of the rights of 
the people.61
According to him, the current Sa gha Act, which was proclaimed in
1962 violates the freedom of religion in that it prevents the emer-
gence of new Buddhist schools in Thailand by the force of law.62 He
argues that while the Mahatherasamakhom ”has the right” to expel
monks whose beliefs deviate from Therav da principles from the
Therav da community, it would “have no right” to force monks to
disrobe (as was done in the case of Samana Phothirak). Phiphat sug-
gests that monks whose beliefs deviate from normative beliefs and
practices of the Therav da should, however, indicate to the public
that they belong to a different school.This could be done for example
by wearing robes of a different style.63 However, in addition to the
hermeneutical problems involved, as already indicated above, the
“solution” that Phiphat proposes here might also be problematic
from a P li canonical law point of view, as the Buddha was quite
                                             
58 Wirat Thiraphanmethi/Thongbai Thirananthangkun 2546, p. 4. See 
also McDaniel 2008, p. 103. 
59 See Seeger 2009a. 
60 Phiphat Phasutharachat 2549, pp. 316–317 and 336. 
61 Ibid., p. 320. 
62 Ibid., pp. 351 and 396. 
63 Phiphat Phasutharachat 2549, pp. 389, 390 and 394.  
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specific as to what styles of robes can be worn by his monks. In this
way, a Buddhist monk who is wearing a prohibited color or gar-
ments of another religion (P. titthiya)64 might incur what the vinaya
regards as a minor offense or a grave offense respectively. Demand-
ing that monks wear a different style of robes might consequently
force them to breach the respective monastic rules and thus obstruct
their religious practice. The proper style of wearing robes as pre-
scribed by the P li canon forms an essential part of proper ordina-
tion procedure and monastic life. In addition to this, the saffron or
brownish robes of Thai monks have become a powerful cultural
symbol in Thailand.65 Numerous special privileges are granted to
monks simply because of the fact that they are wearing the tradi-
tional robes. Consequently, apart from being made into some
“other,” monks with different robes might be precluded from this
elevated social position and the privileges connected to it.
As it stands at the moment, expelling monks from the Thai
Therav da monastic community without asking them to disrobe
would hardly be possible anyway because, as Phra Payutto explains,
based on their ordination Thai monks are not only required to follow
canonical law (vinaya) as outlined in the P li canon, but are also
obliged to follow laws by the state. And according to these laws,
leaving the Thai sa gha can only be done by disrobing:
Once you have been ordained, and as long as you haven’t disrobed (or ha-
ven’t died), you belong to the Thai monastic community and are subject to 
the sa gha law [Th. kotmai khana song; which includes the Sa gha Acts].66
For Phra Payutto, asking monks to obey secular law conforms with
the approach of the Buddha who laid down numerous monastic
rules complying with extant secular law and also prescribed a gen-
eral practice when he said:
Bhikkhus, I ask you to act according to [the laws] of kings [P. anuj n mi 
bhikkhave r j na  anuvattitunti].67
Phra Payutto, consequently, argues that the correct approach in
this respect that would be in coherence with democratic principles
                                             
64 Vin.I.306. 
65 See Seeger 2009b. 
66 Phra Payutto 2531, p. 11. 
67 Vin.I.138. 
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would be to try to change existing legislation regarding all the
points with which one disagrees, without, however, infringing
upon them.68
Phra Payutto’s Cri t ical  Invest igat ion  
of  Human Rights Concepts 
In the following section, I would like to present the critical investi-
gation of Western human rights concepts put forward by the Thai
scholar-monk Phra Payutto.69 This will be done by considering his
arguments in the context of approaches and ideas of other influen-
tial Thai thinkers and Buddhist studies scholars. In this paper I
have repeatedly referred to the ideas of Phra Payutto. Considering
his thoughts in more detail here is an obvious choice for various
reasons. Phra Payutto undoubtedly is one of the most influential
thinkers in modern Thai Buddhism. Due to his manners and his
widely acknowledged erudition regarding the P li-canonical texts,
many regard him as the ideal “personification or representation of
[the Therav da] tradition”.70 Through his enormous literary output
Phra Payutto not only excels in systemically and comprehensively
propounding Therav da’s doctrine in Thailand, he is also widely
esteemed for the way he critically analyses modern social, educa-
tional and scientific phenomena from a Therav da Buddhist per-
spective.71 Likewise, in his talks and publications he has also re-
peatedly and to various extents discussed Western concepts of
human rights from a Therav da point of view. At the same time,
however, as already mentioned above, his conservative stance re-
                                             
68 Phra Payutto 2531, pp. 18 and 23. This does not imply, of course, 
that Phra Payutto agrees with the content of the 1962 Sa gha Act. 
Quite the opposite is the case, he is actually quite critical of it (see, 
e.g., Phra Payutto and Rawi Phawilai 2532, p. 47). 
69 See also Jeffrey’s article “Does Buddhism need Human Rights?” 
(2003) where he investigates Phra Payutto’s critique of human rights 
in order to suggest that “grounding human rights in Buddhism is 
philosophically problematic”. Another article in English that dis-
cusses Phra Payutto’s concepts on human rights is Soraj 
Hongladarom 1998. 
70 Olson 1989, p. 188; see also Olson 1989, p. 192; Seeger 2009a. The 
well-known Thai scholar of Buddhism Camnong Thongprasoet de-
scribes Phra Payutto as: “[…] he is wholly Theravada.” (Olson 1989, 
p. 256).
71 See Seeger 2005, pp. 24–32. 
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garding the “safeguarding” of the Therav da tradition has been
criticized as being problematic in connection with human rights.
For Phra Payutto the
[…] concept of human rights is [very] useful in an age of fighting and con-
tention, or when human thinking is divisive and separatist.72
He sees human rights as outlined in the Human Rights Declaration
as having a “similar nature”73 in comparison with some elements of
Buddhist teachings:
If human beings act in accordance with the [Buddhist] Five Precepts 
[P. s la]74 there is no need for “Human Rights” [i.e. the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights] […] we can find the many provisions of the Human 
Rights Declaration in the framework of the Five s las or [the Buddhist] 
principle of the Six Directions [P. chaddis ].75
According to Phra Payutto, the Declaration of Human Rights could be
regarded as an unfolding, detailing and contemporizing of these
Buddhist teachings. Furthermore, he explains that
[…] [b]y translating the Five precepts [sic] and other teaching into precise 
standards such as the UDHR [Universal Declaration of Human Rights], the 
sense of ownership is created. Each individual will feel that the UDHR be-
longs to him or her and that it can be used as a legitimate claim to prevent 
oneself from being violated by others and as a legal protection. It equips 
oneself with a shield, a weapon to defend oneself.76
While noticing the usefulness of human rights and their similarity
to aspects of Buddhist teaching, Phra Payutto also opines that “the
concepts of human rights” are “flawed” (Th. bokphrong) in various
aspects and possess “weak points” (Th. cut on).77 In this way Phra
Payutto maintains that
                                             
72 Phra Payutto 2550, pp. 18/63 and 20–21/64. Translation as given in the 
original.
73 Phra Payutto 2541, p. 42. Translation as given in the original. 
74 The Five Precepts (s la) are (1) to abstain from killing; (2) to abstain 
from stealing; (3) to abstain from sexual misconduct; (4) to abstain 
from false speech and (5) to abstain from consuming intoxicants 
(see, e.g., DN.III.235; AN.III.203). 
75 DN.III.189–192. Phra Payutto 2541a, p. 19/41. 
76 Phra Payutto 2541a, p. 20/42. Translation as given in the original. 
77 Phra Payutto 2550, p. 20/64. 
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[…] rights [ultimately] do not exist and we are not able to call upon our 
rights with nature [as] in nature all things operate in accordance with a sys-
tem in which all things are causally related to each other […] [This implies] 
that with nature humans cannot even call upon rights over their own life 
and body.78
According to him, rights can only be called upon between humans
in accordance with the conventional, normative system that has
been created by them, but with regard to nature humans do not
possess any rights at all because humans are not capable of influ-
encing natural law (P. dhamma-niy ma). For example, in the case of
illness, humans are not able to call upon their rights, as physical
laws (P. utu-niy ma) will proceed on their own irrespective of hu-
mans.79 For this reason,
[…] from a Buddhist perspective, the Western concept that postulates that 
humans possess natural rights represents a confusion [of natural law and 
convention].80
He summarizes thus:
Human rights are a convention, a purely human invention, and do not exist 
as a natural condition. They are not “natural rights” […] They must be sup-
ported by laws and they must be accepted by all parties in order to work.81
The Thai scholar of Buddhism Somparn Promta seems to have a
different understanding in this respect. According to him, despite
the absence of the word “right” (Th. sitthi) in the P li canon, the
concept of “natural rights” (Th. sitthi doi thammachat) can clearly be
found in canonical Therav da Buddhism:
[…] both human rights and natural rights really do exist within the indi-
vidual being. They are something that people obtain automatically at 
birth.82
To underpin his argument, Somparn refers to Buddha’s teaching of
“self-standard principle” (P. att pan yika-dhamma) to the villagers
                                             
78 Phra Payutto 2543b, p. 222; see also Phra Payutto 2541b, pp. 24–30. 
79 Phra Payutto 2543b, pp. 221–222. 
80 Phra Payutto 2541b, pp. 26–27. 
81 Phra Payutto 2550, pp. 20–21/64. 
82 Somparn Promta 2002, p. 46; see also Somparn Promta 2541, pp. 61–62.  
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of Ve udv ra83 in which the Buddha propounds a kind of Buddhist
“Golden Rule,“ which states: 
For a state that is not pleasant or delightful to me must be so to him also; 
and a state that is not pleasing or delightful to me, how could I inflict that 
upon another?84
For him this teaching can be regarded as the “basis of that part of
Buddhist ethics that concerns society” (Th. rakthan khong phuttha-
cariyatham nai suan thi kiaukap sangkhom). It shows the rationale that
humans “do not have the right” to take another human being’s life
(first s la); to steal (second s la); to commit adultery with someone
who “belongs” to someone else (third s la) and to lie (fourth s la),
because as a consequence of doing these actions, there will be in-
fringement on other people’s rights to life, property and (in case of
the fourth precept) to truth. 85 For Somparn the principles pro-
pounded in the teaching of att pan yika-dhamma are universally
valid86 and show that the Five s las87 have been “laid down” (Th.
banyat)88 or “created” (Th. song thuk sang khuen) by the Buddha in
order to protect “individual rights” (Th. sitthi suan bukkhon), i.e. the
right in one’s life and in property.89 He argues that the validity of
the Five Precepts (s la) is not dependent on the existence of a law-
creating and law-enforcing state. The Buddha
[…] established the five precepts not only as a personal ethic for the indi-
vidual […], but also as means for demanding social responsibility.90
Another canonical passage that Somparn refers to in order to sup-
port his argument is a conversation during which the Buddha ex-
plains to a Brahmin one of the four “virtues that lead to benefits in
                                             
83 SN.V.352–356.  
84 SN.V.353–354. Translation from the P li as quoted in Harvey 2000, 
p. 33. A similar passage can be found at Dpd.130.  
85 Somparn Promta 2541, p. 62. 
86 Ibid., p. 62. 
87 Somparn explains that the first four of the Five s las are to protect 
“individual rights,“ whereas the fifth s la does not have a direct im-
pact on others, but is to help ensure that the first four s las are not 
transgressed (ibid., pp. 62–63).  
88 Ibid., p. 62. 
89 Ibid, pp. 59–62.  
90 Somparn Promta 2002, p. 39. 
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the present” (P. di hadhammikattha-sa vattanika-dhamma), namely
the “achievement of protection” (P. rakkhasampad ). Here the Bud-
dha says that righteously acquired (P. dhammik dhammaladdh )
wealth (P. bhog ) can lead to benefits and happiness in the present
(P. di hadhammahit ya sa vattanti di hadhammasukh ya).91 For Som-
parn, this passage shows that the Buddha acknowledged “that hu-
man beings may rightfully claim ownership of things”.92
According to Somparn, Buddhism is not only concerned with
individual morality that is based on the natural law of kamma, but
also with social ethics. While through the law of kamma reality is
examined on the ultimate level of truth (P. paramattha-sacca), social
ethics is based on conventional truth (P. sammuti-sacca). Here,
Somparn argues rather similarly to Phra Payutto that when seen
from the level of ultimate truth (P. paramattha-sacca), “no one is the
owner of anything” (Th. mai mi khrai pen caukhong arai),93 since ac-
cording to the Buddhist principle of no-self (P. anatt ) anything in
the universe is subject to the law of causality and can therefore not
really be owned:
Even though in terms of paramattha-sacca Buddhism maintains that human 
beings have no right to claim ownership of anything […] in terms of sam-
mutti sacca [sic], Buddhism concedes that human beings may rightfully 
claim ownership of things.94
                                             
91 Somparn Promta 2002., p. 44. 
92 Ibid., p. 43. 
93 Somparn Promta 2541, p. 169. 
94 Somparn Promta 2002, p. 43. According to Somparn, this interpreta-
tion has quite significant implications in connection with ethical 
questions: for example while from a Buddhist perspective suicide is 
not regarded as a breach of the first precept of abstaining from killing 
(P. p tip t  verama ), euthanasia always is, as the ownership of 
one’s life is not transferrable (Somparn 2002, pp. 48–49). Somparn 
sees the way the Buddha designed his monastic regulations, the 
p imokkha, in conformity with this principle. One of the four gravest 
offenses (p r jika) in the p imokkha is assigned to a rule according to 
which a monk who kills another person who asks him to do so is 
immediately and irrevocably expelled from the monastic commu-
nity. At the same time, however, attempted suicide entails the 
breaching of the mildest severity (P. dukka a) and only because as a 
consequence of such an attempt other human beings might be put 
into risk. Somparn states that while according to canonical texts the 
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For Phra Payutto, it is vitally important that humans make them-
selves constantly aware of the difference between conventional
truth (sammutti-sacca) and ultimate truth (paramattha-sacca) in order
to make sure that they develop the right and appropriate attitude
and practice towards these truths. He explains that whereas human
rights might be able to provide humans with peace and security on
an inter-human level, these rights will not be able to sustain peace-
fulness (Th. santiphap) between humans and nature (nature here is
to be understood as comprising not only the material world, but
also and more importantly the human mind). Humans might “be
led astray” (Th. long) in their conventions and neglect their study of
the law of nature. This, however, might have severe consequences
for humanity:
Humans might use [human] rights [in order to gratify their own needs 
whilst] destroying nature or causing contention amongst themselves.95
According to Phra Payutto, in Western-influenced discourses the
conception of equality is often understood to be
[…] equality in competition, which means to have equal rights to compete 
with each other. This is equality based on competition, mistrust and fear.96
Consequently, according to Phra Payutto, there are two extremes
that are to be avoided. That is, on the one hand, it is an extreme if no
rights of others are respected and preserved at all. At the same time,
however, it is also an extreme to “be absorbed [Th. mua mokmun] in
rights”, i.e. restricting oneself to watch over one’s rights, always
suspicious of others infringing on them.97 He demands that people
be aware of and pursue the “real” objectives of human rights,
                                             
Buddha criticized monks who committed suicide, he did this with 
rather mild words, namely that it would “not be appropriate” for a 
member of Buddhist monastic community to commit suicide (Som-
parn Promta 2541, p. 170). “However, if considered from the perspec-
tive of individual morality, Buddhism sees suicide as wrong, since it 
is an action that arises from one of the unwholesome mental roots of 
action, delusion.” (Somparn Promta 2002, p. 45). Cf. Harvey 2000, pp. 
286–310. 
95 Phra Payutto 2543b, pp. 225–226. 
96 Phra Payutto 2550, p. 23/65. 
97 Phra Payutto 2541a, p. 13/36. 
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namely the creation of a peaceful and virtuous society.98 According
to Phra Payutto
[…] the facilitating of moral behaviour [however] is not sufficient for the 
creation and maintaining of human civilization.99
He argues that human rights gain their importance through,100 and
[…] have resulted from, a background and basic attitude of division and 
segregation, struggle and contention […] Human rights must be obtained 
through demand [Th. riakrong thuang au].101
This means that humans do not behave in accordance with human
rights naturally or automatically, but only on the basis of “com-
promising” (Th. prani-pranom) their actual needs and desires. This
idea becomes clear when looking at the way Phra Payutto per-
ceives a major problem of Western ethical systems. He asserts that
there is a basic assumption that
[…] human defilements like greed [P. lobha], aversion [P. dosa], craving 
[P. ta h ] and conceit [P. m na] belong to human nature and cannot be re-
solved. Accordingly [Western] ethics is about constraining oneself and go-
ing against one’s actual desires and needs. 
Buddhist ethics, however, Phra Payutto elaborates, is based on the
supposition that defilements of humans can be resolved since hu-
mans are
 […] beings capable of training and developing themselves […] which al-
lows the converting of defilements into virtues. In this way, ethics does not 
necessarily have to be constraining to the mind. Real ethics is the ethics of 
contentment and happiness.102
According to Phra Payutto,
[…] humans possess a special capability which allows them to train them-
selves […] and develop nearly without any limit.103
                                             
 98 Ibid., pp. 13–14/36. 
 99 Phra Payutto 2541b, p. 51. 
100 Phra Payutto 2550, pp. 17–18/63. 
101 Ibid., pp. 20–21/64. Translation as given in the original. 
102 Phra Payutto 2543b, p. 96. 
103 Phra Payutto 2541b, p. 42. 
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Consequently, Phra Payutto maintains that, due to their under-
valuing of humans’ potential to develop, human rights in their cur-
rent conception are neither able to bring about true peace, unity,
harmony and happiness,104 nor are they “lasting”.
If human rights are to be lasting and firm they must be connected to natu-
ral reality […] the human mind must be developed [Th. phatthana hai mi sa-
phapcit] to a stage where people are prepared to preserve human rights. 
Only in this way will human rights be sustainable.105
For Phra Payutto this implies that, despite being absolutely neces-
sary, morality as described in the Five s las, the teachings of the Six
Directions or the Declaration of Human Rights is by no means suffi-
cient:106
[It] must always be connected to mental motivation, which is both the in-
stigator and the guiding influence of that behaviour.107
As a consequence of this, Phra Payutto appeals for positive or con-
structive ethics.108
Here, in order to understand Phra Payutto’s concept of positive
or constructive ethics, it becomes necessary to look at how he rather
comprehensively defines basic Buddhist technical terms: while vi-
naya, which in its canonical meaning designates the code of monastic
discipline, is a structure or system created by humans as
[…] a means to develop s la […] s la [however] belongs to nature and is a 
human condition; vinaya denotes regulations, legislations and social rules 
[…] it is prescribed external rules.109
                                             
104 Phra Payutto 2550, pp. 18–19/63; see also Phra Payutto 2543c, 
p. 50. Here, it must to be noted that Phra Payutto observes subtle, 
yet significant semantic differences between the English word “to 
compromise” and the Thai lexical equivalent “prani-pranom”. He 
argues that whereas the former has a rather negative connotation, 
as needs have to be reduced in order to “meet the other side half 
way”, the latter has a more positive meaning as it denotes a proc-
ess during which conflict is resolved and harmonious unison is 
pursued (Phra Payutto 2543b, pp. 97–98). 
105 Phra Payutto 2550, pp. 20–21/64. 
106 Phra Payutto 2541a, p. 20. 
107 Phra Payutto 2550, pp. 20–21/64. Translation as given in the original.  
108 Ibid., pp. 42–43/75; Phra Payutto 2541a, p. 21/43. 
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Accordingly, human rights would be regarded as a form of vinaya.
For Phra Payutto it is necessary to
[…] scrutinize carefully […] the vinaya with the purpose to make sure that 
it always is in conformity with the natural law and allowing the realization 
of the objectives of the dhamma.110
He also maintains that
[…] we [humans] have to progress from s la and develop our lives in ac-
cordance with [the Buddhist teachings] from s la toward sam dhi [devel-
oped mind] and paññ  [insight].111
When laws are training rules [P. sikkh pada] to develop oneself, these rules 
become tools for the creation of good people. For this reason, it should be 
stressed that laws are to create good people instead of doing away with bad 
people.112
Phra Payutto argues that good legislation has to take into account
human nature, i.e. human’s ability to evolve.113 In this way, humans
would be able to develop undiscriminating (Th. mai camkat klum-
phuak) and unlimited (P. appamaññ ) love (P. mett ) towards each
other and eradicate di hi (wrong or dogmatic views) that are the
cause of intolerance.114
Fundamental  Semantic Dif ferences  
It has become clear that for Phra Payutto human rights have to be
transcended in order to be ultimately successful. This can be
achieved by integrating them into the “universal Buddhist system
of human development”:
As long as di his are still present, lack of tolerance cannot be resolved and 
the use of regulations, such as those with regard to human rights cannot 
really resolve these problems.115
                                             
109 Phra Payutto 2543c, pp. 62–63. In Thai language there often seems to 
be a confusion between these two terms (Phra Payutto 2541b, p. 61).  
110 Phra Payutto 2541b, p. 99. 
111 Phra Payutto 2541a, p. 21/ 42. 
112 Phra Payutto 2541b, p. 129. 
113 Ibid., p. 121. 
114 Phra Payutto 2550, p. 23/66. 
115 Phra Payutto 2542, p. 184. 
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Phra Payutto explains this point further:
When seen from a Buddhist perspective, ethics is an excellent way of life 
that necessarily consists of the three inseparable [integrated] components 
[s la, sam dhi and paññ ]. The Western understanding of ethics, however, 
solely concerns good behaviour, which corresponds to the Buddhist con-
cept of s la that presents only one aspect of life.116
Or put in other words:
True s la is the behaviour that is demanded by nature.117
Whilst Somparn, in a similar way to Keown,118 extrapolates human
rights from the Five Precepts (s la) — in which he perceives them to
be implicitly existent — for Phra Payutto they are a form of vinaya, a
human convention. Despite these differences in views, however,
both Somparn and Phra Payutto seem to share the opinion that hu-
man rights are to some extent consonant with Therav da’s teach-
ings. Basing his arguments on Alan Gewirth’s views on human
rights, the Thai academic Buntham Phunsap also agrees that Bud-
dhism and human rights are in their principles and methods to a cer-
tain extent reconcilable. However, he also argues that while Bud-
dhism shares some objectives with Western notions of human rights,
such as the creation of a peaceful society, human rights are not only
absent in Buddha’s teaching (dhammavinaya),119 but are also not nec-
essary (Th. mai campen tong asai) for Buddhism: the Five Precepts
would already be a sufficient principle based on which “society can
find peace and happiness” (Th. sangkhom yu ruam kan dai yang sa-
gnop suk).120 He acknowledges, however, that due to their trans-
religious, trans-cultural neutrality human rights might be useful in
culturally pluralistic societies.121 In line with Phra Payutto, he further
argues that from a Buddhist perspective, to demand (Th. riakrong)
human rights might become problematic when this is done with
                                             
116 Phra Payutto 2543c, pp. 20 and 51. 
117 Ibid., p. 22. 
118 Keown 1998, pp. 31–33. Keown’s interpretational approach in this 
respect has been variously criticized by other scholars. See, e.g., 
Ihara 1998.
119 Buntham Phunsap 2533, p. 64. 
120 Ibid., p. 68. 
121 Buntham Phunsap 2533., pp. 72–73. 
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unwholesome (P. akusala) motivation. This might cause exploitation,
suppression and infliction of pain on animals.122
The arguments and concepts of Thai Buddhist studies scholars
presented above have revealed that there are fundamental differ-
ences in meaning of a number of terms that are central both to
Western human rights notions and Therav da’s soteriology. Due to
one of its most important teachings, that on no-self (anatt ), which
rules out the existence of any enduring substantial entity, the
Therav da does not allow for the idea that humans could be en-
dowed with any rights on the ultimate level of truth (paramattha-
sacca). According to the Therav da, humans are ultimately “only”
streams of causally-related events, while (human) rights are merely
conventionally, not ultimately, existent. Closely related to the
teaching of anatt is the Buddhist concept of freedom, regarding
which there are also significant semantic differences with Western
human rights notions. Suwanna Satha-anand nicely summarizes
this problematic discrepancy:
From a Buddhist perspective, freedom is not something given, but some-
thing that has to be acquired by effort and training, mindfulness [P. sati], 
wisdom [P. paññ ] and loving-kindness [P. mett ], something one has to 
practise for.123
Generally, humans are far from being born free, but have to put in a
lot of sustained effort and determination in order to attain real
freedom. This freedom cannot be guaranteed or provided by any
institution but has to be realized internally by each individual him-
/herself. Freedom in the Therav da is defined as the release
(P. vimutti) from stress (P. dukkha) and the extinction (P. nibb na) of
the defilements of greed, hatred and delusion. According to Bun-
tham Phunsap, however, in Buddhism
 […] humans possess freedom as a natural condition, in the same way that 
they are born with legs which enable them to walk wherever they want. 
Therefore, freedom is something that is given and not something they have 
to acquire. Using this freedom in a correct way, however, is another matter.  
                                             
122 Ibid., p. 72. 
123 Suwanna Satha-anand 2533, p. 128. 
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For Buntham Phunsap, freedom is the potential to develop oneself,
release oneself from kamma (Skr. karma) and attain awakening (P.
nibb na). This potential is inherent in every human being.124 Some
30 years ago, after having briefly reviewed concepts of freedom
proposed by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau from a Buddhist per-
spective, the Thai human rights scholar Prof. Saneh Chamarik
maintained that:
The truth is that the notion of freedom and human rights thus far comes to 
nothing much more than serving what, by Buddhist definition, is exactly 
the freedom and right to the craving and scrambling for things transient 
and illusory.125
Another fundamental conceptual difference between Western hu-
man rights and central Therav da teachings is expressed by Phra
Payutto:
Humans are born equal only in some respects. In many respects, however, 
no human being is born equal to others.126
While humans are equal in that they possess the same spiritual po-
tentiality, that is, the ability to train themselves towards nibb na and
ultimate happiness, due to the law of kamma each human being is
born individually unique. 
Summary and Discussion 
I have presented a variety of different Buddhist approaches and
views on Western concepts of human rights. Some of these are
rather radical and try to offer constructive criticism: they not only
maintain that Western human rights concepts are “flawed” in vari-
ous aspects, but also point out ways in which human rights can be
integrated into a system of human development. Here it is argued
that this could ensure that human rights as conceptualized in the
West can overcome its “weak points” and become sustainable.
Also, in Thai Buddhism there are influential thinkers who state that
rights do not ultimately exist, but are solely the outcome of inven-
tion and convention. Other approaches, however, maintain that
                                             
124 Buntham Phunsap 2533, pp. 51–52. 
125 Saneh Chamarik 2543, p. 20/70. Translation as given in the original.  
126 Phra Payutto 2543a, p. (9)/50. 
THERAV DA BUDDHISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS
89
concepts of human rights can indeed be identified in fundamental
P li canonical teachings and that according to early Buddhism
“natural rights” are inherent in every human. Still others have pur-
sued the approach of reinterpretation of culturally-relevant ca-
nonical texts in order to identify human rights principles. Here, the
aim is to invoke these Buddhist texts to promote the cause of hu-
man rights.127
While there seems to be a general agreement that Western con-
cepts of human rights are useful and to some extent reconcilable
with Buddhist teaching, influential thinkers of Thai Buddhism
have argued that human rights cannot be referred to when, as a
consequence of doing so, traditional practices and beliefs that are
perceived as conforming with the P li canon are undermined. In
1996, Thai Professor of Law and winner of 2004 UNESCO Prize for
Human Rights Education Vitit Muntarbhorn referred to the Bang-
kok Non-Governmental Declaration of Human Rights of 1993 which
says that
[…] [w]hile advocating cultural pluralism, those cultural practices which 
derogate from universally-accepted human rights, including women’s 
rights, must not be tolerated.128
It appears that we can identify a debate between universalism and
cultural relativism in many of the discussions that I have presented,
above: indeed, there are ongoing debates in Thailand as to the ex-
tent to which Buddhist monks or the monastic community should
be regarded as “special,” or are to be treated as normal citizens or as
a “private organization” (Th. ongkon phak ekkachon), respectively. At
the moment, it is quite obvious that Thai monks are treated in a par-
ticular way, for example they are not allowed to vote (prescribed in
the 1997 Thai constitution) and, at the same time, have been tradi-
tionally extremely highly revered in Thai society.129
Also, Thai academics have been discussing the extent to which
specific hermeneutical practices in present Thai Therav da Bud-
dhism, monastic legislations like the Sa gha Acts, and particular
                                             
127 See also Suwanna Satha-anand 1999. 
128 Quoted in Sulak Sivaraksa 1999, p. 195. 
129 See Channarong Bunnun 2549, pp. (29)–(31); Phiphat Phasuthara-




prohibitions for monks can be justified by referring to a particular
socio-cultural context or simply have to be seen in fundamental con-
tradiction to universal law. Where is the dividing line? To make it
more complex, defenders of traditional practices that have been per-
ceived as problematic from a human rights perspective have also ar-
gued that it is their right to defend and adhere to the traditional prac-
tices and principles of their religion. During the nun-ordination de-
bate, we have seen the complexity of reinterpreting tradition and
normative and formative Buddhist texts that have culturally been
enormously significant. Several thinkers have attempted to root
human rights in P li canonical texts and principles in order to ask for
changes to traditional practices which they regard as sustaining ine-
quality between genders. In this way, scholars have argued that as
monastic and canonical law are conventional systems having the ob-
jective to facilitate spiritual practice, the Thai Therav da should
change its conservative hermeneutical approaches in this respect in a
way that would allow female ordination. This would not only be in
line with human rights but also with the very principles of the Bud-
dha himself. While admitting that the vinaya could theoretically be
changed as it is a conventional system that should be accommodated
according to its socio-cultural context, many influential Thai think-
ers are concerned that such changes could potentially critically en-
danger authenticity and longevity of the Therav da. The Thai Bud-
dhist studies scholar Watchara Ngamcitcaroen summarizes this no-
tion as follows:
According to Therav da Buddhist principles the monastic community 
[Th. khana song] “has no right” to change the vinaya, but has to confine itself 
to practise according to it. It can be compared to policemen who have the 
duty to follow the law but not the right to change it.130
The Therav da has developed into a complex entity that is charac-
terized by its strict conservatism which Therav dins believe has de-
veloped and been maintained since the year of Buddha’s passing
away, some 2500 years ago. This conservatism is motivated by the
concern to preserve “authentic” Buddhist texts and practice. Chang-
ing these basic markers of its identity would entail changing the
Therav da into something else, and would therefore be inherently
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contradictory for the Therav da.131 At the same time, defenders of
Therav da’s conservatism stress that they believe that the absence of
bhikkhun s does not necessarily imply the inequality of genders in
terms of Buddhist practice. For them the Therav da tradition is
flexible enough to offer other venues for equal opportunities (such as
creating “bhikkhun s in a new form”).132 Some would even say that
this approach would provide better opportunities, as being a
bhikkhun would necessarily have to entail institutional subordina-
tion of the female order under the male order (see above). In the
course of the bhikkhun ordination controversy many have argued
that emphasis should be placed rather on individual spiritual pro-
gression and the facilitating of it than on institutional change. This
again seems to point at another basic and crucial difference between
Therav da concepts and Western notions of human rights. Saneh
Chamarik expresses this idea nicely by stating that 
[…] according to Buddhist view [sic], what really obstructs the attainment 
of freedom is not so much the social and conventional “chains” or restric-
tions, as one’s own ego and the three poisons: lust, hatred, and delusion.133
By contrast, Western human rights first of all seem to gain their im-
portance through the possibility of referring to them as protection
against governments, institutions or persons that exert power over
people.134
There is a considerable number of Thai scholars and thinkers
who have investigated Western human rights concepts. Some have
attempted to connect Western human rights concepts with Thera-
v da Buddhist teaching. However, the fundamental differences be-
tween Therav da views and Western human rights notions con-
cerning the concepts of freedom, personhood, rights and aspiration
seem to be so enormous that Thai scholars have argued that a theo-
retical connection between these two thought systems is a hugely
challenging undertaking. 135 This undertaking does not seem to
                                             
131 See also Seeger 2009a. 
132 Watchara Ngamcitcaroen 2550, p. 478. See also Seeger 2006a, p. 172. 
133 Saneh Chamarik 2543, p. 68. The original text is in English. See also 
Buntham Phunsap 2533, pp. 55 and 65. 
134 See Thanes Aphornsuwan 2539, pp. 223–224; Junger 1998, p. 84. 
135 See Caran Khotsananan 2535, pp. 200–201; Thanes Aphornsuwan 
2539, p. 224. 
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have been very successful so far. As both the Therav da and hu-
man rights are inherently relevant for current Thai society, the dia-
logue will continue.
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The Purification of the Mind
and the Encounter with Those who Suffer. 
A Christian View of Buddhism
and Human Rights 
KENNETH FLEMING
This article considers Buddhist critiques of the theory and praxis of
human rights from a Christian theologian’s perspective. It consid-
ers what Buddhism can contribute to an understanding of human
rights and how Buddhism is itself challenged by human rights con-
cerns, with particular reference to the thought of Prayudh Payutto
and the Thai context. In conclusion, it considers what Christianity
and Buddhism can learn from each other in their basic approach to
human rights.
The Context  
The secularization thesis, which predicted the decline of religion in
the world, has to a large extent been discredited and rethought.1
Even in Europe, where the forces of secularization and the predic-
tions of doom for religion have been strongest, there is a growing
awareness that what we name by the term “religion” is here to stay,
                                             
1 Peter Berger (1999) is a leading sociologist of religion who, along 




albeit in new and uncertain forms.2 The role of religion is again at
the center of political discourse.
Regrettably, it is often because religion is seen as a force behind
social conflict, violence, and discrimination that it obtains a promi-
nent place in newspaper headlines and in fields of public discourse.
There is a growing recognition in political and intellectual circles,
however, that religion can and must be understood as a tool for
overcoming violence and prejudice on a societal level. Religion,
thus, is widely acknowledged as having a central role to play in the
promotion and furtherance of human rights. 
Since the adoption of the United Nations Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in 1948, there has been widespread discussion about
its “universal” claims, and about how it should be interpreted and
implemented in different countries and local contexts. In recent
decades, there have been a number of debates, sometimes heated,
about the relationship between human rights and the religions.3 It
is also the case that people of religion have, increasingly, come to
adopt the language of human rights when relating their religious
teachings to the social sphere. This is not only true in the West, but
also in other regions of the world and among Asian Buddhists.
The perception of human rights in the political sphere in Asia,
where the great majority of Buddhists live, can be characterized as
having shifted from one of suspicion to a more open acceptance.
Soraj Hongladarom, commenting on how human rights have been
viewed in the Thai context, wrote: 
The concept is also generally regarded as foreign, and the Thai word for 
human rights — Sitthi Manussayachon — still rings an unfamiliar sound. 
For most Thais, the word simply conjures up the image of someone who 
disregard the traditional pattern of compromise and harmonization of so-
cial relations; someone, that is, who is quite out of touch with the tradi-
tional Thai mores. 4
                                             
2 This is grounded in extensive sociological data gathered from the 
European Values Study, cf. Davie 2006. 
3 Rappenecker 2004. The UN Declaration has prompted the devel-
opment and adoption of various international and regional human 
rights legislations, but it is the 1948 document that is principally re-
ferred to in this paper when speaking of human rights. 
4 Hongladarom 1998, p. 97. 
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Hongladarom goes on to admit, however, that the language of hu-
man rights has come to be increasingly used and accepted in Thai
circles. Further afield, even the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions (ASEAN), in which some of the most vociferous voices critical
of human rights language were to be heard, has recently begun the
process of setting up its own human rights body.
Leading Buddhist figures in Asia, who have been at the fore-
front of movements for peace and freedom, such as the Dalai Lama,
Maha Ghosananda and Aung San Suu Kyi, have all been clear in
their support for human rights legislation. In Thailand, the leading
Buddhist social critic, Sulak Siviraksa, along with the various
NGOs he has inspired, together with leading monks, like Buddha-
d sa and Payutto, have also been keen to voice their support of
human rights. In the political arena in Thailand, human rights leg-
islation was incorporated into the 1997 Thai constitution and the
National Human Rights Commission of Thailand was established a
few years later.5 There does appear to be a growing agreement,
therefore, that human rights legislation is a useful, valuable, and
necessary tool in today’s world.
Several Buddhist commentators argue that human rights and
Buddhist teachings are complementary and supportive of each
other. Two basic reasons repeatedly surface to support this conver-
gence: a recognition that human rights is concerned with the moral
good, just as “morality” (P. s la) is fundamental to the Buddhist
path of liberation, and that human rights are concerned with reduc-
ing or overcoming suffering, the raison d’être for the Buddhist to
undertake the religious life. The support for human rights, how-
ever, is not without qualification and criticism, and it is to this that
we now turn.
The Buddhist  Cri t ique 
Despite the convergence between Buddhism and human rights
concerns, a number of Buddhist commentators are highly critical of
how human rights are understood, formulated, and put into prac-
tice. Criticisms cover a variety of issues — the theoretical basis of
human rights legislation, the language used in classical documents,
                                             
5 Harding 2007. 
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the socio-political interests they promote, and the scope they cover.
It is possible here to cover only some of the main areas.6 On a phi-
losophical level, there is much criticism of the basis upon which
human rights are proclaimed. The preamble of the UN Universal
Declaration of Human Rights describes this foundation using particu-
lar language: the “inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family”. This is reflected also in
the German constitution, written up a few months after the UN
declaration:
Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar […] Das Deutsche Volk bekennt 
sich darum zu unverletzlichen und unveräußerlichen Menschenrechten als 
Grundlage jeder menschlichen Gemeinschaft, des Friedens und der Ge-
rechtigkeit in der Welt.7
The influences of the Judeo-Christian tradition, with its notion of
creation in God’s image, and European Enlightenment thought,
with its emphasis on the role of the individual and reason, are cited
here by Buddhists. It is difficult to find a direct correlation of “in-
herent dignity” in Buddhist texts; indeed, the concept seems to con-
tradict or at least stands in significant tension with the Buddhist
doctrines of “impermanence” (P. annica) and “no-self” (P. annat ).
In response, Buddhists have sought, in various ways, to provide a
religious basis for human rights based on interpretations of their
key teachings. Doctrines ranging from “buddhahood”, “depend-
ent origination” (P. pa iccasamupp da), annat , and everyone being
subject to dhamma have been put forward as possible alternatives.
Another notable basis is offered in the value Buddhism attributes to
being born in a human life, which is an occurrence that is consid-
ered extremely rare and, moreover, offers the precious opportunity
and possibility for development towards liberation.
Some commentators, like Damien Keown, 8 have argued that
agreeing on a common transcendent reference is unnecessary, since
                                             
6 For a variety of Buddhist opinions towards human rights cf. Keown 
et al. (1998) and Schmidt-Leukel (2006). 
7 Official English translation: “Human dignity shall be inviolable […] 
The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalien-
able human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of 
justice in the world.”
8 Cf. Keown 1995. 
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human rights are widely accepted by atheists and people of differ-
ent religious convictions alike and for varying reasons. In searching
for an answer in this field, it does appear that we are asking ques-
tions about the basic meaning and value of human life. The diffi-
culty is, as witnessed in our pluralist world of different religious
traditions and political ideologies, that a variety of answers are
given to these questions. It is also interesting to note that no expla-
nation for the use of “inherent dignity” is proffered in the UN Dec-
laration. While the positive exchange of views and debate within
Buddhism on this philosophical plane are fascinating to follow, the
outcomes will probably be, like those in other religions, of limited
application. If an alternative were ever to be agreed upon and
promulgated, it would come under as much critical scrutiny by the
international community as that of “inherent dignity”. It is, none-
theless, a significant and necessary internal debate which high-
lights the limitations of conceptual language in human rights
documents and the need to be sensitive towards alternative ap-
proaches. What is essential, it would appear, is that there is broad
agreement on the content of human rights. On this point, it is in-
deed remarkable that the UN Declaration has been met with such
“universal” acclamation.
Buddhists, like many in Asia and elsewhere, are critical of the
emphasis on the individual person in human rights language. For
“socially engaged Buddhists,” however, this critique has to be dis-
tinguished from that of the so-called “Asian values” school of
thought. Supporters of this school, propounded by the likes of Ma-
hathir Mohamad and Lee Kuan Yew in the past and by certain cur-
rent Asian governments, like Myanmar, seek to portray human
rights as a Western invention, with imperialist intentions, that are
insensitive to the Asian cultural values of respecting authority and
putting community needs before individuals’ rights. Many Bud-
dhists, along with Asian intellectuals like Amartya Sen,9 are highly
critical of this Asian values approach. They criticize this Asian ap-
proach as a ruse for seeking to maintain the power of undemocratic
ruling Asian elites. They argue that the desire for human rights has
been as much a part of Asian history as that of the West. The threat
to Asian societies does not come from a Western notion of human
                                             
9 Cf. Sen 1997. 
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rights, but rather from the importation of Western forms of con-
sumerism and capitalism.
Some Buddhists, nonetheless, charge that human rights fail to
adequately stress the essential collective character of people’s exis-
tence and the responsibilities that come with belonging to a social
group. Rights and responsibilities have to be seen together, it is ar-
gued. This is, however, not based on a hierarchical understanding of
human society, as in the “Asian values” case, but rather on alterna-
tive notions like that of interdependence, particularly in relation to
the doctrine of pa iccasamupp da. The interconnected nature of all re-
ality, as understood in Buddhism, leads to the assertion that human
rights abuses are often a result of rampant individualism, which fails
to take note of the needs of other people and fails to appreciate that
humanity is bound into an interdependent relationship with the
wider natural environment. Buddhist activists, therefore, like the
environmentalist monks in Thailand, have stressed the need to re-
think our relationship with nature and to engage in environmental
protection in order to effectively protect human rights.10
The development of human rights language is widely criticised
as an ideological product of the liberal West. Without denying the
Western influence on human rights formulations, the Buddhist
criticisms are often, I believe, more an attack on how the UN Decla-
ration has itself been misinterpreted and misused than on its un-
doubted internal inconsistencies. This abuse of the Declaration is a
point made by the law professor, Mary Ann Glendon, who re-
minds us that the original document was shaped by people from
different cultural backgrounds and that the strong social and eco-
nomic aspects of the document were lost under the interpretation
of liberal Western human rights organizations in the 1960s and
1970s.11 The Buddhist critique, as represented briefly above, can be
viewed as a part of an ongoing critical process that would have
been welcomed by the original drafters of the 1948 Declaration. It
was the hope of those drafters that the declaration would be
adopted and adapted according to local socio-cultural circum-
stances; it was viewed as a “yardstick” rather than as a complete
and perfect document. 
                                             
10 Darlington 2000. 
11 Glendon 2004. 
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It is in another area of criticism that a Buddhist concern, I be-
lieve, makes its most telling contribution: looking deeper into the
causes of suffering. Buddhist critics claim that the language of hu-
man rights does not go far enough in explaining the underlying
causes of suffering that lead to human rights abuses. Like others
today, they point to the corrosive effects of consumerism and at-
tachment to socio-economic ideologies that expect and demand
ever more economic growth at the expense of the environment and
social equality, but they locate the cause of these destructive forces
deep within the lives and attitudes of people. It is perhaps unfair to
expect a UN document written in 1948 to cover these issues, but it is
here that Buddhism offers something particular, for it is here that
Buddhism takes us a step further in locating the source of suffering
in the untrained minds of individuals. 
The Pur i f icat ion of  the Mind — a Buddhist  
Contr ibut ion to Human Rights 
Therefore, bhikkhus, one should often reflect upon one’s own mind thus: 
“For a long time this mind has been defiled by lust, hatred, and delusion.” 
Through the defilements of the mind beings are defiled; with the cleansing 
of the mind beings are purified. 12
For some 2500 years, as the text from the Gaddula Sutta above re-
minds us, Buddhism has placed a particular focus on the training of
the mind. This “cleansing” involves a detailed process of “atten-
tiveness” or “mindfulness” (P. sati). It leads the practitioner, as out-
lined in the Satipa h na Suttas and elsewhere, from mindfulness
into deepened concentration, insight and wisdom. A central aspect
of this mindfulness focuses on the interior thought processes, de-
sires and intentions that arise in a person’s mind and determine the
actions they take in life. Discernment is employed to recognize and
root out the “unwholesome” causes of suffering in the mind and to
encourage those that are “wholesome”. Buddhism, therefore,
places a premium on the purification of the mind, because it has
identified this as the key way to understand the sources of suffering
and to overcome them.
                                             
12 Sa yutta Nik ya 22:100. 
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It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the Buddhist concern for
rooting out the “unwholesome” causes of suffering in the mind, and
encouraging the “wholesome” causes that lead to inner peace and
liberation, is raised in relation to a critique of human rights. One of
the most articulate and challenging of Buddhist speakers in this re-
gard is the eminent Thai monk, Prayudh Payutto. Often referred to
as the most distinguished Buddhist scholar living in Thailand today,
Payutto has taken a keen interest in relating Buddhist teachings to
contemporary social ills, such as wealth and poverty,13 and to areas
of contemporary thought, such as religion and science.14
Payutto has also often mentioned human rights in his writings
and speeches. Notably, he developed a critique of human rights in
a speech he gave to the “World Parliament of Religions” on Bud-
dhist solutions for social problems in the coming century.15 He de-
scribed human rights as important and necessary for society, but
essentially limited in character. They are fundamentally flawed, he
argued, in that they are built in response to a history of violence and
division, are a human invention that do not exist as a natural condi-
tion, and represent a compromise in order to control social behav-
ior and limit aggression.16
In a further talk, accepting the UNESCO Peace Prize in 1994, he
said: 
Our current moral education, perceiving the problems and conflicts caused 
by the unbridled struggle for happiness, teaches restraint based on aware-
ness of human rights. We therefore live in societies where peace is enforced 
through restraint. But any ethic based on fear and obligation is negative 
and unreliable — its prohibitive nature is inadequate.17
                                             
13 Payutto 1992. Payutto has gone under several names, including Ra-
javaramuni, which denote the ecclesial titles he has received in 
Thailand. 
14 Payutto 1993a. 
15 Payutto 1993b. 
16 Hongladarom sees a difference here in the approach of Sulak Sivi-
raksa and Payutto, with the former viewing human rights as repre-
senting an ideal of human society in contrast to Payutto who 
stresses their conventional nature. The difference is overstated, I be-
lieve, reflecting differences in two approaches, the activist and the 
scholarly, to the issue. 
17 Payutto 2007, p. 3. 
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Apart from these historical and conceptual failings, the key critique
of Payutto is that human rights offer only a limited analysis of suf-
fering. Human rights fall short, he claims, when it comes to under-
standing the causes of the suffering they are designed to confront
and are, therefore, of limited overall value. They fail to take account
of the root causes of violence and abuses, which are to be located in
the unwholesome mental processes of people. 
In arguing for a better basis for human rights, Payutto brings
traditional Buddhist teachings into play. He stresses that the roots
of human suffering in the social sphere are situated in the interior
motivations of people, directed by greed, hatred, and wrong views.
These sources of suffering correspond to the three ”unwholesome
roots” to be found in numerous Buddhist texts (P. lobha, dosa, and
moha) though Payutto prefers to speak in terms of “views” (P. di hi)
rather than “delusion” (moha). From this standpoint, Payutto is able
then to question even the commitment of human rights activists.
He warns that if they are motivated by the above unwholesome
mental factors they will be unable to achieve the social goals they
profess and may add to the suffering. It is through the development
of the mind, he argues, through the purification of interior motives
and views, that a foundation for human rights is properly estab-
lished. For Payutto, it is simply not enough to base human rights on
good intentions and the rule of law; these measures must be com-
plemented by giving human rights a more fundamental basis in
tackling the internal workings of the human person. 
Although Payutto seeks to provide a basis for human rights in
the overcoming of the three hindrances of greed, hatred and wrong
views, and points to the ways in which these are interwoven, he
nonetheless places particular importance on tackling the problem
of wrong views:
When greed and hatred are founded on or supported by views, be they re-
ligious, political or otherwise, they will be intensified and sustained, with 
far-reaching results which are very difficult to put right. As long as the 
views upon which greed and hatred are based are not set right, it will not 
be possible to remove greed and hatred.18
                                             
18 Payutto 1993, p. 2. 
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Di hi, when referring to wrong views in the Buddhist texts, is often
associated with greed and with a variety of mistaken opinions and
approaches. He states that correct views (di hi) need to be devel-
oped in three areas: to see that we stand in an interdependent rela-
tionship with nature, that we appreciate our fellow human being as
of equal worth to ourselves and thus care for them, and that we
have a proper understanding of the true aim of life. In this last cate-
gory, the emphasis is on developing an interior freedom that is
deeper and more far-reaching than external political freedoms.
This is to be largely achieved by means of mental development, by
not being inwardly attached to material possessions and sensual
experiences and in seeking a truly independent sense of happiness.
In describing what constitutes wrong views, Payutto’s method
here is of interest, because he omits particular Buddhist teachings.
Little is said of the classic Buddhist understanding, where the pre-
eminent wrong view is the attachment to the notion of a lasting,
unchanging, substantial “self”. In his “World Parliament of Relig-
ions” speech, Payutto also bypassed any mention of how develop-
ing correct views are in Buddhism closely tied to an appreciation of
the “three characteristics of existence” (P. ti-lakkha a — annica, duk-
kha, annat ). Moreover, he spoke of correcting “views,” as men-
tioned above, rather than using the more religiously loaded lan-
guage of overcoming “delusion” (moha). Payutto thus presents his
argument in ways that are accessible and more acceptable to people
from different religious backgrounds. There is little doubt, though,
that he speaks from the basis of these core Buddhist teachings and
the Therav da’s interpretation of them. 
It is perhaps wishful thinking to hope that such emphasis on the
development and cleansing of the mind would be incorporated
into internationally recognized human rights documents. On the
philosophical level, the Buddhist basis for these claims would be
undoubtedly questioned. Moreover, on the socio-economic level,
the Buddhist critique would surely be too radical for politicians
and citizens to contemplate. It would be rejected not because of its
Buddhist flavor but because, when followed through, it fundamen-
tally questions key articles of belief in modern societies — notions
of freedom, consumerism, nationalism, capitalist economic devel-
opment, justice, and, of course, human rights itself. Moreover, it
implies a radical change in lifestyle in a world increasingly shaped
by the pursuit of individual security and wealth. 
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Perhaps, however, in the current global financial and economic
crisis that affects us all, an opportunity is presented for religious
voices on controversial and significant social issues to be heard
more. It is interesting to note that the Guardian newspaper in Brit-
ain, which often adopts a skeptical view towards religion, wel-
comed the intervention of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan
Williams, in his detailed questioning of modern-day social values
that have defined citizens primarily as consumers and allowed
debt to spiral.19 It seems important, in the increasingly globalized
world in which we live in, that religious leaders such as Williams
and Payutto enter into these debates and offer an analysis that
seeks to influence not only religious insiders but also the wider so-
cial and political spheres as well.
Human Rights Chal lenges to Buddhism 
Glendon describes the significance of the UN Declaration of Human
Rights for the international socio-political sphere: 
The Declaration, with its small core of principles to which people of vastly 
different backgrounds can appeal, is the single most important reference 
point for cross-national discussions of the human future on our increas-
ingly inter-dependent and conflict-ridden planet.20
She presents the original intention of most of the drafters: to pro-
vide a basic moral document with legal implications, not to create a
fixed set of laws, which covered not only individual rights but also
social, economic and cultural rights from the beginning. This is an
important reason why the UN document has had such a wide,
cross-national and cross-cultural appeal. In its own words, it repre-
sents a “common standard” for nations representing many differ-
ent socio-economic, religious, cultural and political backgrounds.
In light of this and the way in which the UN Declaration is con-
stantly referred to by numerous international and local bodies,
human rights must be seen as an essential dialogue partner, not
only for those in authority and power but also for religious com-
munities as they seek to promote efforts at establishing a more
peaceful and just world. Human rights concerns have, therefore, a
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legitimate role to play in challenging the practices and beliefs held
by religious communities. For religions to ignore this is to risk the
indignation of public and international opinion.
The relationship between human rights and religious commu-
nities can at times appear ambiguous and controversial. This has
often been noted in reference to the Roman Catholic Church.21 It
took quite some time before the language and concerns of human
rights were fully recognized and valued in the official documents
and doctrine of the Church. The concept of human rights was not
embraced until the Second Vatican Council, with the document
Pacem in terries marking a significant shift in the Church’s under-
standing. Despite being embedded in the official pronouncements
of the Church since, there remains today an uneasy tension be-
tween the church’s public commitment to human rights and how
some of its own practices appear to conflict with them. This is often
mentioned in relation to the unequal role of women in the Church,
and to the secretive and autocratic ways in which the Church is hi-
erarchically run, especially in relation to how theological dissent is
dealt with. The Church, an old and powerful institution with a
global reach, can at times present a picture of disregarding human
rights arguments or standing above the reasonable demands of
human rights, which does little for its image and public standing. 
Perhaps it is unintended but, on a similar note, the impression is
given by Payutto and some other Buddhists that Buddhism has lit-
tle to learn from human rights. The religious tradition is presented
as self-sufficient, the teacher rather than the learner in this relation-
ship. Payutto appears unnecessarily negative in his assessment of
human rights when he says things like “the concept itself is a result
of division, struggle and contention” and “they are merely conven-
tions for social behaviour”.22 It is interesting that he rarely discusses
the history of struggle to overcome suffering that has led to the de-
fining of human rights and the ideals they seek to promote. The UN
declaration cannot simply be understood as a reaction to the hor-
rors of the Second World War, but should also be seen as represent-
ing human aspirations for peace and freedom. Nor does Payutto
much discuss how human rights actually presents challenges to
                                             
21 Reinhardt 2004, pp. 33–34. 
22 Payutto 1993, p. 3. 
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Buddhism. From within his own understanding of the nature of
human rights they can be considered a welcome dialogue partner.
In depicting their conventional nature, he describes human rights
as a form of vinaya (discipline) and thus opens up a link to the reli-
gious institutions of Buddhism, which themselves are open to in-
terpretation and reform.
In Payutto’s native Thailand, it is possible to delineate some ar-
eas where Buddhism is challenged by human rights to rethink its
position or lack of it. Take, for example, the place of women in soci-
ety and within Buddhism. The equality that human rights grants
women and men confronts the sa gha authorities in relation to the
status of nuns. Human rights asks those who block the reestablish-
ment of the bhikkhun order whether their arguments, based on tradi-
tion and the inflexibility of current sa gha structures, are just and sus-
tainable in the light of this “common standard”. Moreover, they
challenge religious leaders to examine the socio-economic and cul-
tural roots of the sex trade. Within Thailand, prostitution is de-
manded as much by Thai men as it is by foreigners and tourists,
though the latter are often the focus of public outcry. Human rights
condemns this as a form of modern day slavery and, in light of this,
asks whether a negative view towards sex and women in Thai Bud-
dhism leads to turning a blind eye to sexual exploitation. Human
rights are also concerned with social justice and with the essential
equality of people. This challenges a popular and widespread un-
derstanding of kamma, in all levels of Thai society, which assigns so-
cial status and wealth to one’s acts in previous lives, and thus mar-
ginalises groups of people like the poor and physically disabled.
Another human rights related issue in Thailand is the recent trend
towards a growing religious conservatism in Buddhism, in which
Payutto is also implicated, which aligns itself with nationalist causes
and negative portrayals of other religions.23 This was reflected in the
recent failed attempt by conservative Buddhist organizations to
make Buddhism the official state religion. Human rights confront
such trends with its calls for the protection of religious freedoms and
minority rights. 
These issues of concern in Thai society highlighted briefly
above are not meant to portray Thailand negatively — all religions
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and societies have issues that contradict or are questionable in the
face of human rights. It is also possible, of course, for Buddhists to
discuss the issues and come to enlightened solutions from within
the resources of their own tradition, as does Satha-anand.24 How-
ever, given that human rights are widely understood as presenting
a yardstick for measuring the ethical health of societies, it is inevi-
table that they will be used in critiquing religious views and prac-
tices. Rather than ignore or distrust them, they should, along with
other external sources, be viewed as an essential dialogue partner.
They enable religion to remain relevant, reasonable, and meaning-
ful in today’s world. 
Buddhists and Christ ians,   
Learning from Each Other 
I recall asking a Scottish man once why he had converted from be-
ing a Christian to Buddhist. The reply was brief: “Too much love,
not enough wisdom.” This represents a common enough critique
of Buddhists when comparing their religion with Christianity. It
can also be applied to their critique of human rights: lots of good in-
tentions, not enough understanding.
In their approach to human rights, I would argue that Chris-
tians could learn from Buddhist wisdom, particularly in develop-
ing right views and on the need to purify mental states. Good inten-
tions, well-formulated ideals and acts of mercy are in themselves
not enough to ensure human rights. The Buddhist analysis calls for
a reassessment of the basic attachments that we have towards ma-
terial possessions. It also asks for a re-examination of the views we
hold to be important and critical within society, including what we
understand by key concepts associated with human rights such as
peace, justice and freedom; to ensure that they themselves are not
simply a front for our own selfish desires. With a clearer view of
what is important in life and a commitment to eradicating our own
interior selfish attachments, human rights work receives a firmer
foundation, where the means meet with the intended ends of over-
coming suffering. 
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Buddhism, I believe, is more consistent in highlighting this need
for purification of the mind than Christianity. Such a concern does,
of course, exist in Christianity, which is evidenced, for example, by
the teaching of Jesus in the “Sermon on the Mount” and in traditions
of contemplation and discernment in various monastic orders.
However, it receives a prominence and emphasis in Buddhism from
which Christians could learn. Christians have indeed begun in many
places to renew their spirituality through incorporating this Bud-
dhist emphasis.25 Christians, without difficulty, can define human
rights abuses as rooted in sin and can point to human selfishness as
the source of such horrors. Buddhism, though, offers a more thor-
ough-going and systematic analysis of how selfish attitudes are
rooted in mental states and desires. These are described in detail, to
aid their recognition, and tools are provided, primarily meditative,
in order for these to be rooted out.
The aim of purification of the mind is, of course, not limited to
overcoming human rights abuses — they are simply the result of a
deeper spiritual malaise of the mind. In the Rathavin ta Sutta, a dia-
logue between Pu a Mant iputta and S riputta, the purification
of the mind is described as simply one of a relay of seven chariots
used for the completion of a religious journey; a journey that leads
to “reaching final nibb na without clinging”26 — the ultimate aim in
Buddhism. This aim and the underlying philosophical framework
that supports it has to be recognized and appreciated by Christians
involved in interreligious dialogue and social action for human
rights. It is not necessary, however, I would argue, to agree with
and this philosophical basis in order to learn from the Buddhist cri-
tique and integrate aspects of it into one’s own religious and social
commitments.
When it comes to suggesting what Buddhists might learn from
Christians in the field of approaching human rights, we could start
by flipping the saying of the convert on its head: “Too much wis-
dom, not enough love.” How are we to arrive at the right views,
which Payutto emphasizes are so important? He and other Bud-
dhists argue for a training of the mind, which would be based on
meditation, the study of religious teachings, and underpinned by a
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basic moral approach to life. I would suggest that there is another
helpful way of training the mind, leading to insight and wisdom,
which draws primarily on the various liberation theologies and ex-
periences of Third World Christians. In liberation theology, it is ar-
gued that we are led into a deeper appreciation of the demands of
justice and compassion through a commitment to the poor and
identification with their suffering. This commitment helps to liber-
ate us from selfish desires by placing what we value and find
meaningful in life within a wider social framework, characterized
by injustice and suffering; it leads to insight into the social reality of
suffering and the way out of it.
As with Asian Buddhist commentators, human rights concerns
have been viewed in the past by liberation theologians as repre-
senting a largely Western approach to social justice issues. As the
Sri Lankan theologian, Aloysius Pieris, argues, they represent the
high-point of Western spirituality, which, though good in them-
selves, are inadequate in a world faced by mass hunger and global
inequality.27 What is required is a more radical approach based on
encountering the poor in their suffering and taking their side in
struggling for justice. In Christian theology, this identification is
based on the long tradition of God’s concern for the poor and op-
pressed in the Hebrew Scriptures, which is intensified in the way in
which Jesus Christ carries out his prophetic and healing ministry
and, then, embodied in the Christology of Matthew 25, where the
sufferings of the poor are identified with Christ himself. An en-
counter and identification with those who suffer unjustly can lead
to a profound change of view and reorientation in life; in other
words, it is a means of salvation/liberation.
It is possible, of course, to find aspects of this approach in Bud-
dhism. In the P li canon there are stories where an encounter with
those who are suffering helps or promises to bring about new in-
sight on the path of liberation. Here, I would raise as examples two
well-known sources, the Kalama and Ariyapariyesan suttas. With
regard to the Kalama Sutta, it is worth noting the interpretation of
Bhikkhu Bodhi, who argues that the Sutta has been misunderstood
under the influence of seeking to align Buddhism to a scientific and
anti-dogmatic mindset:
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This interpretation of the sutta, however, forgets that the advice the Bud-
dha gave the Kalamas was contingent upon the understanding that they 
were not yet prepared to place faith in him and his doctrine; it also forgets 
that the sutta omits, for that very reason, all mention of right view and of 
the entire perspective that opens up when right view is acquired.28
The purpose of the Buddha was, then, to teach the Kalamas in a
way which would bring benefit to them and, eventually, lead them
towards discovering the right view. The Buddha enters into a dia-
logue where he convinces them of the need to overcome greed, ha-
tred, and delusion by means of the Brahma Vih ra, the four divine
abodes of loving-kindness, compassion, altruistic joy and equanim-
ity. The emphasis, therefore, is on a moral way of practice — of
compassion towards others — as the necessary grounding for de-
veloping the right view.
In the Ariyapariyesan Sutta the Buddha recounts his earlier
search for enlightenment — the “noble search […] seeking the su-
preme state of sublime peace,” from leaving his family and home,
through association with various teachers, to his final attainment of
nibb na. With nibb na finally attained, however, he weighed up in his
mind whether he should teach the dhamma to others and he tells his
monks:
Thereupon there came to me spontaneously these stanzas never heard be-
fore: 
 “Enough with teaching the dhamma 
 That even I found hard to reach; 
 For it will never be perceived 
 By those who live in lust and hate […]” 
Considering thus, my mind inclined to inaction rather than to teaching the 
dhamma. 29
As he saw it, there was just too much ignorance and ill-will around;
his doctrine would be misunderstood and abused. Fearful of seeing
the Buddha withdraw from society, the Sutta goes on to recount
how the Brahm Sahampati rushed to the Buddha and sought to
convince him of the need for engagement. It is an interesting point
of debate — why a Buddha with a fully awakened mind needs to be
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challenged in something so fundamental — but, putting this to one
side, the tactic of the Brahm Sahampati is of interest here. Brahm
asks the Buddha to view this world of suffering with compassion. It
is, then, through surveying the world with compassion that the
Buddha sees that there are those who will indeed benefit from his
teaching and decides, thereupon, to engage with the world. Is it too
much to say that it is an encounter with those who suffer which
changes the view of the Buddha and convinces him to go out and
teach for the sake of the many?
In Christianity, in any case, a particular concern is shown not
just for those who suffer in general terms — which is all of us — but
for those who suffer through poverty, injustice, and marginaliza-
tion. This is a focus that is not so strong in the Buddhist texts. In lib-
eration theology, in Latin America, this concern was memorably
captured in the coining of the term, the “preferential option for the
poor”. This is misunderstood by Christians and Buddhists alike.
Thich Nhat Hanh, for example, wrote about the option for the poor:
But I do not think God wants us to take sides, even with the poor. The rich 
also suffer, in many cases more than the poor! […] We do not need to take 
sides. When we take sides, we misunderstand the will of God.30
This option cannot be correct because God’s love must be for all
and unconditional! However, this is to miss the point. It does not
mean that the poor are closer to God or more favoured, but that
such an option reveals the true scope of God’s love for all and the
extent to which we are called to participate in it. In this sense, it is
emphasizing that liberation is as much a social event as individual;
it is interdependent in nature. It does not deny the suffering of the
rich but asserts that their liberation is intimately bound up with
how they encounter and respond to those who suffer most through
human injustice and cruelty.
Here, I would suggest, is something for Buddhists to learn, es-
pecially for those who emphasize achieving the right view before
engaging in social action. This seems to already be happening in
the movement of socially engaged Buddhists. There may be de-
bates as to the primary sources of their social commitment, but
there is little doubt that it has been influenced by contact with radi-
cal Christians who take the option for the poor seriously. Again, it
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is not necessary for Buddhists to agree with the underlying theol-
ogy of this approach, but to be open to learn from it.
The Buddhist teachings of training the mind and the Christian
“option for the poor” come out of different religious histories and,
of course, different philosophical/theological perspectives lie at
their roots. It is difficult to see how these differences can be harmo-
nized but aspects of them can be intertwined within the spirituality
of people. They can form a kind of basic common agreement be-
tween Buddhists and Christians when it comes to working for hu-
man rights within our world. This is nothing new. Aloysius Pieris
has been arguing for such a complementary approach for many
years,31 where the struggle to be poor, in terms of renouncing at-
tachments and training the mind, is joined with the struggle for the
poor, in a socio-political identification with their suffering and a
commitment against social injustice — both aspects are necessary
in today’s world. Buddhists and Christians can learn from each
others’ strengths in these areas. This, of course, does not exhaust ef-
forts at developing a common religious approach to human rights;
other elements, relating to nonviolent strategies, the environment,
and other religions and ideologies, need also to be considered. It
does, however, show that differences in religions can provide a rich
resource in the struggle for human rights — where the concern to
purify the mind and encounter those who suffer interconnect.
                                             
31 Cf. Pieris 1988a. 
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Is Mah y na Buddhism a Humanism?
Some Remarks on Buddhism in China 
HELWIG SCHMIDT-GLINTZER
Prel iminary Remarks 
As Bernard Faure recently stated, many ideas about Buddhism
“stem from a refusal to take the diversity of Buddhism as a living
tradition seriously”.1 Furthermore the success of Buddhism was a
result of its willingness to adapt to specific social circumstances.
Thus, Buddhism in China had, and still has, many facets and faces.
It stemmed first from the totality of the so-called H nay na. After
other texts which came from India and Central Asia along the Silk
Road and had been translated into Chinese, the Mah y na version
of Buddhism became the dominant version. Although under con-
stant threat by the Chinese state the Buddhist doctrine permeated
Chinese society on all levels, thus intensifying the culture of com-
passion in China. In the following reflections I will trace aspects of
humanism in China which are connected with the Buddhist tradi-
tions. From its first contact with Chinese indigenous religions and
philosophical traditions Buddhism became amalgamated with
Confucian humanism in which natural law and respect towards
every human being were not unknown. 
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Universal ist ic  Approach of  Mah y na
Buddhism is seen as a universal doctrine which from its beginnings
was directed at every human being. It is not exclusive, but open to
everyone, laymen and clerics alike. However, its social reality was
different and in the early history of the Buddhist teaching the way of
the dharma was restricted to clergymen only. This changed funda-
mentally when Buddhism reached the Gandhara region in the late
4th century BCE, from where it later expanded into China and East
Asia. In Gandhara the teaching of the Buddha was confronted with
Hellenistic thought and particularly with the concept of individual-
ity as it was developed in Ancient Greece. The renaissance of the
original teaching of the historical Buddha kyamuni in the valleys
of Indus and Swat during the last two centuries BCE found expres-
sion in public lectures and at the same time it was written down on
palm leaves and other material. As a result Buddhist teaching found
its way to many different places in Eurasia. One of the most popular
Buddhist Mah y na texts is the Vimalak rti-nirde a s tra (Chin. Wei-
mojie jing) which became very prominent all over Central and East
Asia and China from the 5th century CE as can be seen in mural
paintings as well as in treatises and commentaries on Buddhism by
authors in medieval China.
The central figure is the layman Vimalak rti who had perfected
himself in every virtue and thus obtained the status of a bodhisattva,
but for the sake of “expedience” (Skr. up ya) he had assumed the
role of a householder: 
Although a white-clad layman, he kept the rule of the rama as […] He 
did not stay in the formless realm [P. ar pa-dh tu], but possessed wife and 
concubines. Following what he himself enjoyed, he continually cultivated 
pure conduct. Although possessing family and retinue, he lived continu-
ally as if in a hermitage. Manifestly adorning his person, well clothed and 
fed, within himself he was continually as if in trance [Skr. dhy na]. If pre-
sent among gamblers or revelers, he used the occasion to save men. He ac-
cepted heretics, leading them by the Buddha’s teaching. Not forsaking the 
sacred scriptures, he utilized the good words of worldly and profane teach-
ings, enjoying them through dharma-enjoyment.2
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Thus Vimalak rti transcended all social barriers such as caste and
other differentiations. In the text itself there are several instances
where the similarity of nirv a and sa s ra is exemplified. At the
heart of this is the doctrine that everything including the dharmas is
without substance. The Vimalak rti s tra contains a dispute between
riputra, a disciple of Buddha kyamuni, and a heavenly apsara
during which — to riputra’s astonishment — this apsara turns his
body into a woman’s body using her supernatural power. The apsara
declares:
Good sir, if you can change into this woman’s likeness, then all women’s 
bodies are likewise changeable. If you, not being a woman, have neverthe-
less a woman’s body and are invisible (as far as your original body is con-
cerned), then all women, though possessing women’s bodies, are non-
women and invisible. It’s just as the Buddha said: “All the dharmas are non-
female and non-male.”3
Richard B. Mather has underlined the fresh quality of this early po-
lemical dispute in which the author sets out to ridicule the “cheerless
asceticism of the r vakas and pulverize the dessicated scholasticism
of their Abhidharma,” thus enabling Vimalak rti to endear himself
to the Chinese intellectuals of the third and fourth centuries.4 The
universality of the Buddhist doctrine put forward by the M dhya-
mika school as an exponent of the Mah y na teaching appealed to
the Chinese as well as to representatives of other cultures. The say-
ing that “Buddha with a single voice declares the law, while sentient
beings, each in his own way, construe the meaning” 5 means that
Buddha’s law is applicable to every culture and not restricted to the
lifestyle of the Indians. This universalistic notion is reflected in a pas-
sage by Liu Xie contained in chapter 8 of the “Collection to Propa-
gate and to Illuminate [Buddhism]” (Chin. Hongming ji):
The “Expedient Teaching” [Chin. quanjiao] is not localized; it does not, be-
cause of differences between the religious and secular, violate what is 
proper. Its subtle influence is not exotic; how can it, because of differences 
between Chinese and barbarians, go against human sensibilities? There-
fore, “With a single voice it declares the Law,” and variant interpretations 
are understood simultaneously; in a single vehicle it transports the Teach-
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ing, and the different s tras all reach the same conclusion. Is the mere fact 
of being barbarian of Chinese a barrier?6
Thus Mah y na tradition took up the tradition of Buddha’s teach-
ing of the middle path by which liberation is provided for every-
body and not just for those who join the sa gha.
Another aspect of Mah y na is embodied in the concept of the
bodhisattva. It is not just the fact that all sentient beings are bound to
the cycle of birth and death which means that every human being
must consider all living beings equal. Since they are all waiting for
salvation, every sentient being is able to increase its own karmic ac-
count by showing compassion and helping other sentient beings, all
of which are all said to be able to perfect their Buddha nature. 
Buddhism versus  Human Rights 
Although Buddhism at first sight seems to be compatible with
claims for human rights, there are many inconsistencies between
Buddhism and the human rights movement. This has been already
commented on by others.7 The fundamental difference between
Buddhism and the concept of human rights is that in spite of the at-
titude of accommodation demonstrated in the case of Vimalak rti,
Buddhism principally renounces the world. It accepts differences
and explains them as being the result of former deeds. Although in
Mah y na the principal possibility of attaining enlightenment is
well known, the teaching still accepts the theory of karmic retribu-
tion. Thus even attaining the state of liberation and spiritual
enlightenment does not mean that one is freed from injustice, sup-
pression or other circumstances which usually are regarded as con-
travening human rights. On the contrary, attaining enlightenment
does not depend on being free of suppression of any kind. Thus the
central conception of Buddhism in no way includes struggling
against a disregard for human rights.
On the other hand, because of its strong claim for compassion
Buddhism always stands on the side of the suffering creature. The
rhetoric of human rights, however, is alien to Buddhism. This is
due to a different attitude towards the individual in East Asia on
the one hand and in the West on the other. There are even some
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scholars who argue that the human rights discourse is even deep-
ening the gap between different cultures. Masao Abe stated:
Strictly speaking, the exact equivalent of the phrase “human rights” in the 
Western sense cannot be found anywhere in Buddhist literature.8
David Chappell is quoted as saying:
Scholars have argued that Buddhism has no doctrine of human rights and, 
technically, they are right.9
These statements refer to the different concept of man in Buddhism
on the one hand and in the human rights discourse on the other.
In fact the human rights discourse can be regarded as a means
of masking privilege. It is obvious that Western powers do not fol-
low the principles set by human rights when their own interests are
involved. This was neither the case in the Congo in the early 1960s
nor in Vietnam, and it was also not applicable in the context of the
invasion of the US and its supporting powers in Iraq. Thus it is
more than reasonable that some of those who perceive themselves
as guardians of the humanist tradition of East Asia are not willing
just to subscribe blindly to the Western concept of human rights.
This has much to do with the different concepts of state power in
the West and in East Asia (as well as with the defense of authoritar-
ian practices in Asian countries). 
In spite of these fundamental differences, many representatives
of present-day Buddhism tend to sympathize with advocates of
Western human rights. When communism became the state ideol-
ogy in countries such as China, which had long Buddhist tradi-
tions, tensions between state and religion came to a head. But even
before that, as in Japan, in processes of modernization conflicts be-
tween institutionalized Buddhism and the claims of the representa-
tives of the modern state led to conflicts and very often to suppres-
sion of Buddhist institutions and adherents of their religion, espe-
cially the monks and nuns. Mainly as a result of such experiences the
idea arose that there could be a natural alliance of Buddhism and the
claims of human rights.10 In this context one might even argue that
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throughout its history Buddhism has been adapting itself to chang-
ing situations and circumstances. Seen from this perspective, one
might even claim that in a process of assimilation Buddhism has de-
veloped into a strong advocate of human rights.
Aspects of  Incompatibi l i ty 
In spite of evidence of processes of assimilation one cannot neglect
the fundamental differences between Buddhist doctrine and West-
ern human rights discourse. From the beginning it was the central
conception and the main aim of Buddhism to foster awareness of the
interplay of sa s ra and nirv a. Buddhist cosmology and its neglect
of human concerns is incompatible with our understanding of hu-
man rights. Therefore any attempt to identify a central conception of
Buddhism, on the one hand, and an attempt to prove that it is in
harmony with the conception of human rights is doomed to failure.
All that is possible is a reconstruction of the Mah y na traditions in
order to trace elements of humanistic attitudes. We should not only
pay attention to the written sources but also take the actual practice
of Buddhism into consideration, especially Buddhist ritual, the vi-
naya and meditation practice.
Are there human rights in the world of sa s ra? Is being reborn
in the Pure Land a kind of realization of humanist ideals? What role
do meritorious deeds play? And what about the relationship be-
tween the karmic situation and the quest for respect? It seems that
from the start the issue of human rights does not concern the Bud-
dhist because empathy and compassion are things one does not
practice in order to respect other living beings’ rights — they them-
selves are not entitled to ask for compassion — but rather to obey the
precept not to harm other living beings. The status of each individ-
ual depends not on rights or restrictions but on his karma. In general
Mah y na thinking is relativistic and thus stands in contrast to the
universal claims of the Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.11 Despite
Buddhism’s concerns for self-perfection and its lack of a social uto-
pian vision, in practice Buddhists have shown themselves commit-
ted to an idea of social justice and even the use of force.
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Subject iv i ty 
Buddha formulates his doctrine as a result of his internal insights
and experiences both from his own and former lives. Thus, outside
him there can be no other independent instance to which to appeal.
This is another reason why it seems impossible to ground a declara-
tion of human rights on Buddha’s teaching. One must admit, how-
ever, that statutes and laws are necessary in order to prevent con-
flicting interests resulting in manslaughter and murder.12 But seen
from a Buddhist worldview it is questionable to demand compli-
ance with human rights as long as the motivation for this is min-
gled with any interest. There is, however, the option for hoping that
by spiritual practice, compassionate behavior, and cooperation
human rights might be factually realized.13 The pursuit of happi-
ness in a material world as defined by the American Declaration of
Independence is, however, not of interest to the Buddhist; instead he
follows his dharma.
The Four Noble Truths 
After realizing that there is a truth of suffering on the one hand and
a truth of the origin of this suffering on the other, i.e. that all suffer-
ing has its causes, there is the third truth which describes not the
path to the elimination of suffering but the goal itself, i.e. the state of
utter absence of suffering known as nirv a. In this state there can
be no concept of self. The fourth truth describes the path to nirv a.
Whereas the starting point for the human rights discourse is that
man should be prevented from suffering, in Buddhism it is funda-
mental to accept that life in itself is suffering. Only with regard to
the notion of equality does Mah y na Buddhism (“all living beings
have an innate Buddha nature”) come near to the human rights po-
sition, namely in claiming that all men are equal in that they have
the potential to attain enlightenment.14 But whereas the human
rights discourse argues in favor of the acknowledgement of par-
ticular rights, Buddhism does not seek justice but liberation. There
is, as has been said, no identifiable instance in Buddhism which
could guarantee rights. Only in later developments and in amal-
gamation with Chinese religious and bureaucratic traditions do we
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encounter the emergence of a Buddhist hell with the function of a
purgatory and a judicial court to deliberate upon human fate.15
Vimalak rt i , Bodhisat tva  Ideal  and Hybris 
As far as humanist attitudes in Mah y na Buddhism are con-
cerned the ideal of the bodhisattva is repeatedly brought into play.
The concept evolved out of a critique of the idea of the arhat in the
school of the Mah s ghikas, and describes one who seeks to at-
tain the state of Buddha while at the same time practicing com-
passion. This became the fundamental concept of the way of the
bodhisattva. Out of empathy and compassion the liberation of the
individual is thus regarded as being tantamount to the liberation
of all living beings. Thus a bodhisattva was one who postponed his
own redemption, the entrance into nirv a, in order to save others
or to lead them to salvation. It was presupposed that one’s own
karma could be transferred to others. Thus hope was engendered
that salvation could be reached through deeds by others, thus
leaving the wheel of reincarnation.
The bodhisattva protects all living beings, subduing all evil and
practising the six “perfections” (Skr. p ramit ) which are the cardinal
virtues: 
(1) “generosity” (d na-p ramit ),
(2) “morality” ( la-p ramit ),
(3) “leniency and forbearance” (k nti-p ramit ),
(4) “vigor” (v rya-p ramit ),
(5) “contemplation” (dhy na-p ramit ), and 
(6) “wisdom” (prajñ -p ramit ).
In some lists the following four are added:
 (7) “skilfulness in transmitting the teaching” (up ya-kau alya-
p ramit ),
(8) “decisiveness” (pranidh na-p ramit ),
(9) “magic power” (bala-p ramit ),
(10) “knowledge” (jñ na-p ramit ).
Correspondingly, these perfections are realized in ten stages or lay-
ers or realms (Skr) bh mi): 
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(4) blazing Wisdom, 
(5) unmatched, 
(6) alertness, 
(7) unexhausted skill, 
(8) quietude, 
(9) perfect understanding, 
(10) cloud of the dharma.
Whereas in the first six stages a bodhisattva remains bound to con-
cepts and reality, from the seventh stage onwards he no longer
concerns himself with the material world. After he has finally
reached the tenth stage he is consecrated with encompassing wis-
dom by Buddha himself. Equipped with unlimited miraculous
power, he is graceful towards all living beings and helps them to
salvation. By this process, in the Mah y na the Buddha kya-
muni is accompanied by a number of similar divine beings, such
as e.g. Amit bha, Maitreya and Avalokite vara, the bodhisattva of
mercy, who in China transmutes into the female Guanyin (Jp.
Kannon) as well as Mañju r , the amicable and majestic bodhisattva
of wisdom. According to Étienne Lamotte these are just manifes-
tations of the wisdom and the mercy of Buddha. Thus these
Buddhas are all identical in their “body of reality” (Skr. dharma-
k ya) which is the teaching itself. According to Mah y na teaching
one finds numberless Buddhas and bodhisattvas filling an increas-
ing infinity of worlds. 
The most prominent among the bodhisattvas in East Asia is Ami-
t bha or Amit yus (“immense light” or “immense lifespan”). He is
the lord of the “Western Paradise,” the “Pure Land” (Skr. Sukh -
vat ), who saves all who pray for help and mercy. These Mah y na
teachings are contained in the Prajñ p ramit literature as well as in
the Diamond S tra, the Heart S tra and the Lotus S tra (Skr. Sad-
dharmapu ar ka).
The concept of the bodhisattva is illustrated in the parable of the
burning house in the Lotus S tra (chapter 3), where Buddha in-




I tell you, riputra, 
you and the others 
are all my children, 
and I am a father to you. 
For repeated kalpas 
you have burned in the flames of manifold sufferings, 
but I will save you all 
and cause you to escape from the threefold world. 
Although earlier I told you 
that you had attained extinction, 
that was only the end of birth and death, 
it was not true extinction. 
Now what is needed 
is simply that you acquire Buddha wisdom. 
If there are bodhisattvas
here in my assembly, 
let them with a single mind 
listen to the true Law of the Buddhas.16
Small  and Great  Wisdom 
There are, however, different kinds of people, those with great
wisdom and others who are not yet able to emancipate themselves
from falsehood and delusion. But the Buddha as the Dharma-King
will “bring peace and safety to living beings”.17 At first sight mod-
ern promises such as Kang Youwei’s “great community” (Chin. da-
tong) or the program issued by Hu Jintao propagating a “harmoni-
ous society” (Chin. hexie shehui) are reminiscent of these Buddhist
ideals. Even the Declaration of Independence issued on July 4, 1776,
may function in the same way.
To come to a conclusion, humanism and human rights do not
contradict the central teachings of Mah y na, but they have differ-
ent intellectual and spiritual conditions. The ideas of humanism
and human rights may function as “expedient means” (up ya)
which help people find the path to salvation. On the other hand the
Mah y na doctrine does not speak of “equally born” and thus
from the perspective of Western theories of human rights Bud-
dhism does not conform to the standard of its concept of the indi-
                                             
16 Watson 1993, p. 71. 
17 Ibid., p. 72. 
IS MAH Y NA BUDDHISM A HUMANISM?
123
vidual. In the end, however, Buddhism might prove to be a better
means to promote the goals of the human rights movement than
Western individualistic concepts. 
After a long history of folk Buddhist movements in late impe-
rial China on the one hand and of the adaptation of Tibetan Tantric
Buddhism by the Manchu emperors, China saw a Buddhist revival
from which new forms of Buddhism emerged such as e.g. the Ciji
group originating in Hualian in Taiwan, a Buddhist charitable or-
ganization founded in 1966 by “master” Zhengyan (born 1937), a
nun hailed by some as “the Mother Teresa of Asia”.18 One of her
central messages reads:
Buddha is not a god. However, all living beings in the world have the 
Buddha-nature. The Buddha has transcended his human nature and be-
come a saint. He is the most respected of those who are enlightened and 
who enlighten others. He is the guide of true human life. […] The truly in-
spiring Buddha can only be found in our hearts.19
She teaches the ability to reach perfection of everyone:
All of us can strive for enlightenment. Once enlightened, you and I can be 
just like Sakyamuni, Kwan-yin, and Ti-tsang.20
Thus Buddhism has the potential to support humanism or it might
even itself be called humanism. Nevertheless at certain times it ac-
cepted, even acclaimed the suppression of counterrevolutionaries.
Holmes Welch transmitted a report on a forum in Peking in which
a nun remarked
[…] that the nation’s resolve to shoot counterrevolutionaries was like cop-
ing with spinal meningitis or tuberculosis: unless one killed it quickly, 
one’s own life was in the greatest danger.21
Therefore although we might accept Buddhism as peaceful and
nonviolent, in reality, “Buddhism has a complex relationship with
war” and violence in general.22
                                             
18 Zhiru 2000, p. 85. 
19 Ibid., p. 92. 
20 Ibid., p. 94. 
21 Welch 1972, p. 287. 
22 Faure 2009, p. 95. 
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Buddhist Responses to State Control
of Religion in China at the Century’s Turn 
SHI ZHIRU
We recall the fate of the Lung-hua Ssu [Longhua si], an ancient and famous 
monastery in the western suburb of the city of Shanghai. In pre-Republican 
days it enjoyed wide popularity, not only on account of its architecture but 
also of its beautiful surroundings. In the spring its courtyards were 
thronged with pilgrims and children who came to worship and to enjoy 
the many colored peach blossom […] Then came the revolution of 1911 
and with it the battalions of new soldiers in khaki uniforms. Some were 
dispatched to Shanghai for its protection. But there were no barracks and 
the government had no money to build them. Someone with a business 
mind, but little capacity for spiritual values, suggested that the commodi-
ous equipment of the [Longhua si] was available and the army could have 
it for a song, for the monks were powerless to resist. And so one morning 
soldiers came, turned out the monks, and established themselves there. 
That was eight years ago and the khaki-uniformed soldiers are still there. 
The droning voices of the bonzes in their chanting, the temple bells, and 
the footsteps of the pilgrims in spring time have all disappeared and in 
their place one hears the mingled notes of bugle and drum and their meas-
ured thud of soldiers’ boots resounding in the yards as they practiced the 
goose-step to the rhythm of the “left-right” of the leader. A sight which one 
can hardly forget on entering the hall is to see, in place of the beautiful tap-
estries, candle sticks, kneeling stools, and burning lamps — the parapher-
nalia of worship and adoration — the entire floorspace crowded with 
stacks of rifles with shining bayonets, soldier-kits, and camp-beds — the 
paraphernalia of war and destruction. But in the center there remains the 
majestic image of Buddha, seated on a raised platform, with the serene and 
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unperturbed face, looking down upon the strange sight with infinite pity 
for poor humanity thus gone astray. 1
This passage describes the Longhua Monastery (Chin. Longhua si,
“Dragon-flower Monastery”) in the aftermath of the Revolution
that established Republican China following the last Qing emperor
Puyi’s (1906–1967) abdication in February 1912. The author, Bishop
Tsu, furnishes a fascinating glimpse of Buddhism in China during
her transition to political modernization as the Qing imperial state
finally crumpled under the weight of external foreign powers (the
West and Japan) and internal civil uprisings to give birth to the Re-
public of China (1912–1949). Besides Longhua Monastery, other
monasteries and temples possessing extensive facilities suffered
similar plights during this era.2
As further evidence of heightened state intervention in reli-
gious activities, in 1915, the Republican Parliament headed by
Yuan Shikai (r. 1912–1916) passed a bill titled “Regulations for the
Control of Monasteries and Temples” (Chin. Guanli simiao tiaoli).
Comprising thirty-one articles, the bill imposed state censure on
ordination, public speaking, reception of guests, and even allowed
the government to dismiss those abbots deemed to have violated
monastic precepts.3 While the bill was actually in effect for too short
a duration to have real impact in practice, it did index the mounting
political pressures under which the sa gha lived out their religious
practices at the turn of the century. In other words, prior to the reli-
                                             
1 Tsu 1921, pp. 497–512.  
2 Holmes Welch’s (1967, 1968) works are still the best sources in Eng-
lish on this topic. Note that much of my information on Buddhism in 
this period is based on Welch (1968). His research suggested that 
revolutionary forces occupied Guangxiao monastery (Chin. Guang-
xiao si, in northern Jiangsu) and Jinshan monastery (Chin. Jinshan si, 
in Zhejiang) at different junctures in the Republican period. See 
Welch 1968, pp. 145–152. For a study in Chinese on Buddhism in this 
period, see Shi (1974). For a detailed study in Chinese on the modern 
Buddhist persecution, particularly in relation to state policies on 
monastery landholdings, see Huang 2006.
3 For a close analysis of these policies, see Huang 2006, pp. 208–254. Cf. 
Welch 1968, pp. 38–39 and 137–138. This bill was further revised in 
1921 into a document of twenty-four articles titled “Revised Regula-
tions for the Control of Monasteries and Temples” (Chin. Xiuzheng 
guanli simiao tiaoli).
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gious persecution that took place under Communist rule, Bud-
dhists already felt a spiraling urgency as to the fate of their religion,
given the historic transformations brought by the encounter with
modernity.
The overwhelming sense of a growing Buddhist crisis engen-
dered salient expressions of Buddhism during the Republican pe-
riod that would be crucial for Buddhist survival under the threat of
religious persecution during Communist rule. This paper analyzes
two different kinds of Buddhist responses generated by a religious
crisis that was profoundly embedded within the social and political
restructuring of the state at the turn of the twentieth century. The
modern Buddhist crisis really began with state violation of monastic
property rights, and rapidly expanded to other areas of religious life
like the rights to ordination, to perform particular religious services,
and ultimately to practice the religion. This paper thus contributes to
the understanding of “Buddhist Approaches to Human Rights” (the
theme of this volume) by discussing an important facet of human
rights, namely, religious rights. It examines the different paradigms
religious leaders undertook during the Qing-Republican transition
as measures to protect Buddhist rights against antireligious state
policies and to ward off the possible extinction of their religion in the
encounter with modernity. While the two Buddhist paradigms ap-
pear, on the surface, to be dichotomized, there really exist significant
overlaps and a certain degree of fluidity between them, so that it is
more useful to see them as prominent tendencies in a continuum,
rather than sharply demarcated polarities. During this critical phase
Buddhist leaders came forward to sow the seeds for formative vi-
sions of Buddhism that have continued today to inspire the practices
of Chinese Buddhist communities outside China, most prominently
in Taiwan, as well as the current resurgence of Buddhism in
mainland China.4
Buddhism and State Relat ions 
As already indicated, the modern Chinese Buddhist crisis really
began with state confiscation and borrowing of monastic land, the
full impact of which can only be understood against the long his-
                                             




tory of Buddhist institutional dependence on the imperial court
and state for patronage and protection to ensure its prosperity. In
India, the religious vocation was privileged as a sphere beyond
secular law and rule so that all religious institutions were naturally
exempted from taxation, criminal law, or paying obeisance to the
ruler and his court. Arriving in China at the turn of the Common
Era, the practices and assumptions of Indian Buddhist monasticism
immediately ran headlong against a different concept of religio-
political rulership: for the Chinese people and the predominantly
Confucian court members, their sovereign (or monarch) was the
“Son of Heaven” (Chin. tianzi) whose political rule was divinely
mandated by Heaven (Chin. tianming), so that the ruler naturally
commanded respect from all classes of people, even religious cler-
ics. The clash of Buddhist practices with Sinitic political ideology is
particularly documented in a court petition titled “Treatise On
Why The Monk Need Not Bow To The Ruler” (Chin. Shamen bujing
wangzhe lun), composed in 404 by the aristocratic, learned monk
Huiyuan (334–416).5
To facilitate state vigilance over Buddhist activities, a hierarchy
of monastic officials was introduced during the Northern Wei rule
(386–585), which perpetuated through the centuries with occasional
revisions until the Qing period (1644–1912).6 State sa gha officials
administered a range of religious affairs such as the dispensing of
ordination certificates, the registration of monasteries, temples, and
monks, as well as the issuance of travel permits for monastic travel,
all of which were conduits for policing and limiting religion. With
state control the religion also received patronage and protection.
From time to time, the state also took steps to downsize, and even
confiscate, properties belonging to Buddhist monasteries and tem-
ples, often redirecting the assets to state use in order to curb the
growth of the Buddhist institution. Throughout Chinese history, the
state powers oscillated between a deep-rooted paranoia of Bud-
                                             
5 The Shamen bujing wangzhe lun is collected in the “Records to 
Propagate and Clarify (the Teachings)” (Chin. Hongming ji), com-
piled by Sengyou (445–518); see T. 2102: 52.1a–95b. For an English 
translation of this treatise, see Hurvitz 1957, pp. 2–36. For further 
discussion of its role in church-state relations of the early medieval 
period, see Zürcher 1972, pp. 231–239. For a study of modern de-
velopments, see Zhe 2004.  
6 For a study of the sa gha official institution, see Shi 1981.  
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dhism as a breeding ground for sedentary movements and parasite
on the state’s resources, on the one hand, and on the other, an
equally strong desire to endorse Buddhist activities, if only to secure
spiritual protection for the state’s prosperity and the ruler’s welfare.
While state patronage was certainly one of the reasons for the
flourishing of Buddhism in China, it also inevitably placed the mo-
nastic establishment at the mercy of state policies that often operated
against its favor. The most important examples are indubitably the
Four Buddhist Persecutions, which were wholesale suppression of
Buddhists carried out on four occasions from the fifth through the
tenth century by four Chinese emperors. Later Buddhist historians
called them “The Buddhist Persecutions by the Three [Emperors]
Wu and the One [Emperor] Zong” (Chin. sanwu yizong fa’nan),
named after the emperors who decreed the persecutions.7 A variety
of factors contributed to these persecutions of Buddhists, among
which were economic reasons (fear of the growing power of the
Buddhist monasteries, or a perceived need to strengthen the state
monetary and land assets), as well as anti-Buddhist sentiments in-
cited by religious rivalry, especially from the other two great tradi-
tions, religious Daoism and Confucianism. Very often, the anti-
Buddhist measures, couched in phrases like “to abolish Buddhism”
(Chin. fei fo) or “to exterminate Buddhism” (Chin. mie fo), included
the destruction of Buddhist texts, Buddha images, and a forced laici-
zation of the monastic community that was intended to reduce the
Buddhist population, sometimes simply to acquire more labor or
military resources for the state. Consequently, for Chinese Bud-
                                             
7 Historians refer to these infamous persecutions as the “Four Great 
Buddhist Persecutions” (Chin. si da fa’nan or sanwu yizong fa’nan).
Zhipan (fl. 1258–1269) discusses the persecutions in his work “Gene-
alogy Record of Buddha Patriachs” (Chin. Fozu tongji), T. 2035: 
49.392–393. The first three persecutions were decreed by emperors 
with the name of Wu: first in 446–452 by emperor Wudi of Northern 
Wei; the second in 573–578 by emperor Wudi of Northern Zhou; the 
third in 845–847 by emperor Wuzong of Tang Dynasty. The fourth 
persecution happened in 955 during the reign of emperor Shizong of 
Latter Zhou during the Five Dynasties. As J.J.M. de Groot (1903, 
vol. 1, p. 16) has pointed out in his classic study of sectarianism and 
religious persecutions in China, “Buddhism has always had much 
more to suffer from the anathema of the State than Daoism”. 
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dhists, a religious crisis was incontrovertibly bound to adversarial
political circumstances and state persecution.
Another related concept was the neologism “Final Dharma”
(Chin. mofa), which describes the demise of Buddhist teachings in an
era when the Buddha had long since entered nirv a and all sem-
blances of the monastic community had disappeared. According to
modern scholarship, while references to the decline of Buddhism
were present in Indian literature, the systematization of this decline
into a threefold periodization — “Correct Teachings” (Chin.
zhengfa), “Counterfeit Teachings” (Chin. xiangfa) and “Final Teach-
ings” (Chin. mofa) — particularly the final phase of mofa — was most
likely articulated in medieval China, particularly the final phase,
mofa.8 These teachings of the decline of Buddhism were prompted
no doubt by an overwhelming spiritual urgency felt by early medie-
val Buddhists who suffered and mourned the deplorable destruc-
tion the consecutive state persecutions brought to their religion.
Strictly speaking, the persecution of Buddhists in modern
China in the sense of fa’nan (like the “Four Buddhist Persecutions”
in the medieval period) only happened during Communist rule.
But prior to this, waves of land confiscation by the state as well as
spreading socio-political instability in the face of modernism and
external threats from the West and Japan already augmented the
crescendo which culminated in scenes of mass religious persecu-
tion. In the name of Cultural Revolution the Communist govern-
ment, convinced that “religion is opium,” took on massive anti-
religious measures: not only did they destroyed Buddhist architec-
ture, images, and texts, they further implemented land reforms to
abolish monastic ownership of land, and reinforced the laicization
of monks and nuns.
                                             
8 In the translations of s tras by the Central Asian monk Dharma-
rak a, the term “Final Age” (Chin. moshi) is used to translate the 
Sanskrit word pa cimak la which means “latter age”. However, the 
term “Final dharma” (Chin. mofa) does not occur in these translations 
of Indian works. Hence modern scholarship argues that the concept 
mofa was most likely coined in China in response particularly to the 
massive state persecutions. On the appearance of the term mofa, see 
Nattier 1991; Hubbard 1996.  
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From Land Confiscat ion
to Ant irel igious Measures 
State expropriation of monasteries and landholdings were to de-
finitively shape the Buddhist crisis, and the Buddhist responses
discussed later are in fact originally linked to the threat of the state
seizure of monasteries and landholdings. Land confiscation actu-
ally began in the waning years of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). In
1898, a proposal to the Qing court composed by the Hunan Prov-
ince governor-general Zhang Zhidong (1837–1909), titled “Essay
on Exhortation to Learning” (Chin. Quanxue pian), argued for gov-
ernmental confiscation of up to seventy per cent of landholdings
and assets belonging to Buddhist and Daoist monasteries for state
educational reform. 9 The court adopted the proposal and pro-
nounced a decree permitting local authorities to convert into
“schools” (Chin. xuetang) those temples that no longer performed
ancestral rites. Records suggest that religious sites were deployed
for setting up not only modern schools, but factories as well. Al-
though this decree was briefly retracted in 1905, the policy was re-
instated later in the same year when official abolition of the civil ex-
amination meant local authorities had to bear the institutional and
monetary provisions for public education in a rapidly dwindling
state economy.10 Again, religious sites with extensive landholdings
and vacant architecture invited preying eyes! This state violation of
religious rights to properties and land ownership must have
greatly alarmed the monastic communities, since it would have
signaled to them that the government increasingly viewed Bud-
dhism as possessing negligible social utility in a modern world. In
                                             
9 Zhang basically echoed sentiments that were already voiced by 
others, for example Kang Youwei. Zhang’s contribution was to 
work out a precise calculation of the distribution of income, propos-
ing that seven out of ten “Buddhist monasteries” (Chin. fosi) and 
“Daoist temples” (Chin. daoguan) should be turned into modern 
“learning academies” (Chin. xuetang), with seven tenths of the in-
come from their agricultural fields redirected to subsidize the costs 
of running the schools. The monks should be left with only three 
tenths of their landed income. See Huang 2006, pp. 75–132.  
10 For example, in his biography, the monk Xuyun registered a wave 
of confiscation of Buddhist monasteries during the winter of 1905–
1906 (Luk 1988, p. 67).
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fact its extensive landholdings and assets might have seem to im-
pede the modernizing of Chinese society since they occupied badly
needed ground space and resources for building public economic
and social institutions, or modern transportation. Qing-Republican
Buddhist leaders would have felt particularly dismayed given that
these land and asset troubles were coming on the heels of the re-
peated blows Buddhism recently suffered from the widespread
civil rebellions against Qing rule, the most severe of which was the
Taiping rebellion (1850–1864), a millenarian movement which in-
geniously amalgamated traditional Chinese eschatology with
Christian messianism.11
When the revolutionary armies entered the scene in 1911, the
military seizure of monastic buildings and landholdings described
by Bishop Tsu became all too common and perpetuated throughout
the Republican era (1912–1949). After the founding of the Republic
warfare did not cease. Instead, the nation was plunged into consecu-
tive wars: further revolutions, the return of Warlords, the Sino-
Japanese War (1927–1937), and the Chinese Civil War (that is, the
Nationalist-Communist War, 1927–1950) with the Communists
emerging as the final victors who founded the People’s Republic of
China in 1949. All through the Republican Era, confiscation or bor-
rowing of Buddhist properties was widespread, especially in the
outlying provinces, notably in Canton (Guangdong Province), the
seat of revolutionary thought, where Sun Zhongshan (1866–1925,
also known as Sun Yat-sen) urgently needed resources to fortify and
maintain his troops. Moreover, Sun’s accomplices and followers,
who were frequently antireligious in outlook, were especially fer-
vent in stamping out superstition. One description of the situation in
Guangdong tells us:
In the ensuring years most of the large monasteries and small temples of 
the city were confiscated, sold, or demolished. Heavy taxes were imposed 
                                             
11 The Taiping rebellion was headed by Hong Xiuquan (1813–1864), a 
frustrated scholar of the Hakka minority who repeatedly failed the 
imperial examinations. Converting to Christianity, he had visions of 
himself as the younger brother of Jesus Christ and formed a reli-
gious movement, an ad hoc mixture of indigenous Chinese escha-
tology and Christian salvation, and soon after put together an army 
to challenge Qing rule.  
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on the fees charged by monks for mortuary rites and even on the tinfoil 
used in making the paper images that were burned for the benefit of the 
deceased. These antireligious levies became so pervasive that in 1924 an 
Italian flag was seen on a paper automobile to save it from confiscation in 
hell. The government was indifferent to religious sensibilities. For example, 
in order to free land for agriculture, a mass exhumation of graves was or-
dered in the countryside around [Guangdong Province]. Despite the popu-
lar reluctance to disturb ancestral bones, this was ruthlessly carried out. 12
As the revolution army marched northward to take over the rest of
China, the troops continued on this path of destroying religious
culture wherever they went. Monasteries were demolished; “idol”
images were smashed; and religious buildings and land were
seized to make way for schools, police stations, agricultural pro-
jects, or other public welfare establishments. 
In 1928, the first Society to Abolish Superstition was established
in Beijing, and soon after, similar societies appeared in Zhejiang, all
of which had the agenda to cause the government to laicize the
monastics, abolish Buddhist rites for the dead, and ban the use of tal-
ismans, amulets, and such type of “superstitious” objects.13 Faction-
alism occurred in the revolutionary army that resulted in the expul-
sion of the Communists by the conservative strand in the Nationalist
government. Although the surge to suppress superstition gave way
in 1929 to policies of religious tolerance and protection of religious
architecture, destruction and infringement of Buddhist properties
and images persisted in those regions outside Nationalist rule.
Moreover, the Sino-Japanese War (1927–1937) brought yet another
tide of large-scale destruction throughout the country. Metal images
were melted down to make bullets; Buddhist monasteries and lands
were again borrowed by the state for various administration or mili-
tary purposes. For example, the Longhua monastery, in Bishop
Tsu’s description, remained in the hands of one batch of troops or
the other until the end of the Sino-Japanese War. The Jinshan Monas-
tery (Chin. Jinshan si, “Golden Mountain Monastery”), a renowned
Buddhist monastery in Zhejiang, was evidently occupied by Na-
tionalist troops who even used the facilities to house Japanese pris-
oners at one juncture.14 Monasteries and temples were also ravaged
                                             
12 Welch 1968, pp. 147–148.  
13 Ibid., p. 151.  
14 Ibid, p. 145.  
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by the wars. Japanese bombing particularly targeted and inflicted
severe damage upon religious buildings that were converted for
state purposes.
Under imperial rule, the Buddhist communities had enjoyed
state protection while subjecting itself to state regulation. However,
with the birth of modern China in the Republican Era, absence of
state protection critically undermined the stability of the religion.
Under Nationalist rule, the government repeatedly issued policies
(for example, 1931, 1936, and 1946) to ensure some degree of protec-
tion for Buddhist monasteries, especially against the frequent land
encroachment by local authorities or sometimes even selfish ab-
bots. Moreover in 1930, 1935, and 1946, the government passed a
law to prevent local authorities from levying taxes on the perform-
ance of Buddhist rites for the dead. Despite these state laws, the ac-
tual situation was usually more in the hands of the local authorities
since the centralized government was undermined by the incessant
warfare of that period. Local officials were faced with the real pres-
sure of finding space to set up schools and other public institutions
in their areas, very often with minimal assistance from the central
government; hence they frequently chose to ignore the revised
policies and continued the borrowing and confiscating of monastic
properties for public use.
In short, the Buddhist communities in the Republican period
faced a religious crisis that included state encroachment on monas-
tic properties, threats of laicization and persecution, all of which
were compounded by the ravages of incessant warfare. While vio-
lation of property and religious rights are not yet as serious as they
would become during the Cultural Revolution under the Commu-
nist rule, the Republican Buddhist leaders must have felt a pro-
found urgency to locate means to ascertain the survival of their re-
ligion in the changing circumstances of modernity. Throughout
this period, China endured intense political turmoil, social conflict,
and cultural clashes. In the late Qing period, the expansive pres-
ences of Western and Japanese powers already signaled the tides
against the collapsing imperial authorities.
As Western economics, knowledge, rationality, and science infil-
trated Chinese society, China had to rapidly redefine itself in a mod-
ernizing world after centuries of deep entrenchment in the tradi-
tional cultural, ideological, and social practices of imperial rule. Ex-
hortations to transform “an Old China” into “a New China” echoed
throughout intellectual, literary, and political discourse, as leaders
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emerged in multiple spheres to articulate new visions of a progres-
sive China which would assume a critical role on the global land-
scape, while still preserving its traditional strengths. In this ferment-
ing environment, one controversy that was repeatedly debated was
the place of religion in modern China. Revolutionary thought in
general, particularly pro-Marxist thought, tended to see religion as
superstition or even opium that ultimately numbs the faculty of ra-
tional discrimination. Nonetheless, during the Qing-Republican
transition, Chinese intellectuals like Kang Youwei (1858–1927), Li-
ang Qichao (1873–1929), and Tan Sitong (1865–1898) remained par-
tial to Buddhist thought, considering it to be more favorably dis-
posed to modern, objective rationality while possessing Asian habits
of mental cultivation and moral behaviour.15 For several thinkers,
given Buddhism’s long history in China and (for them) its relative
compatibility with modern society (over and against Christianity,
the religion of the West), it had true potential to become the unique
Chinese contribution to global cultural and intellectual conversa-
tions in a modern world.
Buddhist  Responses:  Progressive 
Intel lectuals and Modernist  Visions  
In response to the tenuous intellectual and political climates, there
arose in Qing-Republican period a cluster of lay and monastic advo-
cates for reforming and modernizing Buddhism for a “New China”.
To a greater or lesser extent these leaders readily incorporated mod-
ernist tendencies, frequently Western elements, into their visions of a
new Buddhism. Among the laymen the most representative is Yang
Wenhui (1837–1911), who spearheaded the “Jinling S tra Publish-
ing House” (Chin. Jinling kejing chu), and also brought back from
Japan three hundred s tra texts which had been lost in China.16 In
addition, he was very active in establishing centers for modern stud-
ies of Buddhist texts, such as the “Jetavana Hermitage” (Chin. Zhi-
huan jingshe) built in 1908 at the site of his Publishing House and the
“Buddhist Research Society” (Chin. Foxue yanjiu hui) founded in
1910. Yang was therefore a pivotal figure in the beginnings of mod-
ern Buddhist studies in China, and his centers of modern Buddhist
                                             
15 Chan 1985, pp. 37–49; Pittman 2001, pp. 67–68.  
16 For Yang Wenhui’s biography and work, see Lou 1996; Zhang 2004. 
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learning attracted students who would become major thinkers in
modern Chinese intellectual history like Zhang Taiyan (1868–1936),
Tan Sitong, and the reformist monk Taixu (1890-1947).17 On account
of Yang’s Buddhist publishing and learning enterprises, major fig-
ures in the intellectual and political thought came into contact with
Buddhist philosophy. A resurgence in the study of Chinese Yog -
c ra, including interest in comparing the Buddhist Mind-Only
teachings with Western philosophy of Idealism, documents the in-
tellectual creativity and energy that arose from Buddhist efforts to
find a place for the religion in a volatile intellectual and socio-
political environment. Comparative efforts to align Buddhist
thought with science also occurred as part of this type of intellectual
endeavors. These publishing missions and study groups kept alive
and even reinvigorated Buddhist intellectual history during the
challenging times.
Among the monks who advocated reforms, a group of revolu-
tionary monks appeared during the late Qing who supported the
anti-imperial sentiments and joined the revolutionary forces, much
to the chagrin of the Buddhist orthodoxy. This circle of monks were
versed in the so-called “new learning” of the time, particularly the
political writings of modern Chinese intellectuals like Kang You-
wei, Liang Qichao, Tan Sitong, and Zhang Taiyan, and even Chi-
nese translations of Western writings such as Yan Fu’s (1854–1921)
translations of Thomas Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics, Adam
Smith’s Weath of Nations, John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, and Herbert
Spencer’s Study of Sociology.18 However, this phenomenon was ac-
                                             
17 For all these reasons, Yang Wenhui has been frequently hailed as 
the “Father of the Modern Buddhist Renaissance”. On Buddhism in 
intellectual circles and the political thought of the Qing period, see 
Chan 1985.
18 Yan Fu was a Chinese scholar and translator who studied at the 
Fuzhou Navy Administration Academy (Chin. Fuzhou chuanzheng 
xuetang) in Fuzhou at Fujian Province. He also spent two years 
(1877–1879) studying at the Navy Academy in Greenwich, England. 
After 1896, he supervised several translation institutes operating 
under central and local government authority, and following the 
fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911, he was appointed president of the 
Capital Municipal University, later known as the University of Bei-
jing. For a study of Yan Fu, see Schwartz 1964.  
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tually short-lived. More lasting contributions would come from the
monastic reformers who envisioned new expressions of Buddhism,
particularly institutional changes, to ensure that Buddhism did not
become outmoded and irrelevant within the emerging “New
China” in a new world order. Among these figures is the activist
and reformer monk, Taixu from Zhejiang, one of Yang’s students at
the Jetavana Hermitage.19 In his early days as a monk, Taixu joined
the activities of the revolutionary monks and for a time held a firm
conviction that anarchism was compatible with Buddhism and
should be implemented as the political system for the emerging
“New China”.20 Reading Tan Sitong’s “Learning of Benevolence”
(Chin. Renxue), Taixu was persuaded that the world must rely on
“Buddhist learning” (Chin. foxue) for its liberation; thereon he dedi-
cated himself to a lifelong cause of reforming Buddhism “to save
the world” (Chin. jiu shi).21 He would in time became disillusioned
with political revolutionary thought, and after three years of “se-
cluded retreat” (Chin. biguan) at Mount Putuo, reemerged to pro-
pound Buddhist reforms across the spheres of doctrine, education,
and institution in order to prevent Buddhism from the fate of be-
coming obsolete at the dawn of modernity in China.22
Taixu and other reformer monks all had to address the intellec-
tual, institutional, and political problems that Buddhism encoun-
                                             
19 Among the works in English on Taixu, the most important is a 
book-length monograph by Pittman 2001. For a study in Chinese, 
see Guo 1996.  
20 Yinshun 1998, vol. 29, p. 194. Also see Jiang (1993) for his discussion 
of Taixu’s early days. The most popular standard source for Taixu’s 
life is the biography compiled by Yinshun (1950).
21 Taixu, for instance, declared: “At that time I firmly believed that my 
accomplishments in Buddhism together with the ‘new’ knowledge 
would be adequate for me to save the world. The next year Master 
Eight Fingers and I worked on the Sa gha Education Association.” 
(Yinshun 1998, vol. 21, p. 348). Taixu (1978, pp. 115–125) also deliv-
ered a lecture titled “The Spirit of Salvation in Buddhist Teachings” 
(Fofa jiushi zhi jingshen). For an English translation of the Renxue, see 
Chan 1984. 
22 Unable to win the Buddhist community over to his ideas, and fur-
ther devastated by the outbreak of the First World War and the 
war-torn state of China, Taixu retreated in October 1914 to Mount 
Putuo where he remained for three years in self-imposed reclusion. 
SHI ZHIRU
138
tered during the Qing-Republican period. Institutional and educa-
tional reforms were particularly key components that very often
were really introduced first as counter measures to state expropria-
tion of Buddhist properties. The “public monasteries” (Chin. conglin)
drew up four strategies to halt the government from seizing monas-
tic land to set up secular education: (1) voluntary provision of funds
and space to reduce the extent of confiscation; (2) establishing secu-
lar schools of their own initiative in the hope of diverting confisca-
tion; (3) implementing schools for monastic education, including
those created with the help of Japanese missionaries; (4) provision of
funds and space for a secular school, while sending monks to Japan
to learn Japanese monastic education in preparation for setting up
their own monastic schools.23
Up to the Qing period, monastic education had been fairly
loosely conceived, and the study of Buddhist texts was really built
around a tradition of apprenticeship where younger monks would
learn “s tra lecturing” (Chin. jiang jing) from a senior, experienced
monk.24 Buddhist teachers traditionally specialized in one or more
Buddhist s tras, or a particular set of Buddhist literature like the vi-
naya, the code of monastic discipline. In this format the agenda was
to train and prepare preachers for proselytizing and lecturing on
s tras to lay and monastic audiences. The aspirant usually sought
out eminent masters for teachings, or went for intensive training at
renowned monastic centers. Young monastics aspiring to teach
would travel from site to site to listen to sermon expositions by
eminent specialists and study under them. The modern “Buddhist
seminary” (Chin. foxue yuan) with a fairly comprehensive curricu-
lum that taught foreign languages and secular subjects was thus
really an invention of this period; it was conceived as part of a re-
                                             
23 Huang 1991, pp. 300–301. For example, in 1904, the Japanese Bud-
dhists Mizuno Baigy  and It  Kend helped the Kaifu Monastery 
(Chin. Kaifu si) in Changsha (Hunan Province) to set up the “Sa gha
Normal School” (Chin. Seng shifan xuetang), which was structured 
after Japanese Buddhist schools. Another similar school, also based 
on the Japanese model although not explicitly affiliated with Japa-
nese missionaries, is the “Normal Sa gha School” (Chin. Putong 
seng xuetang) at Tianning Monastery (Chin. Tianning si) in Yang-
zhou. See Huang 2006, pp. 101–121; Welch 1968, p. 13.  
24 For a more detailed description of this traditional system of training 
Buddhist preachers, see Welch 1968, pp. 105–109.  
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structuring of sa gha training under the influence of Western and
Japanese models of public education. This new educational system
was designed to train monks to spread the faith, to fortify a lay
Buddhist movement, and also to persuade a broader audience that
Buddhism was a component of Chinese culture worth preserving.
The re-visioning of monastic education included physical renova-
tion: the monasteries installed modern facilities for the seminary,
often fashioned after the Western classroom with chalkboards,
chairs, and tables. In many ways, the new sa gha schools could be
traced to the kind of “new” Buddhist education introduced by
Yang Wenhui at his Jetavana Hermitage, and resonated with the
kind of new secular schools associated with the modern educa-
tional reforms that arose following the disintegration of the tradi-
tional imperial system.
Taixu strongly argued for revolutionizing sa gha education and
introduced educational reforms to radically revise the curricular
and organizational structures of monastic learning.25 As part of
these grand schemes of educational reform, he proposed reducing
the size of the monastic population, the number of which he con-
tinuously adjusted over the years. By 1930, he proposed the ideal
size to be twenty thousand, five thousand of whom would be stu-
dents, with twelve thousand bodhisattva monastics and three thou-
sand elders.26 He designated specific roles to the bodhisattva monas-
tics: five thousand to propagate Buddhism through public preach-
ing and teaching; three thousand to serve as administrators in
Buddhist educational institutions; fifteen hundred to engage in
Buddhist charitable and relief work; fifteen hundred to serve as in-
structors in the monastic educational system; and one thousand to
participate in various cultural affairs. Moreover, Taixu envisioned
a sa gha-operated nationwide system of Buddhist schools to re-
place the secular education that was taking shape in modern China.
He mapped out a statistical distribution of schools of different
grades for counties and provinces, ranging from a Buddhist pri-
mary school in each county to a Buddhist university in every three
                                             
25 Taixu’s own writings on monastic educational reforms are mostly 
collected in vol. 9 of “Complete Writings of Master Taixu” (Chin. 
Taixu dashi quanshu). For a discussion of the background to Taixu’s 
proposed reforms on Buddhist education, see Jiang 1998, pp. 439–
471. For a treatment in English, see Pittman 2001, pp. 229–236.  
26 Yinshun 1998, vol. 9, p. 479.
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provinces.27 The precise specification of statistical and geographical
distribution, as well as the occupational roles, most likely imitated
the style of proposals for reforms in secular education like Zhang
Zhidong’s “Essay on Exhortation to Learning” which was men-
tioned earlier.
Furthermore, in order to combat state infringement on religious
rights, the Buddhist monasteries, which until the Qing period had
stayed fairly independent of each other, rallied together to form na-
tional associations as a forum to lobby against detrimental govern-
ment policies. Early in his career, while he was still in the company
of revolutionary monks, Taixu was already involved in forming the
“Sa gha Education Association” (Chin. Seng[qie] jiaoyu hui), which
promoted systematic education for the monastics.28 After the found-
ing of the Republic of China, Taixu and other progressive monks at-
tempted to set up the “Association for the Advancement of Bud-
dhism” (Chin. Fojiao xiejin hui) with plans to make the well-
endowed Jinshan Monastery its headquarters and to set up a mod-
ern monastic school as part of sa gha educational reform.29 These
plans were made on the socialist assumption that monastic proper-
ties and landholdings should be considered the common property of
all Buddhists, and should therefore be employed for the public wel-
fare and for the education of Buddhist communities. However, the
residential monastic community at Jinshan saw Taixu and his affili-
ates as staging an illegal seizure of their monastic landholdings,
reminiscent of the hostile military and government officials’ actions,
so they rioted against what they took to be an intrusion on their
property rights.30 Taixu commented on the failure:
The Association’s charter did contain the socialist revolutionary notion of 
using Buddhist property to operate a public Buddhist enterprise but it was 
supposed to be a peaceful, progressive step.31
                                             
27 Taixu 1998, vol. 9, pp. 481–482.  
28 Yinshun 1998, vol. 21, pp. 348.
29 For Taixu’s views on national Buddhist associations, see his essays 
(Yinshun 1998, vol. 9, p. 328–459). For a general discussion of the 
role of Buddhist associations, see Welch 1968, p. 26–27. 
30 On the Jinshan incident, see Jiang 1993, p. 114; Pittman 2001, pp. 74–
77; Welch 1968, pp. 33–34.  
31 Yinshun 1998, vol. 29, p. 201.
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This incident earned Taixu the implacable ire of the conservatives
among the Buddhist ecclesiastics. Besides this Jinshan incident,
there were several other attempts to establish national Buddhist as-
sociations but it was not until 1912 that a “Chinese Buddhist Fed-
eration Association” (Chin. Zhonghua fojiao zonghui) was success-
fully formed which collaborated with Sun Zhongshan’s govern-
ment.32
Taixu’s doctrinal reforms tackled yet another major criticism of
Buddhism in this period — the accusation that Buddhists, rather
than engaging actively with the living world, were preoccupied
with only the realm of the dead. Revolutionary and Communist
leaders often frowned on ritual and images as “superstition” which
ought to be eradicated. Reformist Buddhists reacted by sharply
demarcating a true Buddhist core from a degenerate, ritual Bud-
dhism, in a manner parallel to the Lutheran reforms in the history
of Christianity which distinguished a text-based Protestantism
from a ritual-centered Catholicism. Taixu, for instance, argued that
over the course of its history in China, Buddhism lost its original
purpose and became inextricably associated with death and after-
life rites, particularly preparation for rebirth in the Western Pure
Land of Amit bha Buddha. Just as the intellectual, political, and so-
cial orders in China had to rearticulate themselves for a new era,
Buddhism would need to revolutionize in order to retain critical
roles in a “New China“. Toward this goal, Taixu introduced “Bud-
dhism for the Human Life,” a teaching designed to re-orientate the
locus of Buddhism away from death and the afterlife to the living
world of human society.33
A cornerstone in Taixu’s doctrinal framework is his interpreta-
tion of the “Human Vehicle” (Chin. rensheng) for modern society.
He adopted the traditional division of Buddhist history into three
periods, to which he then assigned different teachings and prac-
tices. 
                                             
32 Yinshun 1998., p. 203; vol. 26, p. 260.
33 On rensheng fojiao, see Taixu’s 1928 lecture “Discourse on Buddhism 
for Human Life” (Chin. “Rensheng fojiao de shuoming”) in Yinshun 
1998, vol. 2, pp. 205–216; also his 1946 lecture “Buddhism for Human 
Life” (Chin. “Rensheng de fojiao”; Yinshun 1998, vol. 2, pp. 238–242).  
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• During the period of the “True dharma” (Chin. zhengfa), one re-
lies on the practices and attainments of the “Hearers’ Vehicle”
(Skr. r vaka, Chin. shengwen sheng) to progress to the “Great
Vehicle” (Skr. Mah y na, Chin. dasheng).
• During the period of the “Counterfeit dharma” (Chin. xiangfa),
one relies on the practices and attainments of the “Heavenly or
Deva Vehicle” (Chin. tian sheng) to progress to the “Great Vehi-
cle”.
• During the period of the “Final dharma” (Chin. mofa), one relies 
on the practices and attainments of the “Human Vehicle” to 
progress to the “Great Vehicle”. 34
Taixu thus identified modernity as the period of the Final dharma
and the “Human Vehicle” the expedient (up ya) teaching for this era.
It is not coincidental that Taixu equated the age of modernity in secu-
lar history to the period of mofa in Buddhist history as previously in-
dicated, mofa was introduced in the medieval period in connection
with state persecution of Buddhists, so that the association would
have appeared natural given the threats the state posed to the relig-
ion in early modern China. In pre-modern usages, the “Human Ve-
hicle” and the “Heavenly Vehicle” are lower teachings emphasizing
the accumulation of good karma toward rebirth either as human or
god. But in Taixu’s usage, “Heavenly Vehicle” refers specifically to
otherworldly Pure Lands and Esoteric Buddhist paradises. Taixu
was convinced that the “Lesser Vehicle” (to which the r vaka Vehi-
cle belongs) and the “Heavenly Vehicle” are no longer attractive to
the modern world, since practices of the “Lesser Vehicle” come
across in the modern era as negative and escapist, and those of the
“Heavenly Vehicle” as superstitious.35 In other words, Taixu classi-
fied Buddhist teachings and practices with the goal to subordinate,
or even exclude, those Buddhist elements that would potentially
subject Buddhism to antireligious charges from intellectual and po-
litical thinkers in his day.
Since the core of the “Human Vehicle” really lies in the moral
practices of the five precepts and ten virtuous deeds, its ethical thrust
                                             
34 Vol. 7 of Taixu’s Complete Writings presents each type of teaching 
according to this threefold division.  
35 The dangers of these two vehicles parallel the problems he per-
ceived in Chinese Buddhism of his times.  
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makes the “Human Vehicle,“ or “Buddhism for Human Life” (Chin.
rensheng fojiao), the most conducive teaching for a modern world that
prized pragmatism, rationality, and scientific objectivity.36 For Taixu,
the ethical foundation of the “Human Vehicle” can transform this
world into a “Pure Land for Humanity” (Chin. renjian jingtu), a so-
cial utopia in which each individual serves and benefits one’s com-
munity and nation.37 Within this framework, the place to inaugurate
the bodhisattva path is the “Human Vehicle,“ the teachings of which
can lead directly to the “Great Vehicle” (Mah y na) and ultimately
“buddhahood”. Taixu referred to this bodhisattva paradigm as the
“bodhisattva of Humanity” (Chin. renjian pusa), who is profoundly
engaged with society and renders altruistic service to society as
bodhisattva practices.
The ethical orientation of the “Human Vehicle” is essentially a
social one in Taixu’s view. It is perhaps intentional that the empha-
sis on humanism corresponds to the ideas of Western philosophers
like Bertrand Russell and John Dewey. Moreover, the roots of hu-
manist thinking can be traced to the early Chinese concept of “hu-
manness” (Chin. ren) in Confucian thought, which located human
cultivation within the context of human relationships in the social
realm.38 The concept of “humanness” is fundamental to the Confu-
cian rendition of the ethic of “reciprocity” (Chin. shu) which states:
“Do not impose on others what you do not want to be done to one-
                                             
36 The five precepts prescribe abstinence from killing, stealing, sexual 
misconduct, and imbibing intoxicants. The ten virtuous deeds are 
divided into three physical actions (not killing, not stealing, and not 
engaging in sexual misconduct); four verbal deeds (not lying, not 
backbiting, not speaking evil words, and not engaging in frivolous 
speech); and three mental actions (lack of greed, anger, and deviant 
views).  
37 See his 1930 lecture “Establishing an Earthly Pure Land” (Chin. Jian-
she renjian jingtu lun), Yinshun 1998, vol. 14, pp. 431–456. 
38 The Chinese character for ren combines the radical for “person” with
the number two; as such, the character aptly signifies the meaning, 
that is, the common ground of humanity shared by two persons. 
Many of the important virtues (“filial piety” or chin. xiao, “reciproc-
ity” or chin. shu, “patriotism” or chin. zhong) which the Analects exalts 
are basically founded on ren, and may even be viewed as the concrete 
manifestation of ren within a particular familial or social relation.  
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self”. 39 The practice of “humanness” thus distinguishes human
from brutish and other non-human behavior, and is therefore reit-
erated as a defining trait of humanity.40 The innateness of “human-
ness” made the realization of humanism always theoretically pos-
sible. Thus Taixu’s teaching of “Buddhism for Human Life” effec-
tively reoriented Buddhism toward the new intellectual trends of
modernity while still preserving continuities with traditional Chi-
nese morality.
Ultimately, Taixu’s progressive reforms aimed to produce a
class of elite monastic leaders who, with their new learning and
skills, would be best able to represent the religion, argue for and
demonstrate its continued relevance in modern society. Embracing
the tenets of Buddhism for the Human Life, these elitist sa gha
would be deeply engaged in daily society where they would pro-
vide social leadership for an increasingly learned laity.
Buddhist  Responses:  Spir i tual  Cult ivat ion  
and Restoring Tradit ion 
Besides the modernist, progressive approach, another strain of Bud-
dhist responses approached the mounting religious crisis in the
Qing-Republican period through a discourse of traditional practices
and teachings often pared down to one particular method, the
choice of which varied for each proponent. This category is largely
made up of eminent monks, all of whom had claims to traditionally
constituted training and spiritual realization, which earned them the
deep respect of both lay and monastic communities. Among them
the most prominent figures included the Chan master Xuyun (1840–
1959), the Pure Land master Yinguang (1861–1940), and the vinaya
master Hongyi (1880–1942). For Yinguang, Pure Land practice was
the “singleminded recollection of the Buddha” (Chin. yixin nianfo);
for Xuyun, Chan practice was the silent contemplation of “Who is
the one recollecting the Buddha?” (Chin. nianfo shi shui). 41 For
Hongyi, rigorous observance of the monastic discipline was his criti-
                                             
39 Analects 12.2 and 15.23.
40 Comparable, for instance, to Epicureanism in ancient Greece, which 
extended brotherly love to embrace all humankind, manifesting in a 
love of the human race known as philanthropia.
41 For Yinguang’s Pure Land method, see Jiang 1998, pp. 417–427.  
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cal practice. It should be noted that like other periods in Chinese
Buddhist history, the Qing-Republican eminent practitioners were
syncretic in their religious observances; Xuyun and Yinguang, for
instance, drew on and combined both Pure Land recitation and
Chan meditation into their practice.
Unlike the progressive intellectuals who promoted worldly en-
gagement and sought to “modernize” Buddhism with new knowl-
edge and resources coming from outside of China, eminent renunci-
ate monks adamantly insisted on returning to “tradition” and stead-
fastly reiterated how traditional Buddhist teachings and practices
still had a place within the fast changing society and historical cir-
cumstances. Monasticism was still at the core of these visions, al-
though they were adapted to an expanding laity who usually con-
gregated around and relied on distinguished monastic practitioners
for teachings and guidance. These visions rhetorically endorsed the
traditional Buddhist rejection of the world that was the basis for mo-
nasticism. Although it is tempting to polarize the two groups into
progressive versus conservative, it should also be noted that the
seemingly “conservative” approach did not totally reject modern
innovations and changes, despite its strong rhetoric on the preserva-
tion of “tradition”. Despite their rhetoric of world withdrawal, they
participated, for instance, in founding national Buddhist associa-
tions which provided a forum for safeguarding Buddhist interests
and lobbying against those governmental policies that violated
Buddhist rights. Some of these monks also endorsed and partici-
pated in sa gha educational reforms.
Through his life and work the eminent monk Xuyun embodied
the range of diverse activities undertaken by members of this
group. A salient component of Xuyun’s contribution is his restora-
tion of dilapidated monasteries during this critical period of his-
tory. Besides the natural toll of time, the protracted borrowing and
confiscation for state use, as well as the consecutive wars beginning
from the late Qing, meant that the monasteries and temples en-
dured much damage and urgently required repairs or even full
scale restoration. Xuyun’s first major restoration work happened in
1904 when he was visiting at Jizu Mountain (Chin. Jizu shan,
“Cock’s Foot Mountain”) in northern Yunnan Province. At that
time, all the temples and monasteries had become hereditary tem-
ples that were passed on by individual monks in the same lineage;
the big public monasteries, traditionally regarded as the common
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property of all the sa gha, no longer existed so that pilgrims had no
place to stop and rest for the night. To remedy the problem Xuyun
tried to build a shelter for the pilgrims, but the hereditary temples
vehemently opposed the plan. Eventually with help from the laity
in Dali, including some high-ranking officials, Xuyun was able to
obtain rights to a ruined temple, the Boyu Hermitage (Chin. Boyu
an, “Alms Bowl Hermitage”), which he began to restore. On com-
pleting the restoration, he opened the temple’s doors to pilgrims
who were welcomed to take shelter there for the night. He further
drew up a code of rules, instituted meditation, delivered s tra lec-
tures, and held an ordination ceremony for about seven hundred
postulants.42
The struggles between the hereditary and public monasteries
was one of the religious institutional problems which changes in
state policies on monastery landholdings in the Qing-Republican
period aggravated. Due to the lack of state protection, as well as the
widespread mobility within monastic communities on account of
the constant warfare and impoverished conditions, numerous pub-
lic monasteries had fallen into hard times and were no longer able to
sustain communal life, so that opportunist abbots and other indi-
viduals in the community, looking to acquire property rights during
the uncertain economic and political times, usurped the rights to
these public religious properties and transformed them into heredi-
tary temples. As Xuyun’s biography reveals, the state of Buddhist
institutions was an acutely sore point for this eminent monk who as-
sociated the golden age of Buddhism with the flourishing of public
monasteries which functioned as major centers of monastic training
and religious practice, or even great academies of Buddhist learning.
In this respect his views differed substantially from his contempo-
rary Taixu who strongly advocated restructuring traditional monas-
tic education in alignment with the modernization (mostly West-
ernization) taking place in secular education.
The next restoration project was the Huating Monastery (Chin.
Huating si, “Floral Pavilion Monastery”) in the Western Hills of
Kunming (capital of Yunnan Province) in the year 1920. The resi-
                                             
42 See the 65th year (1904/05) of his biography (Luk 1988, pp. 54–58). 
For the orginal Chinese biography, see http://www.jindingsi. 
com/text/xuyunheshangnianpu.htm.
BUDDHIST RESPONSES TO STATE CONTROL
147
dent monks of this monastery were planning to sell the dilapidated
monastery to Europeans who had the desire to renovate and con-
vert it into some kind of club. It was again Xuyun’s intervention
that convinced the local authorities to preserve and restore the
Buddhist site. The officials agreed and appointed Xuyun as the ab-
bot to oversee the restoration, a position he accepted.43 After its res-
toration, he renamed the monastery from Huating Monastery to
Yunqi Monastery (Chin. Yunqi si, “Clouds Perching Monastery”)
in honor of the great Ming monk, Yunqi Zhuhong (1535–1615),
who promoted the amalgamation of Chan and Pure Land practices
at the original Yunqi Monastery in Hangzhou (Zhejiang Province).
Other major restoration projects Xuyun supervised included the
Gushan Monastery (Chin. Gushan si, “Drum Mountain Monas-
tery”) in Fujian Province, the site of the master’s ordination. Here
he restored not only the physical environment, but also its former
rigor and moral character; he instituted a seminary for ordained
monks and converted it back to its original status as a public mon-
astery and implemented rigorous discipline. In short he frequently
extended the task of material refurbishing to further encompass in-
stitutional reform.
But his most outstanding restoration projects are indubitably the
Nanhua Monastery (Chin. Nanhua si, “Southern Floral Monastery”)
and Yunmen Monastery (Chin. Yunmen si, “The Gate of Clouds
Monastery”) both major Buddhist sites in the Chan lineage which
are located in Guangdong Province. The Nanhua Monastery was
where the famous sixth patriarch, Huineng (638–713), had lived dur-
ing the Tang period and where his relic body had been enshrined
until then. It was last restored by the Ming monk Hanshan Deqing
(1546–1623) in the early seventeenth century, but had once again
fallen into ruins. Another major project, one of Xuyun’s last restora-
tion works, was the Yunmen Monastery, the seat of the Yunmen
Chan Buddhism, at Mount Yunmen, also in Guangdong Province.
When he undertook the rebuilding of Yunmen Monastery (1944–
1945), Xuyun was already 105 years old. This massive rebuilding in-
volved the cooperation of several networks from the local patrons
and monastic communities to the secular and religious governing
officials, at times extending to overseas communities. Moreover, his
                                             
43 Luk 1988, p. 101. See his 81st year (1920/21). 
SHI ZHIRU
148
biography records his receiving patronage from Chinese immi-
grants abroad in places such as Burma, Hong Kong, and Singapore.
In other words, Xuyun was hardly reclusive, but actively traveled
and interacted with domestic and international Chinese Buddhist
communities to raise funds for his restoration work. As his biogra-
phy suggests, wherever he went, he taught s tras, administered pre-
cepts, converted lay followers, and set up lay associations. More-
over, under the rubric of restoration projects, he also revitalized mo-
nastic training centers.44
Xuyun’s life also demonstrates how eminent Buddhists de-
ployed religious practices in response to political violations of reli-
gious rights during the Republican period. Given Xuyun’s stand-
ing and his close ties with officials in the government, Xuyun often
became a major negotiator and spokesman for local Buddhist
communities whenever their religious rights were threatened. In
this vein, when the revolutionary army marched from Wuchang to
Yunnan Province in 1912, Li Genyuan, one of the commanding of-
ficials, issued a warrant for the arrest of the renowned Xuyun who,
instead of attempting to escape, stayed to confront the commander.
Xuyun convinced Li through his teachings so that the latter with-
drew his armies and stopped demolishing monasteries in the re-
gion. Subsequently Li even attended vegetarian feasts at the mon-
asteries.45 This was only one of several instances whereby Xuyun
asserted considerable sway over potential enemies of the religion,
so much so that in submitting to his holy charisma, they became pa-
trons of the faith. 
After rebuilding the Nanhua Monastery in northern Guang-
dong Province, the Sino-Japanese War broke out. The editor for
Xuyun’s biography inserts a description of an incident during this
war at Nanhua Monastery:
[…] The Japanese intelligence learned that the temple was used as a meet-
ing-place for Chinese officials. In the seventh month, when a large number 
gathered there, eight enemy bombers came and circled over it. The master 
knew of their intention and ordered the monks to return to their dormito-
ries. After all the guests had taken refuge in the Hall of the Sixth Patriarch, 
the Master went to the main hall, where he burned incense and sat in 
                                             
44 For example, at the Nanhua Monastery, he helped set up a monastic 
discipline for novices. See his 104th year (Luk 1988, p. 129). 
45 See his 72nd year (Luk 1988, pp. 86–88).  
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meditation. A plane dived, dropping a large bomb which fell in a grove on 
the river bank outside the monastery without causing damage. The bomb-
ers returned and circled over it when suddenly, two of them collided and 
crashed to the ground at Ma-ba, some ten miles to the West. Both planes 
were destroyed with their pilots and gunners. Since then the enemy planes 
dared not come near the monastery and always avoided flying over it on 
their bombing missions to the hinterland.46
The account shows that Xuyun deployed meditation — which for
him meant “recollecting the Buddha” (Chin. nianfo) — as a means
to achieve singularity in mental focus. Renowned practitioners like
Xuyun evidently believed in the “otherworldly” powers of cultiva-
tion. In responding to the exigencies of war and political oppres-
sions, his actions reflected the traditional Chinese Buddhist cos-
mology based on the concept of ganying, a causal theory of stimulus
(Chin. gan) and response (Chin. ying). A synthesis of indigenous
Chinese cosmology and Buddhist karmic causation, ganying ex-
plains how the power of spiritual action brings about the miracle of
religious protection.47 Moreover, by virtue of his holy attainments,
Xuyun provided miraculous protection for the local community,
just as the state had always counted on the supernatural powers of
Buddhist saints and monks to render protection for the court and
the nation at war.
Xuyun also experienced the more intense religious persecu-
tion under Communist rule. When he was 112 years old 
(1951/52) and living at Yunmen Monastery, a hundred Commu-
nists seized the monastery and ransacked the place for two days:48
                                             
46 Luk 1988, p. 128.  
47 In addition, from the Chinese Buddhist perspective, a “miraculous 
experience” is in some sense always bound to the principle of moral 
causation insofar as the spiritual efficacy or “numinous verification” 
(Chin. lingyan) — however strange or inexplicable at first glance — 
is always caused, so to speak, through the observance of some form 
of religious practice, such as by the worship of a deity, scripture, a 
holy person or object. Several scholars have discussed the Chinese 
Buddhist concept of ganying and similar usages; see Birnbaum 1986, 
p. 137; Kieschnick 1997, pp. 97–101.  
48 Although the biographical text only calls them “bad people,” it is 
clear from the context that this was probably a Communist inquisi-
tion. In the introduction to the English translation, the editor Richard 
Huhn also refers to them as Communist cadres (Luk 1988, p. xiv).
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[…] They also put the registers, documents, correspondence and all the 
Master’s manuscripts of explanations and commentaries on the s tras — 
and his recorded sayings during a whole century — in gunny bags which 
they carried away. They then accused the community of all sorts of crimes, 
but in reality they had wrongly believed groundless rumors that there 
were arms, ammunition, radio transmitters, gold bars and silver bullion 
hidden in the monastery […]49
As the search did not yield any result, the thugs roughed up the
resident monks and then isolated Xuyun for interrogation. They
locked him up, starved him, refused him drink, and hammered
him with steel batons.
He was interrogated while being attacked, but sat in the meditation posture 
to enter the state of dhyana. As the blows rained down mercilessly, he closed 
his eyes and mouth and seemed to be in the state of samadhi. That day they 
beat him brutally four times […] A little later […] the Master’s attendants 
carried him to a bed and helped him sit in the meditation posture.50
Xuyun survived two rounds of such brutal beatings and lived to
describe to his disciples his visionary encounter with the Future
Buddha Maitreya in the Tu ita heaven during one of these semi-
unconscious states following the harassment. The lives and spiri-
tual attainments of eminent teachers like Xuyun served as critical
sources of inspiration for Buddhists during the troubled times of
political oppression in the modernization of China. They were bea-
cons who embodied the resilience and strength of the “tradition” in
difficult times.
Diverging Paradigms,  Converging Paths? 
On the surface there exist stark contrasts between the two sets of
Buddhist responses to political oppression that took shape in early
modern China. In fact, the seemingly conservative Buddhist monks
were quite often openly critical and skeptical of the progressive
Buddhist reformers, and there are reports of Yinguang frowning on
Taixu’s engagement with society.51 Progressive Buddhist intellec-
tuals like Taixu advocated doctrinal and institutional reforms to
modernize Buddhism in the hope that the religion would survive
                                             
49 Luk 1988, pp. 138–139.  
50 Ibid., p. 139.  
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the process of China’s modernization without being discarded as
irredeemably obsolete.51They enthusiastically incorporated mod-
ern knowledge and resources from the West and Japan into their
visions of a new Buddhism, and often presented Buddhism as an
ideal candidate for representing Chinese society in global ex-
changes of thought and culture. It is no coincidence that for the lat-
ter half of his life Taixu participated actively in global conversa-
tions, allied himself with international forces, and visited different
countries in the West and Asia, so much so that he earned himself
the (somewhat disdainful) reputation of a “globe-trotting” monk.52
As Taixu’s career demonstrated, these progressive Buddhist intel-
lectuals often derived their original inspiration from the revolu-
tionary thought in secular politics that would eventually topple
over the age-old system of imperial rule and traditional culture
with Western notions of democracy, liberalism, and pragmatism.
For example, it was contact with Sun Zhongshan’s political ideol-
ogy which persuaded Taixu that “Buddhism would need to un-
dergo a revolution in the same way as China’s political revolu-
tion”. 53 However, ultimately, Taixu returned to the Buddhist
                                             
51 Pittman (2001, p. 237) cited oral interviews with Yinguang he had 
gathered from different sources, in all of which Yinguang seemed to 
have expressed dissatisfaction with Taixu and his companions.  
52 For his own descriptions of his travels to England, France, and 
Germany, see Taixu 1978, pp. 1–91. 
53 Yinshun 1998, vol. 29, p. 192. Taixu was subsequently introduced to 
Sun Zhongshan’s Revolutionary Alliance and his “Three Principles of 
the People” (Chin. sanmin zhuyi), and in 1910 would become impli-
cated in revolutionary activities to overthrow the Qing dynasty. The 
“Three Principles” are “People’s Welfare” or “Government for the 
People” (Chin. minsheng), “People’s Rights” or “Government by the 
People,” (Chin. minquan), and “People’s Relation” or “Government 
of the People” (Chin. minzu). People’s Welfare refers to social wel-
fare and is sometimes identified with socialism; Sun, under the in-
fluence of the American thinker Henry George, understood it as an 
industrial economy and equality of land holdings for the Chinese 
peasant farmers. People’s Rights really refers to democracy, which 
for Sun, represented a Western constitutional government. People’s 
Relation is simply nationalism which, for Sun, meant freedom from 
imperialist domination, the need to foster “civic-nationalism” as 
opposed to “ethnic-nationalism”.  
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sources for inspiration, and introduced a form of modern Bud-
dhism, the “Buddhism of Human Life,” which deliberately rein-
terpreted traditional elements to make them compatible with mod-
ernist insistence on rationality, empirical objectivity, and an explicit
humanitarian thrust, just as their Tang, Song, and Ming predeces-
sors too had reimagined Buddhism for their historical times. In
other words, Taixu and the progressive Buddhist intellectuals
hardly discarded Buddhist traditions, but instead reimagined them
for the age of modernity. In terms of relations with the state, the
modernist, progressive visionaries promoted active Buddhist par-
ticipation in the secular spheres of economics, politics, and society.
The strategy was to present the sa gha as no longer reclusive and
otherworldly, but as useful agents in modern Chinese society who
could make invaluable social contributions as community leaders
in education and social welfare. 
On the other hand, the seemingly more conservative, practice-
oriented eminent monks portrayed themselves as restoring and
perpetuating “tradition” during the troubled social and political
times. But “tradition” here refers really to the teachings and practices
of the four major Buddhist reformers in the Ming period (1368–1644)
like Hanshan Deqing, Ouyi Zhixu (1599–1655), Yunqi Zhuhong, and
Zibo Zhenke (1543–1603).54 Both Hanshan and Zhuhong were im-
portant proponents who synthetically linked Chan meditation to the
Pure Land practice of “recollecting the Buddha” (Chin. nianfo)
through the “one mind” (Chin. yixin) — an innovative amalgama-
tion which both Republican monks Xuyun and Yinguang adopted
and promulgated. 55 Zhuhong, in addition, was particularly re-
nowned for his reform of monasticism, something with which Xu-
yun was also engaged, in addition to his physical restoration of di-
lapidated great monasteries. Zibo was known for his numerous res-
torations of Buddhist sites, again a practice that was widely adopted
in the Republican period, Xuyun being a stellar example. In other
words, this cluster of Republican eminent practitioners styled them-
                                             
54 On Buddhist reforms in the Ming period, see Jiang (2005).  
55 For Hanshan’s understanding of Chan and Pure Land, see Hsu 
1970, pp. 127–136; for Zhuhong’s interpretation of the one mind, see 
Hurvitz 1970. For a book-length study on Zhuhong, see Yü 1981. 
For an overview of Ming Buddhism with a special focus on Zhixi, 
see Shengyan 1975.  
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selves as “transmitters of tradition,” thereby placing their endeavors
within a distinct historical trajectory that Confucius began in the
Analects with an exhortation to return to the golden era of early Zhou
Dynasty. The quest to recover a lost golden era is a familiar, recur-
rent theme in religious history and in the guise of reinstating “an-
cient tradition” religious innovations are introduced, authorized,
and allowed to flourish.56
Although Republican monks like Xuyun and Yinguang rhet-
orically presented themselves as restoring traditional monasticism
— both its physical architecture and moral fabric — as a lifestyle
understood to transcend the secular world, particularly familial,
political, and social ties, the historical realities were far more com-
plex. The Chinese term for becoming ordained as a bhik u or monk
is chujia, which literally means “leaving the household,” that is,
withdrawal from the affairs of the world. From the perspective of
Buddhist relations with the state, this rhetorical assertion of the
transcendence of the monastic vocation is double-edged. On the
one hand, since the sa gha is withdrawn from society, they could be
deemed to have little impact and therefore pose no threat to the
central government. On the other hand, given that its lifestyle and
values are deliberately counter to normative society, its very exis-
tence is a powerful critique and always potentially a threat to po-
litical stability. As previously discussed, Xuyun was hardly a naive
spokesman of the “tradition,” but evidently capitalized on both
these strands in his relations with the state during the tumultuous
times. He certainly withdrew from the secular world insofar as he
remained singularly focused on Buddhist propagation and prac-
tice, and functioned mostly among Buddhist circles. However, he
repeatedly employed his moral and religious charisma to challenge
government officials and military bandits so as to protect local
                                             
56 The quest for the pristine origin is found in different aspects of re-
ligion. Mircea Eliade (1907–1986), the famous Romanian historian of 
religion, called attention to this theme in myth and ritual by coining 
the phrase, “the eternal return”. By this, he was pointing to an al-
most compulsive urge to return to the mythical age, to become so to 
say contemporary with the events described in one’s myths — a be-
lief often expressed in religious behavior, particularly through ritual 
(see Eliade 1971). Eliade’s model and the quest for origin in religion 
have been critiqued in more recent scholarship; see Masuzawa 1993.
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communities and his religion during the civil wars and the Japa-
nese invasion. Given his numerous ties to official patrons, it is not
surprising that Xuyun emerged as a major negotiator for Buddhist
rights playing a role reminiscent of the fourth-century aristocratic
monk Huiyuan who was mentioned at the beginning of this essay.
Interspersed throughout his biography are anecdotes of how Xu-
yun’s religious attainments so impressed potential military or offi-
cial persecutors of the religion that they spared the Buddhist mon-
asteries and local communities from further violation of Buddhist
properties and religious rights.
Moreover, in real life, eminent monks like Xuyun actually en-
gaged in a broad spectrum of activities that embraced worldly par-
ticipation. Like Taixu, Xuyun had an amazingly extensive network
of Buddhist patronage and support domestically in China as well as
internationally around Asia. His international activities, however,
were always couched within the traditional Buddhist framework
and circuits of cleric-laity patronage and instruction. Eminent practi-
tioners like Xuyun also actively participated in Buddhist reformative
activities such as revitalizing sa gha education, forming national
Buddhist associations, and establishing Buddhist or secular schools,
and social charities on the monastery’s premises. Like the progres-
sive reformers, the more conservative wing was also very active in
helping to train a broadly based lay movement to which the sa gha
could look for support, patronage, and protection. Educating the
laity was deemed especially important in a time when Buddhist
rights, especially those of the monastic communities, were fre-
quently transgressed upon by the state. In other words, these emi-
nent practitioner monks were never rigorously conservative, or
even totally reclusive.
The progressive modernists and traditional conservatives were
in short never really as sharply polarized as modern scholarship
would have us believe.57 Rather than an irreconcilable dichotomy,
                                             
57 Studying Pure Land in Taiwanese Buddhism, Charles Jones (2003, p. 
128) sets up a dichotomy between the modernists and the denounc-
ers of modernist interpretations, tracing them back to early twentieth-
century figures like Taixu and Yinguang. He bases this approach on 
Welch’s (1968) characterization. There are indeed some salient dis-
tinctions, for example, in the academic study of Buddhism: the mod-
ernist group embraced scholarship while the conservative traditional 
BUDDHIST RESPONSES TO STATE CONTROL
155
there existed a continuum of voices which fluidly overlapped in
their concerns, practices, and enterprises to secure the survival of
Buddhism during the social and political transitions in early mod-
ern China. Both these forms of Buddhist responses are still very
much alive in Chinese-speaking Buddhist communities. In Taiwan,
Buddhist modernism has been recreated for the Taiwanese audi-
ence and under the name of “Humanistic Buddhism” (Chin. renjian
fojiao) is now accepted as one of the mainstream expressions of
Buddhism.58 In mainland China, the two groups of Buddhist re-
sponses were unable to halt the destruction to their religion under
Communist rule, particularly during the Cultural Revolution.59
Nonetheless they remained important sources of inspiration, par-
ticularly in the contemporary scene, where a robust resurgence of
Buddhism has taken place in recent decades. Supported in part by
the central government, this revitalization of Buddhism is organ-
ized around the two different Buddhist paradigms that first arose
in the Qing-Republican period.60 How these paradigms may be
used to apprehend modern concepts like religious rights and hu-
man rights is a topic that awaits further ethnographic research.
                                             
expression was quite often anti-intellectual and adhered to tradi-
tional s tra and commentarial studies. See Jones 1999, p. 124.
58 Renjian fojiao is a teaching espoused by Yinshun (1906–2005), one of 
Taixu’s monastic students, who fled from Communist China and 
finally settled down in Taiwan. Deriving inspiration from Taixu’s 
rensheng fojiao, Yinshun introduced the concept of renjian fojiao, so 
coined to highlight the human realm as opposed to the other realms 
of rebirth. The rise of “Humanistic Buddhism” (renjian fojiao) is 
linked to the flowering of independent Buddhist organizations 
which flourished in the late twentieth century challenging the he-
gemony of the Buddhist Association of the Republic of China, after 
the lifting of military law in 1987. They yield new, divergent formu-
lae for adherents to realize the bodhisattva path right here and now 
by creating a better society for all beings. The most powerful Tai-
wanese Buddhist groups, “Compassionate Relief” (Chin. Ciji, more 
commonly spelled Tzu Chi), “Dharma Drum Mountain” (Chin. 
Fagushan), and “Buddha Light Mountain” (Chin. Foguangshan) all 
present themselves as renjian fojiao.
59 For Buddhism under the Communist rule, see Welch 1972. 
60 See Zhe 2004.  
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Translations of Human Rights.
Tibetan Contexts1
JAN-ULRICH SOBISCH AND TRINE BROX
Introduct ion
In the announcement of the symposium “Buddhism and Human
Rights,“ the participants had been invited to look for elements and
aspects of Buddhism that could contribute to a discussion of the
principles of universal human rights. The implication was, accord-
ing to an accompanying letter, that we should search for such ele-
ments within the traditional, doctrinal foundation of Buddhist tra-
ditions that would allow traditional Buddhist societies to approach
Western standards of human rights. The academics among the par-
ticipants were invited to contribute from a theoretical perspective.
In accordance with these directions, we would like to begin our
contribution with a critique of methods. In a second section we will
deal with some general aspects of the contemporary efforts of the
Fourteenth Dalai Lama to embed modern ideas in the Tibetan exile
community. Finally the focus will be on the question of whether
and possibly how one might find concepts and ideas in the Bud-
                                             
1 The first part of the article, focusing on contemporary issues, and 
the final conclusion were largely contributed by Trine Brox. The 
second part with an inquiry into history and a suggestion of an ap-
proach to Buddhism as a source for inspiration in the human rights 
debate was largely written by Jan-Ulrich Sobisch. 
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dhist intellectual sphere from which one might be able to derive a
contribution to the discussion of universal human rights. 
Methodological  Remarks 
Some methodological remarks are indeed necessary. Certainly, in a
collection of articles seeking to locate within Buddhism a dominant
discourse regarding fundamental and universal rights, which has a
specific life trajectory in the West, it is important to remind our-
selves of troubling issues regarding the construction, translation,
and manifestation of culturally determined concepts. 
The Concept of  Human Rights 
Human rights are based on the assumption that humans are uni-
versally bound together by moral rules that are intrinsic to all hu-
man beings (i.e. fundamental) irrespective of their culture (i.e. uni-
versal).2 The term “human rights,” as it is commonly used, as it is
used in political discussions, and as it was largely used in the con-
ference panels, is based on The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
issued on December 10, 1948, at the General Assembly of the
United Nations. That declaration, in turn, refers in its contents
chiefly to European and American traditions. Explicit forerunners
and masterminds of the UN declaration were the Magna Charta and
the Bill of Rights in England, the United States Declaration of Independ-
ence, the Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen, and in gen-
eral the thought of John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel
Kant and so forth. In other words, human rights as they are com-
monly referred to are deeply embedded in Christian and occidental
traditions. This, then, is the intellectual sphere that must be ap-
proached by traditional Buddhist societies. 
Human rights have become a universalizing moral project to
“humanize” the world, and, especially after the Cold War, there has
been no escape from this project. Though far from a triumphant idea,
people all over the world are forced to relate to human rights. The
normative project of universal human rights is disregarding what
several scholars have seen as its Euro-American origin and promo-
                                             
2 Asad 2003, p. 129. 
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tion of Christian values.3 Skepticism towards The Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights also stems from the assumption that universal-
ism equals imperialism, in the sense that societies are forced to con-
form to ethnocentric ideas, disregarding or even denying cultural
differences.
Though it is clear that The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
is a historically bounded construction, there are those who never-
theless see it as the result of different cultures coming together with
the common goal of identifying fundamental rights applying to all
of them. For example, Hastrup does not deem human rights as a
primarily Western construction nor as a priori imperialistic.4 For
instance, the delegates who ratified the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights were of different nationalities, and when they decided
upon the wording of the declaration, Hastrup argues, they asserted
their culture. One example is the first article of The Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, stating that
[…] All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They 
are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one an-
other in a spirit of brotherhood.5
The word “reason” was a suggestion of the Lebanese delegate and
“conscience” a suggestion of the Chinese delegate as a translation
of a Confucian concept of “mindfulness of another person“.6 Thus
the declaration is not exclusively of Western origin.
Leaving the question of origin aside, the main point is that the
globalization of a discourse on human rights does not simply equal
Westernization. This, we argue, is because traveling ideas like hu-
man rights are not unequivocally constructed, translated and
manifested: there is always room for interpretation. Thus, we do
not assume that Tibetans relate to human rights in a uniform way,
and they do not invoke its language in the same way. Instead, hu-
man rights are contested. Nevertheless, we strongly encourage that
ideas and discourses on rights, liberties and obligations are ana-
lyzed as constructs, translations and manifestations that are not
only culturally bound but also influenced by the surges felt from
                                             
3 Eg. Asad 2003. 
4 Hastrup 2004. 
5 UN 1948. 
6 Hastrup 2004, p. 142. 
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global discourses. These not only put pressure on translation ef-
forts, but also influence the ways in which human rights are under-
stood and appraised in different locales. 
For these reasons we find it disturbing that the conveners have
asked us to identify a traditional doctrinal basis within the Bud-
dhist traditions “in order to approach the Western understanding
of human rights“. Why do traditional Buddhist societies have to
bring themselves into line with Western concepts? And does a uni-
fied Western conception of human rights exist at all?
To touch briefly on the second question first, it seems at present
rather questionable that we could find much common ground be-
tween contemporary North American and European practice re-
garding the treatment of prisoners of war, the purpose of prisons in
general, or the justness of the death penalty. It even seems prob-
lematic to come to a unified interpretation of human rights be-
tween such countries as Poland and Sweden. Human rights are de-
fined differently and take various forms in different cultures. 
More general is the first point: Can we be sure that a Western
conception — if such a thing exists — is in principle better than
other concepts in the world, so much better in fact that other civili-
zations have to bring themselves in line with it? Even at the risk of
oversimplification, if we briefly look at only two examples, we
should at least begin to have second thoughts. If we consider, for
instance, the worldwide export of Western ideas of economy with
its multiple side effects such as the inherent destruction of nature
and livelihood in many areas of the world, or the pushing through
(with the force of weapons) of the principle of majority rule in so-
called “traditional societies” that are build on concepts of consen-
sus, we must begin to realize that ideas that have grown over cen-
turies or even millennia in our cultural sphere are not by default the
best solutions for the rest of the world. 
But let us put our methodological bellyache in more concrete
words. The point is that we have constructed a world of ideas in
which we operate with culturally determined terms and concepts,
such as “freedom,” “justice,” “nature,” “democracy,” and “relig-
ion,” that often have evolved over long periods of time in specific
historical contexts. In discussions, it is frequently overlooked that
these are not universal ideas that can be easily codified as universal,
cross-cultural standards. Instead we have to notice that such con-
cepts, if they are employed in Asian cultures, are often constructed
in a completely different manner and have histories that are quite
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distinct from what we might expect. From that observation ensue,
in the broadest sense, multiple problems of translation.
Problems of  Translat ion 
Translating foreign concepts poses huge challenges, not only in pin-
pointing what original terms such as “human rights” mean, but also
in identifying its equivalent in (or translating its contents into) other
languages without reducing the cultural premises that are infused
in the concepts. For instance, the Tibetan counterpart to “human
rights” and its key values and ideas does not contain exactly the
same implications that the English words and ideas do. The imme-
diate problem is that the texts and practices within which we seek
to locate human rights may not have such a concept, and if we find
similarities, there is the danger that we force those concepts to suit
our understanding. 
Furthermore, we attach specific understandings to these Eng-
lish concepts, a bias that potentially can inhibit a clear look at the
Tibetan reality. There are many good examples of this. Take for in-
stance the concept of religion. Trying to locate which practices,
words, ideas and institutions belong to this signifier is problematic.
If one were to carry out an opinion poll on a German street and ask
for the most important aspect of religion, it is quite certain that the
term “faith” would range among the top answers. A similar poll
among Tibetans would certainly produce a different result. But it is
not only thus that concepts such as “religion” have different em-
phases and priorities in the diverse cultures of the world. Some
concepts cannot even be found at all in other cultures as we under-
stand them, and sometimes — and that is an additional difficulty —
the term for it is nonetheless in use. In such a case — for instance in
the case of the terms dharma and “religion” — a one-to-one transla-
tion would only be a phantom translation. And that is true even
though the Tibetans commonly use the English term “religion”
when they mean dharma (Tib. chos). In reality, when they use the
English term “religion”, they actually mean Buddhism. In fact, they
often have obvious difficulties including even their indigenous
(non-Buddhist) religion Bön within their concept of dharma.7
                                             
7 It is true that in their statements official Tibetans take extra care to 
include Bon within their conception of dharma, but it is often obvi-
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When, for instance, the Dalai Lama uses the Tibetan concept of
“merged religion and politics” (Tib. chos srid zung ’brel), which
stems from the 13th century, close analysis reveals that what he ac-
tually has in mind when using the term “religion” in this context is
not Buddhism as such, but “conduct according to ethical rules (or
laws)”.8 A further complication is that the different Tibetan political
groups all have their own understanding of the Tibetan concept
“merged religion and politics”. For example, some understand it as
“Buddhist principles and politics hand in hand,” some as “mixing
of religion and politics,” or as “politics guided by Buddhist princi-
ples”. Regarding the actual practice of this maxim, Tibetans often
refer to the person of the Dalai Lama, who, as head of the state and
as a religious leader, embodies both aspects of religion and politics,
or they point out that the Tibetan Government-in-Exile has impor-
tant religious agendas such as the state-guaranteed maintenance of
religious institutions, or that government institutions are occupied
by monks and lay people according to a certain ratio, or, with a
negative flavor, that certain monasteries have often interfered with
government politics in the past. The Tibetan Government-in-Exile
still calls itself “Ganden Phodrang,” which has its historic roots in
the fact that key-positions in the government have been occupied
by leading monks from the Gelugpa monastery Ganden.
These are some of the many problems that arise when we try to
transfer the term “religion” to a Tibetan context. Let us provide a
second example. In 1991, a heated debate took place within the Ti-
betan Parliament-in-Exile in Dharamsala on whether the Tibetan
polity should be defined as secular.9 In the course of the debate it
became obvious not only that the term “secularism” was translated
differently into Tibetan, but that a number of diverse concepts went
along with it. One of these concepts was an idea of secularism
where the religious was to be completely removed from the politi-
cal. Another concept sought parity between religion and politics. A
third group of members of the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile disap-
proved of all kinds of secularism and wanted to maintain the “tra-
                                             
ous that this is forced or needs a conscious effort. For some earlier 
remarks on the “syzygy of Dharma and Regnum,” see Seyfort 
Ruegg 1995b, esp. p. 150. 
8 The term “ethical” is certainly also problematic in this context. 
9 A detailed account of this debate has been provided by Trine Brox; 
Brox 2008, chapter 8 (forthcoming).  
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ditional Tibetan way” where, according to their understanding, re-
ligion and politics went hand-in-hand. 
During that spring session of 1991, the draft of the Charter of
Tibetans-in-Exile was under discussion. In his introductory speech,
the Dalai Lama mentioned that it would be appropriate for any pol-
ity to be secular in essence — and when he said that, he used the
English term in his Tibetan language speech. In the draft of the
charter, however, the term was translated as chos lugs ris med, which
means something like “impartiality towards the religious tradi-
tions” and was to describe the nature of the Tibetan polity. The
Dalai Lama supported this as a correct translation of the English
“secular” because it was embedded in Tibetan culture and appro-
priate in the particular situation of the Tibetan exiles. In the course
of the debate, other translations and interpretations were dis-
cussed, such as “free personal decision with regard to religious in-
clinations” (chos dad rang mos), or “non-observance of the religious”
(chos la ltos med), or “free from religion” (chos med), to mention only
a few. Some members of the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile feared
that secularism would even mean “anti-religious” in a communist
or revolutionary sense. In the end, none of the terms expressing an
idea of secularism were mentioned in the final charter. Instead, the
parliamentarians voted in favor of defining the Tibetan polity as
“merged religion and politics” without any reference to secularism,
no matter how it was translated into Tibetan. It is quite obvious that
many of these concepts have nothing to do with the way the term is
defined and used in our own Western context.
* * * 
From the above examples it becomes clear not only that there are
many problems related to translation, but that the act of translation
involves more than simply identifying linguistic equivalents.10 In
fact, it may be useful to talk about it as an act of cultural translation.
Cultural translation is more than mere language. It involves revis-
ing one’s own understanding of reality and of oneself. When, for
instance, Tibetan exiles culturally translate “democracy,” it is trans-
                                             
10 Many scholars have made the point that translation is not simply an 
issue of producing linguistic equivalents as found in bilingual dic-
tionaries, but is appropriately studied as a multilayered process 
(e.g. Howland 2003; Richter 2005). 
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formed into something new: it is a gift from the Dalai Lama, and as
it is manifested in their institutions, procedures and political cul-
ture it has obtained a cultural dimension, i.e. democracy is embed-
ded in Tibetan culture.11 Thus, although something might be lost
with translation, something is also gained.12 Therefore, when we
want to understand a concept such as “human rights” in Tibetan
contexts, it should be investigated in its cultural embeddedness
and as historically situated. We argue that there is no idealized
universal scheme about human rights that can easily be imple-
mented into a Tibetan location and culture. Instead, we view hu-
man rights as an unfinished product. We have to focus on the many
forms that human rights can take since it is an idea construed and
constructed differently. 
Translat ing Modern Ideas
in the Exi le-Tibetan Community 
Another question is why the Tibetans at all felt the need to imple-
ment or discuss difficult concepts that originated in the West, as we
have seen above in the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile’s debate on
secularism. This is a complicated issue, and it must suffice here to
say that one factor must have been the realization that lasting sup-
port of the Tibetan freedom movement from the West is only possi-
ble when Tibetans do engage in such discourses as those concern-
ing democracy, secularization, and human rights. It is nonetheless
undeniable that the Dalai Lama and many other Tibetans have
demonstrated on many occasions their genuine interest in these is-
sues of modernity.13
Although we do not argue that an instrumental motivation was
the main drive for translating human rights into Tibetan, it is impor-
tant to remember that mastering the language of human rights can
function as a strategy to acquire diplomatic recognition in the inter-
national community. In short, it has political implications.
Exile-Tibetans have had to relate to new knowledge and com-
peting discourses pouring in from every corner of the world, forc-
ing them to reflect on what can enable them to be modern and still
                                             
11 Brox 2008. 
12 Gimpel and Thisted 2007. 
13 For a more detailed treatment of this matter, see Brox 2006 and 2008. 
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be Tibetan. In general, the exile-Tibetan leadership, headed by the
Dalai Lama, began, in the mid-eighties, to translate global issues
that were placed high on the international agenda. In order to
translate these global issues, new discourses were construed in fa-
miliar cultural settings, old terms were given new meaning, and
new terms were coined. They began to speak the languages of de-
mocracy, human rights, cultural heritage, environmentalism and
feminism, and they also translated and constructed these issues in a
culturally sensitive way to make Tibetans understand, accept and
hopefully also value the ideas involved in these concepts. The exile
leadership showed its willingness to negotiate with the world
community on its terms by using the language of a universalistic
discourse of human rights, and it can be interpreted as a strategy to
mobilize sympathy and international support. 
On the 10th of December 1989, the Dalai Lama was awarded the
Nobel Peace Prize. This proved that he successfully spoke a lan-
guage that the world appreciated: dialogue, pacifism, human
rights, cultural heritage and the like were issues that the global
community listened to. In the Tibetan diaspora, December 10th is a
national holiday that is celebrated not only because of the awarding
of the Nobel Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama, but also as Human
Rights Day.
In short and to repeat: Of course the Tibetans have coined a
term as a translation for “human rights,” namely ’gro mi’i thob
thang, but in the worst case this is because many of them have real-
ized that they have to engage in the human rights discourse to be
accepted in the West as a legitimate political exile group.
* * * 
Out of a certain arrogance or lack of thought we (in the West) lay
claim to the right to define the course of the discourse (i.e. that an
Asian contribution to the universal human rights is to be developed
from Buddhism) and its goal as well (i.e. demanding an approach to
Western standards). In this way we press peoples such as the Tibet-
ans to accept fixations that have developed in our cultures over
hundreds or thousands of years, while we will not allow them time
for an independent autochthonous development. In addition to that,
we close our minds to any discourse that might develop from the Ti-
betan and Buddhist cultures, since it is they who have to approach us.
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In the end we may be left with our Eurocentric ideas and are sur-
prised why no one else is enthusiastic about them.14
A Tibetan Human Rights Discourse 
The Tibetan exiles understand the value of being able to handle a
human rights discourse. The Dalai Lama was no stranger to the
concept of human rights and had experienced that this was a dis-
course that could strategically be applied in the Tibetan struggle.
One instance was in 1959 when the Dalai Lama sent delegates (his
brother Gyalo Thondup and Tsipon Shakabpa) abroad to mobilize
international support. The delegates were to bring the Tibetans’
case before the United Nations, with the issue of independence be-
ing the most important and urgent one. The lawyer-diplomat (and
deputy US representative to the UN in 1950) Ernest Gross served as
the counsel to the Tibetan delegates arriving in New York. He ad-
vised the Tibetans to make a plea to the world community to pro-
tect human rights in Tibet, and via that discourse generate mass-
support which later could be transformed into support for the po-
                                             
14 During the discussion of the conference in Hamburg, our approach 
was at one point criticized as “relativism”. With regard to this, see 
Seyfort Ruegg (1992a, p. 155), who had the following to say in the 
context of the place of philosophy in the study of Buddhism: “But 
when saying that it is historically and culturally conditioned, I most 
certainly do not mean to relativize it or to espouse reductionism — 
quite the contrary in fact. The often facile opposition relativism vs. 
universalism has indeed all too often failed to take due account of 
the fact that what is relative in so far as it is conditioned in its lin-
guistic or cultural expression may, nonetheless, in the final analysis 
have a very genuine claim to universality in terms of the human, 
and hence of the humanities. It seems that this holds true as much 
when we postulate some ‘Western’ or ‘Eastern’ philosophy of this 
or that period as when we consider what is now termed human 
rights, which by definition must transcend specific cultures in time 
and place.” In our own context, we hold that just because we criti-
cize that something that is declared “universal” by one culture is 
uncritically forced upon another, we do not espouse a form of rela-
tivism or reductionism. We do agree that any concept of human 
rights should have to have a claim to universality, but criticize the 
intercultural process through which the status of universality is 
supposed to be achieved. 
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litical issue of sovereignty in Tibet and recognition of the Tibetan
Government-in-Exile.15 Gross wanted the Dalai Lama to appear be-
fore the UN Human Rights Commission but not press the issue of
independence. Gross presented the Tibetan case before the UN. In
the end the UN General Assembly, on October 21, 1959, approved a
resolution16 that noted that the Tibetans, like other human beings,
were entitled to fundamental human rights and freedoms, which
were denied them in Tibet. It also emphasized that the Tibetans’
rights to have a cultural and religious life had to be respected. The
UN General Assembly’s resolutions of 1959, 1961, and 196517 con-
cerning Tibet were noncommittal on the question of whether Tibet
was an independent nation occupied by a foreign power, but in-
stead expressed concern over violations of fundamental freedoms
and rights. In this way the violations of human rights in Tibet were
put on the international agenda.
The Dalai Lama has, in many of his speeches since, both in the
English language and in the Tibetan language, related to the con-
cept of human rights. He talks not only of universal rights belong-
ing to humans, but expands his view to that of all sentient beings,
who have the right to pursue happiness and live in freedom. On
numerous occasions he refers to fundamental human rights and its
twin “universal responsibility“. He believes that there are univer-
sally binding standards of human rights, which are the foundation
of every society irrespective of culture. A “right” in Tibetan lan-
guage is thob thang or bdag dbang. Human rights, translated into Ti-
betan as ’gro ba mi’i thob thang, are the rights held by humans (Tib.
’gro ba mi), but the universal rights that might be extracted from
Buddhist philosophy, and which the Dalai Lama also speaks about,
apply not only to human beings, but to “[sentient] beings” (Tib.
sems can). The Dalai Lama recognizes that humans have a range of
different kinds of “spiritual and temporal rights” (Tib. chos dang ’jig
rten kyi thob thang) and that there are “fundamental rights and free-
doms” (Tib. gzhi rtsa’i thob thang dang rang dbang).
The Tibetans’ political case is also voiced by the Dalai Lama
within discourses well-known in the West by talking about the Ti-
                                             
15 Knaus 1999, pp. 203ff. 
16 Resolution 1353 [XIV]. 
17 DIIR 1997. 
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betans’ struggle in terms of fighting for “inalienable rights” (Tib.
thabs med pa’i thob thang). Tibetan exiles are also asking for “equal
rights” (Tib. thob thang ’dra mnyam) or “fundamental rights” (Tib.
gzhi rtsa’i thob thang). Furthermore, they have also translated the
various categories of rights, like “civil rights” (Tib. spyi mang thob
thang), “political rights” (Tib. chab srid thob thang), “democratic
rights” (Tib. mang gtso thob thang), “economic rights” (Tib. dpal ’byor
thob thang), “social rights” (Tib. spyi tshogs thob thang) and “cultural
rights” (Tib. rig gzhung thob thang). Furthermore, the Dalai Lama of-
ten mentions human rights issues together with other globally
promoted values, placing “human rights” in a line with “democ-
racy” (Tib. mang gtso), “freedom” (Tib. rang dbang), “peace” (Tib. zhi
bde) and “autonomy” (Tib. rang skyong).
Another important promoter of a human rights discourse is
the Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy (Tib. Bod
kyi ’gro ba mi’i thob thang dang mang gtso ’phel rgyas lte gnas
khang) in Dharamsala, North India. It was founded in 1996 as a
desk under the Tibetan Government-in-Exile’s Department of In-
formation and International Relations. Today, the Tibetan Center
for Human Rights and Democracy functions as a research center,
which provides reports and introductory material in Tibetan and
English on different aspects of human rights and democracy. Its
main purpose is to monitor, document and analyze the human
rights situation inside Tibet. It has also publicized the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights18 and translated it into Tibetan under
the title rGyal spyi’i ’gro ba mi’i thob thang gi yongs khyab gsal
bsgrags.19 Furthermore, this Tibetan research center has produced
a booklet on human rights for use in Tibetan secondary schools,20
has published numerous booklets and reports on the human
rights situation in Tibet, and continuously provides news updates
on its website (http://www.tchrd.org). Human rights have be-
come an important concept, and through their commitment to the
human rights discourse, Tibetan exiles not only have to prove that
they master its language, they also have to prove that they are its
protectors and the Chinese its violators. 
                                             
18 TCHRD 2003. 
19 TCHRD 2000. 
20 TCHRD 2004. 
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Searching for  a  Tibetan Culture of  Rights 
The Tibetans are well into the beginnings of the discourse and it
may well be that they only got into it because they were forced to
do it, without having the real chance to develop the discourse
within their own cultural context. If we want to proceed in a fair
manner — and if we perhaps want to retain the chance to learn
something ourselves — they should be given the chance to con-
strue their ideas carefully within their own cultural context. Only
then can something like a fair translation happen between our cul-
tures, which would presuppose that there exists something that is
of similar value, and not necessarily of similar meaning.
We may indeed speak, as is perhaps somewhat fashionable to-
day, of a problem of cultural translation. Let us look at another prob-
lem of cultural translation, which might afford us the chance to re-
turn to (and may contribute to) our actual theme of universal hu-
man rights. The remaining part of this article will first point to an
interesting debate about the application of certain economic-
political terms to issues in the history of Tibet. Then the inquiry fo-
cuses on some problems and possible starting points in the search
for a culture of rights in the Buddhist-intellectual sphere. 
Between 1968 and 1973, Melvyn Goldstein published a number
of articles in which he described the relationship between the
common people of Tibet and the landowners, the state and the local
monasteries as that between serfs and feudal lords.21 Articles of other
authors at that time avoided terms such as “serfdom” and “feudal-
ism,” and some others openly criticized Goldstein for its use. From
that developed in the second part of the 1980s an interesting public
debate, in the course of which Goldstein was severely attacked for
his “self-serving political naiveté [sic] regarding Communist
China”22 and (wrongly) denounced as having “received many spe-
cial privileges” by the Chinese government,23 indicating that such
special treatment had caused him to have a pro-Chinese leaning.
And yet Goldstein had offered a careful and interesting analysis of
                                             
21 Goldstein 1971a, 1971b, 1971c, 1973, 1986, 1988 and 1989. 
22 Jamyang Norbu 1992, p. 19. 
23 Phintso Thonden 1991, p. 12. 
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legal relationships. From his analysis followed, among other
things, that the Tibetan serfs24 owned a number of important rights:
• The duties the serfs had to carry out for their feudal lords were
legally binding for both sides. 
• The serfs were legal persons; they could sue their lords and
could appeal a judgement at a higher court in Lhasa. 
• If they had capacity beyond their duties, they could work for
other serfs for a wage; within that framework they could make
their own economic decisions.
• Anything they earned was their legally secured property. 
• They could buy themselves temporarily out of their duties (e.g.
to go on a pilgrimage).
This is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of the relationship
between the serfs and the feudal lords, but it clearly shows that
serfs were considered to be legal persons.25 In other words, a con-
cept of rights becomes tangible here; Tibetans, even if serfs, had
rights that could be enforced through legal action. These were,
however, not “human rights,” since they were chiefly economic,
and certainly not civil rights and liberties, and it remains unclear
whether there is any document that officially formulated these as
the fundamental rights of a citizen.
                                             
24 We use the technical term “serf” here only as an approximation and 
imply no politicasl or moral judgement with this usage. We are 
aware that there existed some fundamental differences between Ti-
betan mi ser and European serfs. Yet it cannot be denied that the Ti-
betan social system was one of great social unequality. 
25 That serfs are considered to be legal persons is an important issue, 
because this is one of the features that distinguishes them from 
slaves, a fact that not everyone seems to be aware of. When a Chi-
nese-Tibetan delegation visited Copenhagen University in 2008, I 
pointed out that their use of the word “slave” was for this reason 
incorrect. As a reply I was quickly assured that this was the fault of 
the Chinese translator (the Tibetan members of the delegation spoke 
to us in Chinese). In a discussion on Deutschlandradio Kultur
(29.3.2008), Eberhard Sandschneider, director of the research insti-
tute Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, who otherwise 
argued very prudently, called the Dalai Lama a “representative of a 
former slaveholder society” and his exile government “far from 
human rights and democracy”. 
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Similar rights were sometimes enjoyed by medieval European
serfs. The much further-reaching European civil and human rights,
however, were chiefly developed from a philosophical perspective,
in particular as a “natural right” by Locke (having a subsequent in-
fluence on Thomas Jefferson and the American Declaration of Inde-
pendence), as the moral freedom to restrict desires according to
Rousseau, and as the civil rights derived from reason according to
Kant. When we are supposed to search within the traditional, doc-
trinal foundation of Buddhist traditions for elements and aspects of
Buddhism that could contribute to a discussion of the principles of
universal human rights, the implication clearly seems to be that the
focus should be on Buddhism as a source of philosophical systems.
Concepts of  Rights in the 
Buddhist  Intel lectual  Sphere? 
If Tibetans were searching for a source of further-reaching rights
that could possibly be developed and construed from their own
culture, Buddhism is an obvious choice. But that is — and this
should not be overlooked — not completely unproblematic, since
there exists among Tibetan exiles a group of people that is to be
taken seriously, whose protagonists are not altogether happy to
have to embed modernity by default in the Buddhist tradition (as
the majority of lamas and elder politicians certainly prefers — if
modernity is an agenda for them at all). They feel uncomfortable in
being only perceived as carriers of the Buddhist gene or as in some
other way exotic beings, and instead would favor the freedom to
shape their culture as Tibetans — not necessarily as Buddhists.
Does the source of the human rights concept have to be rooted in
Buddhism? Is Buddhism the proper guide for a culture of rights?
Another unspoken problem is that we have no clue as to whether
or not (or to what degree) the Tibetans in the so-called “Autono-
mous Region” in China would prefer to derive their civil rights and
liberties from Buddhism. In any case, the demand that the Tibetans
develop something from Buddhism in order to approach Western
standards is in two ways normative: we define the course of the
discourse and also its goal. 
* * * 
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If now a suggestion regarding the general theme of “Buddhism and
human rights” is presented here, this should not be understood as a
normative demand. These are the thoughts of a Western academic,
and they are meant for our own discourse.26 If, parallel to the de-
velopment of human rights in Western philosophy, we search
within Buddhist thought for stimulus, we will soon realize that the
Mah y nistic philosophy of Tibetan Buddhism has some problems
and challenges in store for us.
Among the problems of Mah y na philosophy in this context is
certainly first and foremost the fact that the people for whom the
rights are to be developed — as, by the way, all beings — are from
the perspective of “ultimate truth” (Skr. param rtha) only an illu-
sion. It should hardly be possible, therefore, to develop rights from
those elements of Buddhist philosophy that make statements about
the absolute. It appears to be a constant problem to derive rights
from Buddhist ideas that are concerned with the nature of exis-
tence. How could a special right (i.e. special in the sense of being for
persons) be derived from a concept that includes the idea that the
ones who obtain it are an illusion? 
In fact, we have to ask first where within Buddhism something
like “rights” are discussed. This is certainly the case in the vinaya,
although the discussion there focuses chiefly on certain legal ar-
guments concerning transgressions of the rules for ordained per-
sons, in particular the establishment of the fact of the transgression
and the question whether the transgression can be excused or must
lead to a punishment. Investigating the purpose of these rules, we
find that 
• certain acts are karmically negative to such an extent that a con-
tinuation of ordination is unthinkable; 
• other acts disturb the peace of the community of ordained ones; 
• and some acts would ruin the reputation of the community.
It appears to be difficult to develop civil rights etc. from this com-
plex. Nevertheless, the vinaya could be an interesting starting point,
for we also find within its literature ideas that are formulated in a
much more fundamental manner. An often-quoted principle says
that it is the nature of the pr timok a not to harm other beings and to
                                             
26 The following suggestion in particular is a personal contribution by 
Jan-Ulrich Sobisch. 
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cultivate a corresponding mental attitude. Such an attitude may well
be described as the foundation of all of Buddhist ethics.27 This basic
disposition of avoiding harm to others and to cultivate a correspond-
ing mental attitude is also expressed in the “Golden Rule,“ which
can be found also within Buddhism at many places: As oneself
wishes to live and to avoid suffering, so should this be admitted for
others. From this, one could develop a claim for dignity, namely the
dignity to be perceived as a sentient being and to have the right to
avoid vulnerability. 
In derivation from that, the “Golden Rule” could also be seen as
containing an ethical-normative element in the sense that there also
exists the duty not to harm others, if it is agreed that such a duty for
all could be derived from the claim of the individual. 
The moral principle of the golden rule has the advantage of be-
ing free from any metaphysical assumptions, i.e. it does not matter
whether the other being is an illusion or not — I myself am not dif-
ferent from that and I do feel pain, and thus others feel pain as well.
The fact, however, that a psychological element has replaced the
metaphysical creates new problems, since the call for compassion
presupposes that everyone is capable of empathy. And even if such a
capability is presupposed as something innate, as the optimistic
Mah y na Buddhists believe, one has to acknowledge the fact that
this innate ability is liable to be impaired by outside manipulation,
or in some cases can even be completely suppressed. The general
call for an education that fosters the capability to empathize is such
a fundamental demand that the whole idea must perhaps be cate-
gorized as utopian. And that is a category within which we do not
want to find anything that is fundamental to human rights.
On the other hand, utopian ideas can definitely exercise an in-
spirational influence. The following suggestion may thus appear to
be even more utopian. 
Perhaps the most interesting challenge from Mah y na Bud-
dhism is that it does not allow an exclusive focus on human beings,
                                             
27 The term “ethics” is used despite the many implicit problems. We 
prefer, however, not to discuss them here. The abovementioned 
principle says that it is the nature of the pr timok a not to harm other 
beings and to cultivate a corresponding mental attitude. This 
thought is identified and contextualized in Sobisch 2002, pp. 36, 41, 
99, 133 ff., 187 f., 203, 419 and 429. 
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as the Christian-occidental tradition does.28 In other words, if we try
to derive human rights from the ideas of Mah y na Buddhism, then
these must be the rights of beings, and not human rights alone. At least,
if we want to get involved in our context with Mah y na Buddhism,
we seriously have to tackle the problem of why certain rights are
only for human beings, and not for other beings.
One thing is clear: Buddhism concedes that human beings have
greater abilities than most other beings (in particular: animals), but,
as far as we can see, nowhere greater rights. It may be objected that
the killing of human beings is considered more grave than the kill-
ing of animals, but in our opinion this has, in the context of the vi-
naya, to do with the socially greater taboo on the killing of human
beings (which the community of ordained persons had to ac-
knowledge as it depended on the goodwill of society), and in the
Abhidharma and related literature with the greater amount of
negative karma that ensues from it. But deriving greater rights for
human beings appears to be unfounded.
Thus when human beings, as the Dalai Lama (consistent with
the Mah y na teachings) often points out, aim to avoid suffering
and strive for happiness just like any other being, then we can, due
to the certainly higher abilities and faculties of human beings, only
derive special duties for them, but not greater rights. The greatest
challenge from Mah y na Buddhism is, therefore, that we would
have to develop rights of beings along with human rights, or that we
at least combine human rights with the duty to include sentient be-
ings within our striving for happiness. 
Why Search for  Simi lar i t ies  
between Global  Values and Ancient  Cultures? 
Several Tibetan Buddhists have already gone out to look for simi-
larities between acceptable global values and Tibetan Buddhism.
For instance, there are Tibetans arguing that the Buddha’s teach-
ings conform to democracy. The Dalai Lama and Prime Minister-
                                             
28 As the idea of natural law and inalienable rights developed in the 
Christian-occidental tradition, a sharp distinction was made be-
tween animals and humans: only humans had natural rights, or 
only those who possess rights can be regarded as humans. See Asad 
2003, p. 131. By the very concept of rights-bearing human beings, 
human rights distinguish humans from animals. 
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in-Exile Samdhong Rinpoche are among the prominent Tibetans
who see Buddhism and democracy as compatible.29 Making such
comparisons and translating, in this case the concept of democracy,
in a culturally sensitive way may well have a productive effect in
the sense that it may facilitate the Tibetans’ understandings and ac-
ceptance of such a new and foreign concept as democracy. Thus,
global issues are made less foreign to Tibetans by addressing the is-
sues in ways they are familiar with and that are embedded within
Tibetan culture. Global issues can thereby become a part of the Ti-
betans’ property. For instance, when the Dalai Lama, at the begin-
ning of his exile, introduced the concept of democracy to his Ti-
betan followers, he explained that Tibetans were not really strang-
ers to democracy because the Buddha’s teachings essentially com-
plied with the principle of democracy. Many Tibetans have
adopted this reasoning and argue that the core values in Buddhism
and democracy are common. A popular expression of this is when
Tibetans say democracy is for the benefit of the people and Bud-
dhism is for the benefit of all sentient beings. The two share egali-
tarian values and the belief in the potential of human beings. The
same exercise could easily be carried out with the concept of hu-
man rights. 
However, such exercises of comparing cultures, identifying
similarities in concepts as if they share the same meaning, are prob-
lematic. Wilson once remarked how scholarly work on interacting
legal and normative orders had become too wrapped up in discus-
sions of whether traditional societies possessed a concept of human
rights in their own legal codes.30 He thought that some scholars
went about the problem in the wrong way, and his argument can
fruitfully serve as a warning to the project of identifying human
rights in Buddhist societies. Instead of looking for conceptual simi-
larities in different non-Western traditions, one should rather see
how concepts are implanted in new contexts from which they did
not originate. Wilson argued that of course we may very well find
similarities, but we cannot predict how they, in numerous ways,
are articulated and manifested. Additionally we may ask, how do
we know what to compare in order to find parallels to human
rights? Can we agree on what constitutes human rights? Of course,
                                             
29 Dalai Lama 1999; Samdhong Rinpoche 1996, 1999a and 1999b. 
30 Wilson 1997, pp. 13–14. 
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ideas of rights, liberties and duties are not alien to Tibetans, and in
comparing human rights with Buddhism, one can easily argue for
their shared egalitarianism, tolerance, value of freedom, and so
forth. The question is, however, what new insights do we gain from
such an exercise and what new insights do we gain into ourselves
and our concept of human rights? Is the goal to better understand
Buddhism or to better understand rights that are universal and
fundamental? If we follow the advice of Wilson, it is more interest-
ing to investigate how the knowledge of human rights is transmit-
ted to the Tibetans, how they are taught the language of human
rights, and how they negotiate a culture of rights that is Tibetan.
How do they construct, translate and manifest human rights? And
even more importantly, why do we not invite Tibetans to present
to us values concerning rights in order to enlighten and expand our
own concept of inalienable rights? 
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Human Rights and Exile-Tibetan Polit ics 
STEPHANIE RÖMER
Nowadays politics, the topics of human rights and Tibet are in-
separably connected. Even though the issues are not always on our
screens, since the 1980s the international media report at regular in-
tervals about human rights abuses in Tibet. Documentary films,
radio programs, reports in magazines and newspapers and
speeches by Tibetan former political prisoners give evidence of
human rights violations in Tibet. Data on the human rights situa-
tion that are used in these reports are provided by international
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) like Amnesty Interna-
tional, Tibetan Support Groups (TSGs) — for instance Students for
a Free Tibet — or exile-Tibetan NGOs, foremost the Tibetan Center
for Human Rights and Democracy. Especially during the Tibetan
mass demonstrations before the 2008 Olympics in Beijing and the
subsequent detentions of protesters in Tibetan-populated areas, the
topic of human rights in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in
general and in Tibet in particular has risen to the next level.
However, the topic of human rights is not just communicated to
prove the violations themselves, but also serves political interests.
While the Tibetan exiles in India are emphasizing the topic of human
rights violations, the Chinese communist government in contrast is
constantly downplaying the conditions in Tibetan-populated areas.
This paper will look from a political science point of view at the
question: how is the concept of human rights politicized in the Ti-
betan context? After a brief description of the Tibetan political struc-
tures in exile, I will look at how human rights are communicated by
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Tibetan exiles and how this topic is taken up by the international
community. To conclude, I will give a portrayal of the Tibetan Cen-
ter for Human Rights and Democracy, one of the main voices of hu-
man rights in Tibet.
The Tibetan Exi le  Pol i t ical  System 
After the arrival of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama in India in March
1959, more than 122,000 Tibetans have followed him into exile until
the present day.1 The majority of the exiled Tibetans live in India,
Nepal and Bhutan where they found a new home in one of the 53
Tibetan permanent settlements. With help of the host countries,
and also with international operational and financial assistance,
these settlements were established during the 1960s. Apart from the
Tibetans in South Asia there is also a considerable number living
abroad: in the USA, Canada, Switzerland and other European
countries.
Despite the scattered distribution of their present places of living,
all exiled Tibetans are politically represented by the so-called Central
Tibetan Administration of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (CTA), the
present Tibetan Government-in-Exile. This exile administration,
which was founded in 1959, is set up in the northern Indian town of
Dharamsala and can be described as the center of Tibetan exile poli-
tics. The entire administrative infrastructure, including the Dalai
Lama’s private residence, is located in and around Dharamsala, but
mostly in the governmental district, called Gangchen Khyishong. In
addition to the exile government, many exile-Tibetan NGOs and ra-
dio stations call Dharamsala their headquarters or have at least a
branch office there. Because of Dharamsala’s political importance
and its being home to the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, this former British
hill station on the southern edge of the Himalayan mountain range
has changed rapidly over the last decades. The town developed into
a tourist center; today the streets are jammed with traffic and the
town has been changed with foreign funding; schools, medical and
handicraft centers have been set up; Indian and Tibetan shopkeepers
are in line with movie halls, restaurants, hotels and guest houses;
monasteries and museums attract the tourists. 
                                             
1 CTA 1969, pp. 95–120; CTA 1994, p. 3. 
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The Tibetan Government-in-Exile struggles from its base in ex-
ile to return to a free or at least autonomous homeland, meaning
the entire territory populated by Tibetans, compromising of three
large Tibetan regions Ü-Tsang, Amdo and Kham, i.e. today’s Ti-
betan Autonomous Region (TAR) and parts of the Chinese prov-
inces of Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan. Furthermore, the
exile administration claims to represent the entire Tibetan nation,
i.e. all Tibetans living both inside and outside of Tibet. But these
representative claims are internationally not recognized. Rather,
the Tibetan exile government receives all of its international moral
and operational support from governments, transnational organi-
zations, NGOs and individuals. 
The CTA’s structure and policies are characterized by the main
principles of Buddhism and democracy, which indicate a combina-
tion of traditional values of the past with Western political con-
cepts. This combination was outlined by the Fourteenth Dalai
Lama in the beginning of the 1960s and later determined by two ex-
ile charters. In regard to the combination of politics and Buddhist
religion the exile administration is set up as followed: 
At the top of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile is the Fourteenth
Dalai Lama. He is the ruling institution and holds, at least theoreti-
cally, ultimate legislative, executive and judiciary powers within
the CTA — competences that are still determined by their Indian
hosts. That is, despite the Fourteenth Dalai Lama’s position of su-
perior power within the CTA structures, all political decisions need
to be approved by the Government of India. The Dalai Lama is ser-
viced by a private office that handles all affairs that regard his per-
son, from the management of thousands of visitors annually to the
organization of his daily schedule. 
Even though the Fourteenth Dalai Lama is being vested with
sweeping powers, the CTA has a legislative organ, which fulfils the
demands of a democratic system. 46 Tibetan deputies stand at the
moment for the regionally and religiously heterogeneous Tibetan
community: Each region of the national territory of Greater Tibet —
Ü-Tsang, Kham and Amdo — is represented by ten deputies, out of
whom at least two have to be women. On the religious side, the ma-
jor Tibetan Buddhist schools, Nyingmapa, Kagüpa, Sakyapa and
Gelugpa, provide each two deputies. Since 1976 there have been
two Bön delegates as well. There are also two deputies who repre-
sent the interests of the exiled Tibetans in Europe and one for those
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who live in North America. In this regard, the composition of the
assembly emphasizes the CTA’s claim to stand for all Tibetans de-
spite their differences in regional heritage, religious affinities or
current place of residence. The CTA deputies meet twice a year to
discuss financial and political matters, while in emergency cases
they can be called for extraordinary sessions, as well. 
The Tibetan executive is subdivided into the Tibetan cabinet, its
subordinate departments, and constitutional bodies. The cabinet,
the kashag, is the main executive body of the CTA, which strongly re-
lies on the traditional structure of the Lhasa government, as indi-
cated by its name, structure, and function. The kashag consists of four
ministers, or kalons. One of the kalons acts as prime minister. The four
ministers head the following exile-Tibetan departments: security; in-
formation and international relations; health; religion and culture;
education; finance; and home affairs. There are also three constitu-
tional bodies, namely the Tibetan Election Commission, the Tibetan
Public Service Commission and the Tibetan Audit Commission. 
The Supreme Justice Commission represents the Tibetan judici-
ary, a new invention in the Tibetan political context. It adjudicates all
civil disputes within exile-Tibetan communities and settlements, but
in all court decisions it is subordinate to Indian law. 
To summarize, one can state that through an elaborate struc-
ture, which is subdivided into numerous units and highly special-
ized sections, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile is able to reach all
exiled Tibetans in India, Nepal and Bhutan and also those who live
abroad. Furthermore, the administrative setup emphasizes its rep-
resentative claims regarding the Tibetan territory and people.2
Additionally, there are different exile-Tibetan NGOs, which
have their head office in Dharamsala and also maintain local offices
in the major Tibetan settlements. Despite their independence, all
exile-Tibetan NGOs act within the CTA political framework and
support its official policy through their high specialization in vari-
ous fields, as will be seen later when looking at the topic of human
rights more closely. The most important exile NGOs regarding
their political relevance and numbers of members are the Tibetan
Youth Congress, the Tibetan Women’s Association and the Tibetan
Center for Human Rights and Democracy. 
                                             
2 Cf. Roemer 2008. 
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Talking about Human Rights  
in  the Tibetan Exi le  Community 
Since 1959 there has been a steady flow of new Tibetan arrivals in
India and Nepal. One can estimate that between 2,000 and 3,000 Ti-
betans cross annually the borders. Most of them are Buddhist
monks and nuns who flee religious persecution, young Tibetans
seeking better education and job opportunities in exile than they
have at home, and former political prisoners who were tortured
while being jailed.3 With the constant number of newly arriving Ti-
betans the matter of human rights violations in the homeland has
been always visible in the host countries. But in the context of Ti-
betan exile politics, the human rights issue was not highlighted in
the international community until the 1980s. The political devel-
opments that led to the international promotion of the human
rights situation in Tibet can be described as follows: 
Right after the flight of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama the topic of
human rights already became important for the Tibetans with re-
spect to two reports of the International Commission of Jurists (in
1959 and 1960). This commission charged China with a genocide in
Tibet that targeted Tibetans’ religious beliefs. Furthermore, one can
see that immediately after the Dalai Lama’s arrival in India, the Ti-
betans profited from wide international media coverage by pro-
moting worldwide the plight of Tibetans through press articles and
TV reports. The Tibetan exile political elite used this interest to
lobby the United Nations (UN), which finally passed three resolu-
tions: in 1959, in 1961 and in 1965.4 There, the UN General Assem-
bly expressed its concern about the human rights violations in Ti-
bet.5 But the initial expectations of the exile-Tibetans, that the UN
would be in a powerful position to help them, was disappointed by
the fact that China was in such an internationally strong political
position that the resolutions had no consequence. The opportunity
for exile-Tibetan efforts to raise awareness in the UN became even
worse in 1971. First, the US Nixon administration altered its focus
in the Cold War and stopped struggling against China. This deci-
                                             
3 CTA 1994, pp. 41–42; Hoppe 1997, pp. 95–96. 
4 Resolutions 1353/14 (1959), 1723/16 (1961) and 2079/20 (1965). Cf. 
CTA 1997, pp. 4–6 
5 Morris and Scoble 1990, p. 177. 
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sion had the side-effect that the USA lost interest in Tibetans and
withdrew its support from them.6 Second, in 1971 China was con-
ferred its own membership in the UN. The permanent seat in the
UN Security Council in particular provided the Chinese leadership
with a powerful instrument to block any resolution on Tibet.
Besides appealing to the UN, Tibetan exiles have always sought
to resolve the Tibetan issue themselves, including efforts to im-
prove the living conditions for those Tibetans left at home, on a bi-
lateral basis between Dharamsala and Beijing. These efforts were
officially represented by numerous negotiations between the PRC
and the exile-Tibetans at a high political level, but without note-
worthy success.
Realizing that the UN would not act in the interest of Tibet, nor
would the bilateral negotiations with the Chinese leadership bring
the desired results, the exile government shifted its political focus in
the 1980s to the international grassroots level. From now on, interna-
tional NGOs were the main focus of the political activities of the Ti-
betans. In this context, Tom Grunfeld points out that Jimmy Carter’s
election to the presidency of the United States in 1977 influenced the
decision of the exile-Tibetan elite to focus on human rights issues,
because Carter was “[…] pledging to carry out a foreign policy
based on the principles of ‘human rights’ around the world.” This
led Tibetans to declare that “it is his special emphasis on the human
rights issue that makes him a potential Messiah for Tibetans”.7 Thus,
the CTA realized that the human rights discourse was an important
tool for any displaced and indigenous people in particular to change
the political situation in their home territories — a relevance that had
its beginning with the UN Declaration on Human Rights in 1948 and
became important in the 1970s anew. Because the topic of human
rights is still one of the key concerns of the UN, it brought the Tibet-
ans unexpected hearings in the USA and Europe. This fact has since
the 1980s provided the Tibetans with the opportunity to communi-
cate its political objectives through the language of the Western
world, using terms like “human rights” and “injustice”.8
                                             
6 Xu 1997, p. 1066. 
7 Grunfeld 1987, p. 198. 
8 Mountcastle 1997, p. 296. 
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According to an interview with the present exile-Tibetan prime
minister, human rights and environmental issues are regarded by
the CTA as more important than the topic of Tibetan independence
itself.9 Such a statement is at first sight surprising because Tibetans
since entering exile have aimed to return to a free homeland. But
looking at the political situation of the exile-Tibetans and interna-
tional political circumstances in general one can understand the rea-
son for such emphatic weighting. Starting with the political position
of the exile government in India one has to realize that the CTA was
never in the situation to act independently from the political will of
the host country, India. Apart from political benefits in their domes-
tic agenda, India hosted the Tibetans because of a deep sympathy for
the Tibetan people based on the Buddhist religion. But to limit its
own security risks, India forbade the CTA to struggle against the
PRC from Indian soil. This meant that the exile government had to
focus on topics that are in the first place easier to communicate than a
direct encounter with China in order to regain the homeland. This
served as one reason among others for the exile-Tibetans to decide
that the preservation of Tibetan religion and culture was going to be
one of the top priorities of the CTA politics. In this cultural and reli-
gious orientated frame the human rights topic fits as well as the
promotion of eco and women’s rights. All three topics are promoted
internationally and are known among Tibetan and Western pro-
Tibet activists as the so-called “universal rights strategy”. This term
combines Tibetan cultural protection and nonviolence with the ad-
vocacy of human, environmental and women’s rights as a vehicle to
campaign for the exile-Tibetan struggle.10
Moreover, the destruction of thousands of religious sites in Ti-
betan-populated areas in the PRC, in addition to the ongoing deten-
tions of compatriots at home, had a deep impact on the Tibetan ex-
iles’ decision to focus on human rights. Furthermore, the human
rights-based approach contributes to the limitation of potential
conflicts between Tibetans in exile and those who are left behind.
This can be explained by the fact that in comparable exile situa-
tions, the exiles’ geographical distance from their home territory,
their absence from important happenings and limited ability to re-
                                             
9 Interview with Mr. Tenzin Norgay, Dharamsala, 24.04.2002. 
10 Pike 2001, p. 14. 
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tain a foothold at home may result in a break between the exiles
and the nationals at home. This gap is even widened by different
social, political and economical living conditions, ideological goals
and views on how the present political system at home should be
changed or overthrown. In the worst case both groups, the exiles
and their compatriots at home, may fight each other instead of con-
centrating their energies to struggle against the present alien power
in their homeland.11 Coming back to the Tibetan exiles, one can ar-
gue that through a public articulation of the human rights situation
in Tibet and efforts to improve circumstances in their homeland, at
least contemporarily, their compatriots at home are shown that
they are not forgotten. Moreover, they are often at the center of ex-
ile-Tibetan politics.
For an explanation of exiles’ promotion of human, ecological and
women’s rights, one can also look at the Tibetan exile government’s
role in the international community. Certainly, Tibetan exiles at-
tempt to mobilize and expand international support through the
combination of Tibetan Buddhism and universal rights. The key fig-
ure in this course is the Fourteenth Dalai Lama himself. Through his
extensive traveling around the world he is able to highlight the topic
of human rights in front of different audiences, e.g. in front of Tibet
activists, Buddhists or even economists: “I do not see any contradic-
tion between the need for economic development and the need for
the respect of human rights”.12
The universal rights approach is useful for many different kinds
of pro-Tibet activist, as the representation of each specific right pro-
vides a symbolic and ideological package that is utilized in Western
activists’ discourse in order to categorize and promote the Tibetan
exiles’ claims of Chinese abuses in their homeland. Such a categori-
zation of the exile-Tibetan struggle provides activists all over the
world with a clear organizational framework, which makes a quick
and efficient classification of Tibet-related issues possible. Each key
right demands its own audience and forum for articulation and
therefore appeals to a wider range of potential supporters than the
exile-Tibetan political struggle would do alone. While the Tibetan
Government-in-Exile is able to expand international support with
                                             
11 Shain 1989, pp. 146–147 and 154–155. 
12 Dalai Lama 1993, p. 14. 
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such policy, international NGOs profit from the satisfaction of hav-
ing contributed something to the attainment of a worthwhile cause:
the Tibetan freedom struggle.
But the “universal rights strategy” has not only Western advo-
cates but also exile-Tibetan supporters in the head Tibetan NGOs
that actively participate in the discourse. In the Tibetan exiles’ search
for outside support, they have learned the language of the Western
world and adopted Western ideas, skills and methods to navigate
within the international political arena. Consequently one can state
that Westerners and exile-Tibetans hand-in-hand fashion new
spaces in the global process, which are accompanied by a certain
success in the implementation of the new skills, which in turn make
these Western perceptions even more popular among the exile-
Tibetan elite. Especially important symbolic events and conferences
are used to promote issues and to build networks “[… ] even when
their connection appears somewhat tangential to the Tibet issue”.13
The success in communicating the Tibetan exile struggle in this
specific way is also the result of the existence of a market for uni-
versal rights in Western liberal societies. Upendra Baxi states: 
Human rights movements at all levels (global, national, and local) have 
tended to become capital-intensive. The praxis of protecting and promot-
ing human rights entails entrepreneurship in raising material resources, in-
cluding funding, from a whole variety of governmental, intergovernmen-
tal, international, and philanthropic sources. These sources are organized 
in terms of management imperatives, both of line management and up-
ward accountability.14
In this regard, the promotion of human rights improves the inter-
national NGOs’ positions within a market of human rights.
Through the highlighting of human rights in the Tibetan context
they are able to expand their own network of supporters and im-
prove their own organizational position.15
Universal rights, including human, women’s and environ-
mental rights, have become political symbols that promote the no-
tion of justice, which provides the Tibetan Government-in-Exile
with a powerful instrument against China. But this strategy con-
                                             
13 Pike 2001, p. 85. 
14 Baxi 2002, p. 123. 
15 Bob 2002, p. 44. 
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tains, according to Upendra Baxi, also a situation of overproduc-
tion of human rights in the international sphere.16 In this regard, the
exile-Tibetan struggle movement risks over-employing this topic,
which may lead to the result that the Tibetan cause becomes just
another human rights issue among others in the eyes of the interna-
tional community. Furthermore, the communication of the exile-
Tibetan struggle in human and other rights-based discourses may
[…] fundamentally alter the sites in which the Tibet issue is heard, or even 
subsumed by a larger human rights rhetoric. In the long run then, the uni-
versal rights strategy as it is currently employed may be counterproductive 
to Tibetan nationalist interests.17
In this context international TSGs can be called opportunistic in
making use of the various universal rights as soon as appropriate
or possible.18 The effects of such strategy can be summarized in two
points: firstly, the so-called universal rights strategy legitimates the
exile-Tibetan struggle because it becomes concordant with interna-
tional agreements on human and other rights; and secondly, it pro-
vides all international actors with an argument to express their dis-
satisfaction about the Tibet issue despite the PRC’s growing
strength in international economics and politics. 
Because of the policy shift towards the international grassroots
level, since the 1980s the Tibetan exile struggle has been trans-
formed into a dynamic and multidimensional organizational
movement, including a growing number of non-Tibetan support-
ers who are able to work on different fronts by using highly skilled
methods of communication, such as reports and lobbying, to publi-
cize worldwide a litany of suffering and pain. Already by the year
1997 more than 350 TSGs placed morality, nonviolence, truth and
justice on the agenda of the international community.19
TSGs focus generally in the following fields: They try to raise 
awareness in the international arena through intellectual, financial 
and technical resources that are not available to Tibetan exiles. 
Additionally, they are actively engaged in the Tibetan exiles’ 
struggle through lobbying and putting pressure on politicians and 
                                             
16 Baxi 2002, pp. 67–76. 
17 Pike 2001, p. 74. 
18 Ibid., pp. 56–57; Mountcastle 1997, pp. 307–308. 
19 Tsering 1997, pp. 18–19. 
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officials while rallying the sympathetic public. Furthermore, TSGs 
create new and expanding links between the Tibetan exiles’ strug-
gle and other NGOs. And finally, they provide the Tibetan exiles
with models and methods of effective activism. This new set of 
skills fundamentally altered the whole exile-Tibetan struggle in 
such a way that the traditional concept of state has been widened 
to include transnational political action.20
If Tibetans abroad lacked diplomatic recognition, [official] embassies, or 
representation in important international organizations, they were gaining 
crucial access to power, money, and the media through their newly forged 
partnership with these unofficial and ardent American groups and suppor-
tive celebrities. Thanks to the appeal of these organizations’ cause, the 
compelling personality of the Dalai Lama, and the shrewdness of their tac-
tical planning, they had managed to circumvent many of the conventional 
structures of intercourse between nation-states.21
The Tibetan Government-in-Exile reacts ambivalently to the in-
volvement of TSGs. Robert Pike points out that the CTA regards the
work of the international TSGs as important because these non-
Tibetan activists are able to successfully lobby local and federal gov-
ernments. They are by nature more skilled in navigating within the
international community than most of the exile-Tibetans and more
familiar with established communication mechanisms of the inter-
national community, which enables the activists to communicate the
exile struggle within a legal framework in the international arena.22
Moreover, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama states in that context: “… the
non-governmental organizations have a key role to play. You not
only create awareness for the need to respect the rights of all human
beings, but also give the victims of human rights violations hope for
a better future”.23 At the same time the CTA also keeps a distance
from global activism because the TSGs focus more on Tibetan inde-
pendence than on the Fourteenth Dalai Lama’s future idea of a genu-
inely autonomous Tibet.24
                                             
20 Pike 2001, pp. 35–44. 
21 Schell 2000, p. 38. 
22 Pike 2001, p. 38. 
23 Dalai Lama 1993, p. 14. 
24 Dalai Lama 1991, p. 11. 
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While the TSGs have so far been successful in legitimizing their
work through growing support around the world by following the
“universal rights strategy,” many Tibetan exiles remain in confu-
sion about the initial goal of regaining the homeland.25 Some, espe-
cially the young exile generation, which are represented by the Ti-
betan Youth Congress feel that the “universal rights strategy,” in-
cluding the topic of human rights, is ineffective and does not lead to
any concrete step towards the a free homeland. It rather offers in-
ternational agents a way to evade the Tibetan exiles’ struggle by
paying lip service to it. Furthermore, they disagree about whether
universal rights-based discourse will affect the likelihood of China
engaging itself in a meaningful dialogue, either with the Western
activists or with the Tibetans. Robert Pike states in this context:
While many Tibetan activists and young Tibetans increasingly question the 
efficacy of the Dalai Lama’s moderate approach and opt to demand full in-
dependence, the universal rights strategy — crystallized in the campaign-
ing of Tibet activists — is at odds with their radical goals. While the group 
of radical Tibetans is still a minority, there is allegedly growing friction 
among Tibetan youths who are increasingly disposed toward adopting an 
independence approach. In addition, some TSGs are thinking of radicaliz-
ing their demands for independence.26
This shows that the Tibetan Governments-in-Exile focus on pro-
moting the Tibetan exiles’ struggle in the international sphere un-
der the guise of universal rights is not uncompromisingly accepted
by the exile-Tibetan community, and the young generation in par-
ticular. Furthermore, the international TSGs increasingly shape the
whole debate, which puts the CTA on edge. This new activist para-
digm in combination with Tibetan Buddhist nationalism has been
predominantly articulated in the world arena by transnational
TSGs, meaning by more non-national activists, in this case non-
Tibetans, than in any other nationalist movement.27 This in turn il-
lustrates the high importance of international supporters for the
CTA in functioning as a government-in-exile. 
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26 Ibid., p. 75. 
27 Ibid., pp. 18–21. 
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The Tibetan Center  for  Human Rights  
and Democracy 
The main Tibetan exile voice that promotes the topic of human
rights is the Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy
(TCHRD). As already mentioned, human rights is to a large extent
promoted among the international community to raise awareness
for the Tibetan exile struggle to free the homeland. 
The TCHRD was founded in 1996 from a former Desk for Hu-
man Rights and Democracy that had worked under the CTA De-
partment of Information and International Relations (DIIR). The
change to a new judicial status was carried out in order to expand
the possibilities of political action, because as an NGO the center
was expected to have more room to act in the international sphere
and to have higher credibility among Western human rights activ-
ists. While the CTA may be excluded from conferences because of
its representative claims to be the sole government of the Tibetan
nation, an NGO may not. In turn, the CTA is able to act as an au-
thentic and credible governmental organization and has more op-
portunities for action in the international political sphere while not
dealing with sensitive issues like human rights, which could harm
ongoing Sino-Tibetan negotiations. Nevertheless, despite the offi-
cial separation, the contact between the TCHRD and the CTA is
very close. For instance the center works hand-in-hand with the
Department of Security, as they both monitor the political situation
in Tibet and exchange information on human rights abuses.
The international promotion, highlighting and protection of
human rights in Tibet is carried out by the TCHRD through nu-
merous English-language publications, annual participation in in-
ternational human rights-related conferences, campaigns and lob-
bying activities. Furthermore, the center takes up requests relating
to particular issues and political prisoners, networks and shares in-
formation, organizes workshops, applies for funding and conducts
briefings on the human rights situation in Tibet. Special campaigns
and commemorations are annually organized on the occasion of
the Panchen Lama’s birthday (25th April) or the World Human
Rights Day (10th December). To sum up, one can say that the num-
ber of annual publications and the extent of organization of work-
shops, discussion rounds etc. is unmatched in the exile NGO scene.
Most activities and publications are especially designed to attract
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an international audience. In this regard, one has to mention that
through all these activities the TCHRD maintains a wide network
of cooperation with international NGOs, governmental bodies and
transnational organizations. It is interesting to note that the
TCHRD is almost exclusively financed by Western agents, who
themselves have a vital interest in promoting the topic of human
rights. 
For a successful promotion of human rights violations, the
TCHRD needs internationally acceptable data of tortured and im-
prisoned compatriots through which it is able to emphasize the cul-
tural differences between Tibetans and Chinese. Since the Chinese
takeover, the monastic segment of the Tibetan population in par-
ticular has been repeatedly involved in Tibetan resistance activities
that caused imprisonment, torture or even death due to the tight
control in the TAR.28 As soon as the monks and nuns are free they
flee with the help of international human rights activists to the
Western world, where they report about their imprisonment, rang-
ing from terrible torture methods to the plight of other prisoners
and their health. In this regard, one can say that there is an interre-
lation between Western human rights activists and the Tibetan
former political prisoners. 
Despite knowing much about the human rights situation in the
homeland, the TCHRD has no direct contact with compatriots at
home. Only through the broadcasting of radio stations like Radio
Free Asia (RFA), Voice of America (VOA) or Voice of Tibet (VOT),
telephone calls, and frequent cross-border movements is TCHRD
informed about conditions in the homeland. People within Tibet
are informed from the same communication channels about politi-
cal activities in exile. TCHRD staff even state that Tibetans in Tibet
are encouraged to struggle for their rights continuously, even
though only a limited number of them know about the concept of
human rights at all. In this regard, one can say that TCHRD gives
these Tibetans a voice in the international sphere. Thus, TCHRD
builds a bridge between those left at home, the Tibetan exiles and
international agents.
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Conclusion
One can conclude that exile-Tibetans successfully promote human
rights within the international community. The Fourteenth Dalai
Lama plays an important role in this context as he is able to con-
vincingly promote human rights through his extensive traveling
around the globe. Since the 1980s the exile-Tibetan struggle has
been subdivided into different specific rights that are placed in dif-
ferent global arenas. The topic of human rights is embedded within
the so-called universal rights strategy. The promotion of specific
rights, including human, women’s and ecological rights, provides
the international activists with symbolic and ideological instru-
ments that are utilized to categorize and support the exile-Tibetans
in their struggle to stop human rights violations in their homeland.
In this context, the concept of human rights is applied to mobilize
international NGOs to participate actively in the Tibetan exiles’
struggle to free the homeland. Such a strategy has positive effects
on the position of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile because it le-
gitimizes its political claims to act on behalf of the national cause,
which is represented in the exile struggle. Furthermore, the “uni-
versal rights strategy” is beneficial for the organizational survival
of the many TSGs. 
In addition, human rights are communicated so as to bridge
the present and potential gaps between exiles and the compatriots
at home. They are linked to the exiles’ struggle and their hardship is
promoted in the international sphere. In this regard, both national
and international support can be created by the exile-Tibetan po-
litical elite. 
The most important exile-Tibetan voice that is specialized in
human rights is the Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democ-
racy. This Tibetan exile NGO, and not the Tibetan Government-in-
Exile itself, creates wide recognition and moral support from inter-
national human rights activists, NGOs and TSGs. In this regard,
TCHRD works successfully in raising international awareness
through the issue of human rights. Moreover, the center overcomes
the limitations of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile in maneuvering
in the international sphere and consequently expands the exile
government’s access to the international community. In summary,
the issue of human rights is highly politicized in the exile-Tibetan
community as it is indistinguishable from the efforts that are spe-
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cifically designed to assist repatriation. Human rights in combina-
tion with Buddhism became a vehicle for both Tibetan and non-
Tibetan activists to promote the Tibetan struggle worldwide. 
195
Women’s Rights in the Vajray na Tradition 
JAMPA TSEDROEN (CAROLA ROLOFF)
As a Buddhist nun practicing in the Tibetan tradition I would
rather prefer to speak on Human Rights in Tibetan Buddhism than
in the wider Vajray na tradition, because on the one hand the Va-
jray na is also practiced in Japanese Shingon and Nepalese Newar
Buddhism, neither of which I am familiar with. On the other hand
this gives me the opportunity to approach the topic from a broader
perspective without restricting myself to tantric Buddhism. Thus I
will approach the topic of human rights from a Tibetan Buddhist
perspective, showing how the universalism of human rights can be
deduced from traditional theories that constitute the doctrinal basis
of Tibetan Buddhism. Furthermore, since the organizers of the
symposium have asked me to link the topic of human rights in Va-
jray na to the First International Conference on Buddhist Womens’
Role in the Sa gha,1 which took place at the University of Hamburg
in 2007, I will show that in the context of discussions of human
rights, from a Western understanding, it cannot go unmentioned
that these theories are not always rigorously applied. This will be
made clear using the example of women’s rights, which are not
consequentially observed in any Buddhist tradition so far. During
the Hamburg conference H. H. the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, among
                                             
1 Skr. sa gha (Tib. dge ’dun) has here the meaning of monastic order. A 
selected proceedings of the conference will be published under the 
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by Wisdom Publications (Boston) in 2009. 
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other outstanding speakers, spoke on “Human Rights and the
Status of Women in Buddhism”, while the Protestant bishop Maria
Jepsen presented a paper on “Women and Religion: The religious
competence of women”.2 The discussions during the conference
showed that if Buddhism in the 21st century is to remain credible, it
must soon reposition itself on this issue. Although it is important to
respect various cultures and religions, women’s rights can not be
relativized, but rather the world community needs to follow the
universal principles already laid down and ratified by all the Asian
countries where Buddhism is widespread. 
Ways of Approaching a Western Understanding 
of Human Rights From a Buddhist Perspective 
For the 60th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the Dalai Lama wrote: 
Internationally, our rich diversity of cultures and religions should help to 
strengthen fundamental human rights in all communities. Underlying this 
diversity are basic human principles that bind us all together as members 
of the same human family. The question of human rights is so fundamen-
tally important that there should be no difference of views about it. We all 
have common human needs and concerns. We all seek happiness and try 
to avoid suffering regardless of our race, religion, sex or social status. 
However, mere maintenance of a diversity of traditions should never jus-
tify the violations of human rights. Thus, discrimination against persons of 
different races, against women, and against weaker sections of society may 
be traditional in some regions, but if they are inconsistent with universally 
recognized human rights, these forms of behavior should change. The uni-
versal principle of the equality of all human beings must take precedence.3
On what should a potential universalism of human rights be
based? In June 1993, during the Human Rights Conference of the
United Nations in Vienna, H.H. the Fourteenth Dalai Lama ex-
plained before a gathering of NGOs that for him, the key to creating
a better and more peaceful world is the development of love and
compassion for others. He stated that “universal responsibility is
                                             
2 For the detailed program of the conference see http://www. con-
gress-on-buddhist-women.org (accessed on August 12, 2009). 
3 Dalai Lama 2008. 
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the best foundation for world peace“.4 Tibetan Buddhism offers a
variety of approaches to conflict resolution and respect for human
rights and women’s rights.
Universal  Responsibi l i ty,  a  Key Notion  
of  Buddhist  Mind Training 
“Universal Responsibility” has come to define the Dalai Lama’s
sense of human interrelatedness and compassion, which goes be-
yond all national borders. He reminds us that we are all members
of a large human family and encourages human beings to develop
a sense of responsibility for each and every member of this com-
munity. This advice is based on a central concept of the Buddhist
mind training in the Mah y na: the “exceptional attitude” (Tib.
lhag bsam). By developing love and compassion, one comes to the
decision to take upon oneself the responsibility to strive for the
well-being of others and relieve their suffering. Thus arises bo-
dhicitta, the aspiration for enlightenment for the benefit of all be-
ings. In Tibetan Buddhism, two methods for developing bodhicitta
are explained. Both are based on “equanimity” (Tib. btang snyoms;
Skr. upek ), an impartial, unwavering attitude that is free from at-
tachment and aversion, and beyond distinctions of friend and en-
emy.5
Equanimity,  Respect  and  
Appreciat ion for  Others 
Equanimity is the sense that all beings are of equal value. This atti-
tude is free of hostility towards others, or strangers, and free from
attachment or fixation based solely on one’s own interests and the
interests of those close to one. Based on the theory of “dependent
origination,” one should consider how dependent human beings
                                             
4 Dalai Lama 1993. 
5 A similar method, closely related to universal responsibility, that is 
taught by all Buddhist traditions, is meditation on the four bound-
less attitudes: equanimity, love, compassion, and joy. Cf. Ngawang 
1995, pp. 78–91. One can use this technique to prevent tendencies to 
violence, as well as to strengthen tolerance, respect, appreciation, 
and sympathy. 
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are on one another and therefore how much one owes to others. In
this way, one develops respect and esteem for them. This is difficult
to practice when others do harm in the world, for example, through
violence and torture. Nevertheless, attempts are made not to give
up even on these people and to make oneself aware that they are
similar to oneself in their desire to gain happiness and avoid suffer-
ing. It is just due to ignorance that they think and act wrongly. This
does not mean that one simply sits back and tolerates their actions.
But one strives to see things from the other’s perspective and tries
not to react with hatred and violence. In a spirit of dialogue, one
recognizes the problem and attempts to respond in an altruistic and
skillful way. The aim is to minimize harm and maximize the benefit
for all parties involved. 
Exchanging Self  and Others 
These abilities can be developed through a meditation method
called “exchanging self and others“. One tries to imagine oneself in
the place of others, and behaves accordingly. This meditation can
be combined with mindfulness of one’s own breathing. With each
inhalation, one imagines breathing in the sufferings of others and
the causes of their suffering. With each exhalation, one imagines
sending them well-being, prosperity, and the benefit of all one’s
positive factors actions. This technique is called “giving and tak-
ing” (Tib. gtong len). Generosity is one of the most important Bud-
dhist virtues. It is not limited to material generosity, but also in-
cludes broadminded thinking, the sharing of knowledge, and per-
sonal social engagement, e.g., working for human rights and
women’s rights.
Tradit ion versus Modernity 
These practices, all based on the traditional doctrinal foundations
of Mah y na Buddhism, are suitable points of entry in dialogue
with Western understandings of human rights. From the perspec-
tive of research on Buddhism, however, it is notable that neither the
term nor the concept of human rights is explicitly found in Bud-
dhist texts. In Asia, the concept is often associated with “moder-
nity” and may be regarded as a “threat to the tradition” from a con-
servative point of view. 
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Nevertheless, according to the website of the United Nations,6
all the countries where Buddhism is widespread have already rati-
fied the most important documents on human rights, such as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979.
Hence, the question of whether human rights are universal is, in
fact, too late. All human beings have these same rights, regardless
of race, origin, social status, gender, or other characteristics, and I
assume that we all want to keep them. These documents are not
much help, however, if their implementation is insufficient or lack-
ing altogether. 
The Tibetan translation of “human rights” in modern Tibetan is
mi’i thob thang. Although the term thob thang here means “right(s),”
it implies something else, namely, a certain social position or privi-
lege that is obtained. As in the rest of the world, in Tibetan society
words such as thob thang ’dra mnyam (“equal rights”) or bud med thob
thang (“women’s rights”) are only used in the secular context, not in
a religious context.
In Tibetan Buddhist institutions, all the leading offices are held
by men. There are no female monastic academic titles equivalent to
geshe (Tib. dge bshes, lit. “friend of virtue, spiritual guide”) or khenpo
(Tib. mkhan po, lit. “teacher, preceptor”), and classes in Buddhist
philosophy even at the Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies
in Sarnath, India, are taught only by monks. In 2005, at a meeting of
the Tibetan Nuns’ Project, twenty novices from eight Tibetan nun-
neries decided to pursue their efforts to follow through with full
ordination. Tibetan Buddhist novice nuns at Jangchub Choeling
Nunnery in Karnataka State, India, were supposed to receive the
same title as monks receive after receiving education and training
for up to 17 years. So far about fourteen nuns successfully com-
pleted their studies in the years 2006 to 2009, but they have not re-
ceived any final academic title yet. Earlier, some high-ranking
monks stated that they would do everything to ensure that the
nuns’ accomplishments were recognized, while others stated that
they will know to avoid them as long as they are alive. More re-
cently, however, there have been allegations that religion and poli-
tics are being mixed and that women who seek full ordination or
                                             
6 http://www.ohchr.org, accessed on November 28, 2008. 
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monastic academic titles are no longer seeking religious goals, but
are after purely secular goals, such as fame and glory, which con-
tradict monastic mores. 
The situation is very different in Korea. There, nuns teach
Buddhism at universities alongside monks and lay scholars. The
statutes of the Jogye Order, the largest Buddhist congregation in
Korea, are supposed to state in a figurative sense that monks may
bow to nuns.7 In contrast, gender distinctions are still found in the
Vietnamese and Chinese traditions, expressed in the different col-
ors of their robes. Changes are rapidly occurring, however. The
Australian Sa gha Council, for example, includes gender equity in
its statutes.
Equal  Opportunit ies and Buddha Nature 
In Tibetan circles, I personally decided only to speak about “equal
opportunities” (Tib. go skabs gcig pa or go skabs ’dra mnyam) and not
about “equal rights” or “equality”. Nobody can blame women for
expecting the same opportunities that men have for following the
spiritual path towards liberation. In the Perfection of Wisdom S tras
(Skr. Prajñ p ramit s tra), a genre of Mah y na Buddhist scriptures,
wisdom is designated the “mother of all Buddhas”. Iconographi-
cally, the female bodhisattva Prajñ p ramit embodies the comple-
tion of highest wisdom and knowledge. Already in early Buddhism,
the Buddha ensured that women can attain enlightenment in the
body of a woman. He taught the same path to awakening for women
and men. The minds of all sentient beings are said to equally possess
Buddha nature, the potential to become a Buddha. In this regard, all
human beings are equal, whether female or male. Buddhists of all
traditions agree that the nature of the mind is the same for all, re-
gardless of race, color, sex, language, religion, political ideolology,
nationality, social origins, property, birth status, or other distinc-
                                             
7 During the 2009 International Conference for Buddhist Sangha Education 
— Exploration on the Education for Contemporary Buddhist Ordained 
Women organized by the Luminary Buddhist Institute, Chia-I Hsien, 
Taiwan, in Taipei, May 30th to 31th of 2009, a leading Korean nun-
scholar explained to me that the statutes rather state that the bhik u s
observe the precepts of bhik us to enable them to take over the same 
offices monks do. This needs further research. 
WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN THE VAJRAY NA TRADITION
201
tions. Sometimes sentient beings are born female and sometimes
male. The concept of evolution from a lower form as a woman to a
higher form as a man does not exist. There is also no guarantee when
one dies as to where one will be reborn. The Tibetan lam rim teach-
ings (“Stages of the Path”) speak of a precious human birth, not of a
precious female birth or a precious male birth. Such a distinction
would be seen as an obstacle on the way to liberation.
In general, religious identity is largely decided by where one is
reborn. For example, one can be born in a “central country” (Tib.
yul dbus; Skr. magadha) where the teachings of the Buddha flourish
or in an isolated, uncultured country where there is no living
dharma tradition. But being born into a religious tradition does not
mean that one is necessarily a religious person or a follower of that
religion. In order to become a Buddhist, one needs to take refuge in
the Buddha, his teachings, and his community.8
Attachment to rigid religious views is considered a danger to
spiritual development, especially for monastics. Attachment to
views is considered a common reason for disputes. At the 10th
Sakyadhita International Conference on Buddhist Women in Mon-
golia (2008), the American nun Karma Lekshe Tsomo said that reli-
gious identity or identification is potentially harmful if it creates at-
tachment or aversion to specific religious traditions, in which case it
becomes a potential source of conflict and violence. Therefore, from
a Buddhist perspective, attachment, aversion, conflict, and violence
are all to be avoided.
Nonviolence and the Universal i ty  
of  Human Rights 
“Nonviolence” (Tib. mi ’tshe ba; Skr. ahi s ) and “dependent origina-
tion” (Tib. rten cing ’brel bar ’byung ba; Skr. prat tyasamutp da) are the
two main pillars of Buddhism. Nonviolence is the basis for the ethics
of love and compassion. It includes not only non-violation, but also
altruism and self-sacrifice. The Dalai Lama defines nonviolence as
the wish that beings be free from suffering and actively take respon-
sibility for the welfare of others. For decades, the Dalai Lama has ad-
vocated the universality of human rights. Considering what has
                                             
8 Tsomo 2008. 
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happened to his people in Tibet, one is surprised that the People’s
Republic of China has ratified the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Not only has China received massive criticism for its lack of
implementation of the Declaration, but China also holds the world
record as the country that carries out the most executions. In Tibet,
arbitrary arrests, mistreatment, and torture are the order of the day.
Women’s Rights Can Not Be Relat iv ized 
If the human rights of a nation or state are violated, it does not nec-
essarily mean that its government or its citizens are always well be-
haved or respectful of human rights. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights seems to function as a kind of legal counterbalance
that enables world citizens to address violations of human rights.
The same goes for the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women. Both, without exception, are violated
in all countries where Buddhism is widespread, even though their
governments have signed onto the Convention. One need only
think of domestic violence or child trafficking in Thailand. There-
fore, particularly at the Fourth World Conference on Women in
Beijing in 1995, the culturally and historically different understand-
ings of women’s rights were fiercely contested. Gender equity is
still not self-evident in the politics, economics, and societies of the
world. This is partly the fault of the world’s religions. For example,
it is known that the Vatican often concurs with Islamic conserva-
tives when it comes to the definition of women’s rights. 
In the fields of political science, philosophy, and sociology, there
are many studies on women’s rights. But there are still very few in
the field of religious studies, including Buddhism. One observes
with concern how religious fundamentalist activities increase
worldwide. Certainly not only religions, but philosophies, ideolo-
gies, and political theories put forth claims to ultimate truth. But
nowhere is the conflict as great as between the advocates of women’s
rights and certain religious traditions. Each tradition has its priorities
concerning human rights, women’s rights, and religious rights.
What can be done when the world’s religious traditions lag behind
in their understandings of human rights and assign women a posi-
tion subordinate to men? Many women are denied equal participa-
tion in religious life, the study and practice of their religion, espe-
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cially when ritual is involved. But to deny women the right to exer-
cise shared responsibility for their religions is archaic.
This problem became particularly significant in the framework
of the Vienna Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against
Women of 1993. Although it should actually be a matter of course,
it was noted that women’s rights are an inalienable and indivisible
aspect of universal human rights, and, in any case, cannot be rela-
tivized with reference to cultural and traditional mores. Acts of vio-
lence against women were explicitly condemned as human rights
violations, including physical and sexual violence in the household
and the family. Until then, women were accorded their “privacy,“9
which according to Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights needs to be protected, together with religious freedom. 
The 2007 International Congress on Buddhist 
Women’s Role in the Sa gha at Hamburg 
University 
It is interesting to observe how Western women react when they
have converted to a religion that has been imported from a foreign
cultural environment and have taken gender equity for granted,
but slowly note that theory and practice differ from each other, for
example, in Buddhism. The International Congress on Buddhist
Women’s Role in the Sa gha (“Order”) at the University of Ham-
burg in 2007 was concerned with the full ordination of nuns (Skr.
bhik u ). This level of ordination has only survived in some coun-
tries, such as Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam, but not in the Therav da
and Tibetan traditions. In a world that aims for gender equity,
Buddhism is compromised if it does not take a clear and positive
position on this issue. During the Congress, the Dalai Lama
“outed” himself as a feminist, who has advocated for the equality
of women since the 1960s. He made clear that he supports the re-
vival of the full ordination for women as bhik u s, but cannot move
forward alone, without a consensus among the majority of the
monks. The Tibetan Prime Minister, Samdhong Rinpoche, who is
also a monk, has said that all previously proposed solutions by
competent bodies have been rejected.
                                             
9 Cf. Klingebiel 1995. 
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Buddhist  Feminism 
Today, the Buddhist traditions have no choice but to acknowledge
that the social roles of women have changed over millennia. It is not
acceptable that in the 21st century Buddhism fails to live up to what
the Buddha himself allowed a long time ago. But that is exactly what
has happened. Some monks argue that the Buddha did not want an
order of nuns and only agreed because his favorite disciple nanda
pushed him to establish it. Another claim is that Asian women are
not interested in equity and that even the Dalai Lama only advocates
it because some Western feminists have pressed him on the issue.
Already during the First Council held shortly after the death of the
Buddha, nanda was criticized because he had favored the found-
ing of the order of nuns. The effects of this criticism have been
handed down until today.
However, senior representatives of the Buddhist traditions do
not deny that conflicts have arisen between ancient traditions and
lived secular conventions. The Buddha always paid attention to
prevailing social views. During the Hamburg Congress, on a num-
ber of occasions, people asked what the Buddha would say about
the role of women if he were interviewed today. The answer is
clear. Already around 2500 years ago, the Buddha declined to sup-
port the caste system in India. Women belonged to all castes, in
which they always took a back seat. Although the Buddha was not
explicitly a social reformer, he certainly did not want to create two
new castes of women and men. Discrimination is an issue for those
who consciously experience it and it always entails suffering. Who-
ever causes suffering to others is no longer a follower of the Bud-
dhist principle of nonviolence. 
Buddhism is a religion that has canonical support for equality
between women and men, so gender equity is in the spirit of the
original teachings of the founder. At the time of the Buddha, the so-
cial freedom of women was very limited. Compared with men,
they were considered to be of minor value, and both physically and
socially inferior. Their purported inferiority was increasingly in-
terpreted as a spiritual inferiority. Speculation about the limitations
of female nature arose. The problem lies not in the doctrinal basis of
Buddhism, but with those who are responsible for its practice. They
WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN THE VAJRAY NA TRADITION
205
have the obligation to apply the doctrine as it was intended, even if
that means challenging the rigidities of established traditions.10 Ul-
timately it is a matter of going back to the roots, the earliest sources,
and reinterpreting the texts in accordance with contemporary
needs. A clarification would suffice, explaining how certain state-
ments of the Buddha are to be understood in specific contexts. In
keeping with the key concept of personal responsibility that is
stressed in Buddhism, it is essential to consider the sources in their
historical, social, cultural, and political contexts. A good approach
is offered by Alan Sponberg in his essay “The Female in Early Bud-
dhism“.11
Statements of  the Buddha on Women
and Their  Potent ia l  for  Enl ightenment 
Sponberg suggests that the attempt to reconcile the various Bud-
dhist sources with each other be abandoned, along with any at-
tempt to justify contradictory and ambiguous statements of the
Buddha. Instead, he emphasizes the importance of understanding
the social and intellectual dynamics of the early Buddhist com-
munity. For him, the diversity of sources reflect diverse attitudes
towards women and the feminine. The early canonical literature
includes some statements about women attributed to the Buddha,
but it is difficult to determine which statements actually originate
from him. 
It is important, nevertheless, that the Buddha is credited with
clearly acknowledging women’s potential for enlightenment, in the
body of a woman, and taught both women and men, the same path
to liberation. Gender and caste are no criteria. Already at the time of
the Buddha, women had proved that they are equally capable of
liberation as men. Buddhist texts tell of many female arhats (fully
liberated beings). The Buddha praised laywomen and nuns as out-
standing teachers and as highly realized beings. But it soon became
necessary to regulate the rapid development of the order of nuns
according to prevailing social standards and to legalize it through
institutional structures. 
                                             
10 Bodhi 2007.
11 Sponberg 1992. 
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Loss of  Author i ty on the Part  of  the Order  
of  Nuns by Inst i tut ional  Suborder 
Women in ancient India lived under the protection of their father,
brother, or son. Accordingly, the order of nuns was finally put un-
der the “protection” of the order of monks. Sponberg suggests that
the often-quoted passage on Mah praj pat , the first woman who
asked the Buddha to admit her to the order and who founded the
order of nuns, not be taken literally, as a historic source, but be un-
derstood as a symbolic and mythical summary of an ongoing proc-
ess. To become a nun, Mah praj pat had to accept eight difficult
rules. One of them says that a bhik u , even if already ordained one
hundred years, must bow to a bhik u, even if he has been fully or-
dained only a day. The establishment of an independent order of
nuns had come under criticism and consequently was brought un-
der the control of the order of monks. As a consequence, the order
of the nuns lost prestige and material support. Soon it was deemed
more meritorious to donate to monks than to nuns. In vain, Ma-
h praj pat asked the Buddha’s permission for monks and nuns to
render mutual respect to each other. In 2008, during the Annual
Meeting of the American Academy of Religion in Chicago, Janet
Gyatso, a Tibetologist at Harvard, made it clear that Mah praj -
pat ’s attempts to ensure gender equity in the sa gha demonstrate
that feminist approaches are already evident in the Buddhist
canon, not an innovation by Western women. 
Can Women Become Buddhas? 
Women were increasingly seen as a threat to male celibacy. But in-
stead of identifying the source of the problem as the male renunci-
ants themselves, responsibility was projected onto women. This
misogyny is so evident in the tradition that it has been more care-
fully scrutinized than the androcentric view that led to the institu-
tionalized subordination and devaluation of women in the first
place. Sometime in the first century CE, a dispute erupted as to
whether women were equally capable as men in the achievement
of “buddhahood”. All Buddhist schools concurred that women
were not. According to the Therav da school, although women can
obtain arhatship, the state of a Buddha like kyamuni can only be
attained in the body of a man. And according to some Mah y na
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sources, women, at the time of attaining “buddhahood”, by virtue
of their achievement, must transform themselves into a man.12
Only from the 5th/6th century onwards, in Vajray na literature, is
it explicitly stated that women can achieve the full enlightenment
of a Buddha in the body of a woman. This capability is very clearly
elucidated in the T r -tantra, for instance. The tantric teachings de-
rive from both the early explication of the Buddha’s teachings,
which portray women and men equally travelling the path to lib-
eration, as well as on the Perfection of Wisdom S tras.
Internat ional  Pressure is  Increasing 
In his essay “The Tyranny of Transcendence: Uses and Abuses in the
Development of the Will,” the Australian Therav da monk Sujato
points out that “equality for women” usually means that women
should have equal pay or the right to vote.13 People are happy when
they are given equal and fair treatment. But in a religious context,
women meet strong resistance when they demand equal rights.
Some Buddhist teachers advise them to be content and let go of such
“worldly” concerns. One should not covet; therefore, one should not
talk about obtaining rights. Emptiness and nirv a (P. nibb na) are
beyond all these considerations. Nuns and monks have abandoned
the worldly life and therefore should not be attached to property, ti-
tles, and entitlements. Such advice is egotistical and, in certain con-
texts, may even create and justify totalitarianism. 
Allison Goodwin (2007) demonstrates parallels between the ra-
cial segregation of blacks and whites, and the separation of women
and men.14 She reports from her own experience that in monaster-
ies in Taiwan, she always had to sit behind men and was only al-
lowed to speak after them. Based on psychological and social sci-
ence research, she documented the impact that gender discrimina-
tion has on women’s self-esteem. The effects are evident when
women explicitly or implicitly are regarded as inferior and denied
full equality, including the right to full ordination. The view that
women are weak and karmically inferior to men is current not only
in Taiwan, but throughout the Buddhist world. 
                                             
12 Paul 1979. 
13 Sujato 2008. 
14 Cf. the film: “A Class Divided” (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ 
pages/frontline/shows/divided/), accessed November 28th, 2008. 
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Buddhist practitioners typically meditate extensively. During
intensive practice sessions, their teachers advise them not to think
and not to study. This can lead to the perception that practitioners
in the Buddhist community increasingly escape from ordinary re-
sponsibilities and almost maintain a cult of servility. Therefore, it is
important to understand that there is no vow of obedience in Bud-
dhism. This principle cannot be inferred even from the eight diffi-
cult rules for nuns. Sujato encourages women to take responsibility
for themselves and for the teachings of the Buddha by actively op-
posing attempts to subordinate women, even if it becomes neces-
sary to shift convent.
The Dalai Lama calls upon Buddhists to support human rights
and women’s rights. In a message to the 4th Sakyadhita Conference
in Ladakh 1995, he declared:
Our rich diversity of cultures and traditions should help to strengthen 
fundamental human rights in all communities. Mere tradition can never 
justify violations of human rights. Thus, discrimination against persons of 
a different race, against women, and against weaker sections of society 
may be traditional in some places, but because they are inconsistent with 
universally recognized human rights, these forms of behaviour should 
change. The universal principle of the equality of all human beings must 
take precedence. 15
A comparison with the Dalai Lama’s statement given above16
shows that he has not changed his mind on this essential point.
But it is still made very clear that human rights and women’s
rights must be universal and should go beyond cultural and reli-
gious barriers.
Pract ical  Implementat ion on a Pol i t ical
Level  and Impetus by Buddhism 
If one accepts that human rights are universal, these rights must also
be valid in the field of religion.17 Here I would like to stress that
                                             
15 Dalai Lama 1995, cited by Goodwin 2007. 
16 See p. 196 above. 
17 Cf. the recent statement by ‘The Elders’ that “the justification of dis-
crimination against women and girls on grounds of religion or tradi-
tion, as if it were prescribed by a higher authority, is unacceptable”; 
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women’s rights are not a matter of ensuring the protection of a mi-
nority, but of protecting the rights of 51% of the world’s population.
Now is the time for the world’s religions to recognize that their tradi-
tions have contributed to and at least partially continue to ensure
that women are disadvantaged in religions and in human society.
For example, Bhikkhuni Dhammananda (formerly Chatsumarn
Kabilsingh, a professor of philosophy at Thammasat University in
Bangkok), contends that Buddhist attitudes support girl trafficking
and prostitution in Thailand.18
Buddhism accepts that all suffering originates in the mind. Ac-
cordingly, the solution to gender inequities can just come from
within. Whether we regard women and men as equals is a factor of
our own thinking and religions still have an important influence on
peoples’ thinking. Were the world’s religions to offer women equal
opportunities in their institutions and provide them with equal re-
sponsibilities, this would go a long way in signalling to society that
the subordination of women is no longer acceptable and would
contribute to a rethinking of outmoded attitudes. Buddhist so-
cieties can contribute significantly to this rethinking.
On a political level, governments can organizationally include
religious communities, but cannot dictate their contents. On the
other hand, it is the duty of the state to ensure human rights for all
its citizens. The observance of human rights cannot and should not
be enforced with violence, but the control and monitoring of the
observance of human rights statutes should not be left solely to the
United Nations and human rights organizations. Most impor-
tantly, it should not spare religious institutions. Even if the claim to
universal acceptance of human rights still does not correspond to
social realities, this must not lead to their relativization, making out
that human rights violations are justifiable due to cultural differ-
ences or religious preferences. 
Furthermore, it is important to understand how religious
thought and practice influence cultural activities and social devel-
opments in the course of history, and how social and historical de-
velopments influence religious thought and practice. On the one
                                             
online resource: http://www.theelders.org/media/mediareleases/ 
religious-and-traditional-practices-discriminate-against-women-and-
girls, July 2nd, 2009, accessed August 13th, 2009. 
18 Tomalin 2006. 
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hand, religious practices inevitably change in new cultural con-
texts, which is a sign of the vitality and responsiveness of a tradi-
tion. This does not necessarily challenge the authenticity of the doc-
trine. On the other hand, uncritical acculturation of a tradition may
transform it into something entirely different, indeed compromis-
ing its authenticity. This, of course, raises questions about how au-
thenticity can be gauged, whether tradition is intrinsically valuable,
and what is at stake in preserving tradition. For example, some
Buddhist teachers in the West are teaching “feelgood Buddhism,”
minus any mention of ethics, death, rebirth, discipline, control of
the mind, etc. On the other hand, the Buddhist orthodoxy of some
schools renders them almost unapproachable and irrelevant, for
example, on gender issues.19
Comparative cultural, historical and religious scientific con-
siderations can help to strengthen this knowledge and build mu-
tual understanding between East and West. Active dialogue be-
tween representatives from the fields of science and religion on
human rights and women’s rights in world religions and dialogical
religious education in schools are needed. In the long term, on both
the local and global levels, this can lead to a rethinking and consis-
tent observation of human rights. Buddhism has proved to be
flexible and useful in linking ideas in interfaith dialogue. It offers a
variety of doctrinal foundations to approach the Western un-
derstanding of human rights and, in many respects, could have a
stimulating effect.
                                             
19 Partly based on a personal communication with Ven. Karma Lekshe 
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This index is intended to be used as a glossary as well. The main en-
tries are arranged according to English terminology. Corresponding
terms in Chinese (Chin.), P li (P.), Sanskrit (Skr.), Thai (Th.), and Ti-
betan (Tib.) occurring in the texts are added as well. They are listed
in the order of the Latin alphabet together with a reference to the
main entry of the index. This does not apply to the words
dharma/dhamma, karma/kamma, nirv a/n bb na and s tra/sutta which
are used interchangeably with their Anglicized equivalents. 
Abhidharma (Skr.) 115, 177 
abolish Buddhism (Chin. fei fo) 130 
ahi s  (P.) – see nonviolence 
altruism 202 
Ambedkar, Bhimrao Ramji (1891–
1956) 54 
Amdo (Tibet) 181 
Amit bha (Skr.) 121, 142 
Amnesty International 37, 179 
an tma (Skr.) – see no-self 
anatta (P.) – see no-self 
arahant (P.) – see fully awakened one
arhat, arhatship (Skr.) – see fully awak-
ened one 
ar pa–dh tu (P.) – see formless realm 
Asian values 59, 97–98 
A oka (304–232 BCE) 47, 58 
aspiration for enlightenment for the be-
nefit of all beings (Skr. bodhicitta) 197 
Association
Association for the Advancement 
of Buddhism (Chin. Fojiao 
xiejin hui) 141 
Chinese Buddhist Federation As-
sociation (Chin. Zhonghua fo-
jiao zonghui) 141 
Sa gha Education Association 
(Chin. Seng[qie] jiaoyu hui) 
138n, 140 
attachment (Skr., P. up d na) 99, 102, 
107, 197–201 
Aung San Suu Kyi (born 1945) 51, 57n, 
95
Australian Sa gha Council 200
autonomy (Tib. rang skyong) 170 
Avalokite vara (Skr.; Chin. Guanyin) 
121
aversion (P. dosa) 83, 101, 197, 201 
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Beijing 133, 137n, 179, 184, 202 
Bhutan 180, 182 
bhikkhu (P.) – see full ordination 
bhikkhun  (P.) – see full ordination 
bhik u (Skr.) – see full ordination 
bhik u  (Skr.) – see full ordination 
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bodhicitta (Skr.) – see aspiration for  
enlightenment 
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bodhisattva (Skr.) – see Buddha-to-be 
bodhisattva of Humanity (Chin. renjian
pusa) 144 
body of reality (Skr. dharmak ya) 121 
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Boyu Hermitage (Chin. Boyu an) 146 
btang snyoms (Tib.) – see equanimity 
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P. bodhisatta) 16, 70, 109, 114, 116,  
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guangshan) 156n 
Buddha nature 116, 119, 123, 201 
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Buddhism
Great Vehicle (Skr. mah y na) 12, 
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144, 174, 176–177, 197–198, 
200, 207  
Small Vehicle (Skr. h nay na) 113 
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Vajray na (Skr.) 12, 17, 18, 195, 207
Buddhism for Human Life (Chin. ren-
sheng fojiao) 142–144  
Buddhist learning (Chin. foxue)
136–137, 147 
Buddhist monarchy 48 
Buddhist seminary (Chin. foxue yuan)
139
Buntham Phunsap 86–88
Burma 9–12, 59, 97, 148 
caste 53–54, 115, 204–205 
causal theory of stimulus and re-
sponse (Chin. ganying) 150 
celibacy 206 
central country (Skr. magadha; Tib. yul
dbus) 201 
Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) 
18, 180–191 
chab srid thob thang (Tib.) – see rights, 
political
child trafficking 202 
China 9, 11, 16-17, 34, 59, 113–156, 161, 
171–174, 183–190, 202 
Communist China – see People’s 
Republic of China 
Modern China 130, 134-135, 140, 
143, 151, 156 
“New China” 135–137, 142 
People’s Republic of China 17, 
43n, 132, 156n, 172, 179, 202 
Republic of China 126, 141, 156n – 
see also: Taiwan: 
Chinese Cultural Revolution (Chin. 
Wenhua da geming) 131, 135, 156 
chos (Tib.) see dharma
chos dang ’jig rten kyi thob thang (Tib.) – 
see rights, spiritual and temporal 
chos lugs ris med (Tib.) – see impartial-
ity towards the religious tradi-
tions
chujia (Chin.) – see full ordination 
Christianity 28–29, 35, 93, 106–110, 132, 
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155
yixin nianfo (Chin.) – see singleminded 
recollection of the Buddha 
Yuan Shikai (1859–1916) 126 
Yunmen Monastery (Chin. Yunmen 
si) 148, 150 
Yunnan Province 118, 146–147, 149 
Yunqi Monastery (Chin. Yunqi si) 147 
Yunqi Zhuhong (1535–1615) 147, 153 
Zhang Taiyan (1868–1936) 136–137 
Zhang Zhidong (1837–1909) 131, 140 
Zhejiang Province 126n, 133–134, 137, 
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zhi bde (Tib.) – see peace 
zhong (Chin.) – see patriotism 
Zibo Zhenke (1543–1603) 153 
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